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ABSTRACT

The Final Solution was largely accomplished in eleven months; its executors, the
Nazi SS, faced the constant problem that as killing and plunder escalated so did internal
competition and corruption; and the SS deliberately cultivated an intensely competitive
and polycratic organizational culture that fit the Nazi worldview of life-as-struggle. By
tying these three observations together—that the Final Solution was punctuated, entropic,
and polycratic—the problem arises: How did SS organizational communications manage,
just barely long enough, to create a temporary social reality that regulated the internal
contradictions of its genocidal project and fragmented bureaucracy? This study contends
that through its organizational and technical communication—the outwardly normal and
communally validated regime of formatted documents, official stationery, preprinted
forms, filing codes, organizational nomenclature, and bureaucratic catchphrases—
competing SS personnel found a common frame of reference to socially construct rules
for temporary cooperation. Thus, their documents became boundary objects (Star &
Griesemer, 1989; Wilson & Herndl, 2007) which bridged competing organizational
interests within the rhetorical community (Miller, 1994) of desk-murderers. To explore
this thesis an evidentiary sample of surviving documents is selected from a single but
representative SS bureau, the Security Police (Sipo) Technical Matters Group that
administered the mobile gas van program. The documents are analyzed according to
Longo‘s (1998) cultural research methodology for technical writing in which texts are
examined in their historical and cultural contexts and then analyzed as discourse,
followed by an interrogation of how the texts have been ordered by their analysts for
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purposes of study and the analysts‘ relationships to the text. The organization of this
project follows this methodology as Chapter 1 introduces the problem; Chapter 2
provides an historical narrative of the gas van program and its antecedents; Chapter 3
reviews the integrative aspects of the Group members‘ national and institutional cultures,
and the differentiating aspects of their organizational culture and its various subcultures;
Chapter 4 describes the biographies and postwar testimonies of the Group‘s principal
actors; Chapter 5 introduces and describes the documents themselves; Chapter 6 offers an
analysis, grounded in Miller‘s (1994) concept of the rhetorical community, of the
documents‘ textual and visual rhetorics; Chapter 7 provides a discourse analysis of Group
members‘ use of linguistic resources; Chapter 8 explores various postwar orderings of the
lengthiest and most notorious of the gas van texts, prior to and including Katz‘s (1992a)
introduction of the document into the technical communication literature; Chapter 9
interrogates how subsequent analysts within the discipline have ordered the text and what
this may reveal about their relationships to it; and Chapter 10 elaborates possible
implications for communication ethics. The research problem is answered with the claim
that, rather than understanding the Final Solution only as the operation in extremis of
Weberian bureaucratic rationality, the desk-murderers may be viewed as a rhetorical
community that held chaos at bay through boundary objects—their documents—that
deployed metaphors, narratives, and genres onto which competing interests could project
their own interpretations while constructing temporary spaces of cooperation.
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and to the Six Million and their unfathomable loss
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CHAPTER 1
CAN GENOCIDE BE REGULATED?

An Ontological Shift
In popular imagination and cultural memory the potent phrases ―Final Solution‖
and ―Six Million‖ impart to the genocide a monolithic quality, a single all-encompassing
crime perpetrated against a symbolically composite victim. And this tendency to deal
with the unfathomable enormity of the Holocaust by reducing it to a singular act has
important consequences for how the genocide is understood. Some ascribe ―the
Holocaust‖ to mystery and give it the singular quality of a radical and inexplicable (see
Bauer, 1990) disjuncture in history (e.g., Fackenheim, interview with Rosenbaum, 1998,
p. xvi; Wiesel, 1989, 2006). A variant on this theme is the view that the Holocaust is an
aberration in the otherwise generally upward progress of Western civilization (e.g.,
Moore, 2005). Others believe ―No Hitler, No Holocaust‖ (Himmelfarb, 1984) and
emphasize the driving force of a singular will (e.g., Fleming, 1984)—while in stark
contrast, Goldhagen (1996) controversially argued that a desire to eliminate the Jews was
a ―monolithic‖ German cultural axiom that the dictator merely catalyzed. Still others see
in ―the Holocaust‖ not a singular mystery but a singular continuity—whether a tragic
culmination of great social forces rooted in the sweep of European history, as analysts
(e.g., Freud, 1939; Lyotard, 1990; Sartre, 1948; Steiner, 1971) and historians (e.g., CohnSherbok, 2002; Fischer, 1998; Mosse, 1978) of anti-Semitism point out, or the horrific
denouement to generations of lived experience, a reality lived by the actual Jewish
victims and by their descendants in the Jewish Diaspora of today. All of these
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perspectives offer their own contributions to our attempts at understanding the genocide.
For they rightly draw our attention to what was radical and unprecedented about the Final
Solution; or to the dynamics of a totalitarian dictatorship; or to the interplay between
cultural attitudes and individual actions; or how a potential for genocide was latent in
European anti-Semitism; or how any history of the Shoah that ignores the victims‘
experience is inadequate and incomplete.
Yet to explore the organizational and technical communication of the Final
Solution, as this study endeavors to do, we must begin by limning the consequences of
another reductionist ontology that is prevalent in the scholarly study of organizations—
and then suggesting the possibilities opened by two alternatives to that ontology.
Since the discipline of ―management science‖ emerged a century ago, scholars in
organization studies have historically hewed to a functionalist or positivist ontology
(Corman, 2005). In this view, ―organizations‖ are ontologically distinct entities whose
behaviors are driven not by individual mindsets but by the constant quest to maximize
efficiency and productivity. Thus, from observations of organizational behaviors can
causal theories be derived and predictions made ―with the consciousness of the actors
being superfluous‖ since decision-makers are impelled ―to choose the option that best fits
the situation and produces the best outcomes‖ (Donaldson, 2003, pp. 44-45). This way of
thinking is, with respect to the Final Solution, neatly expressed by what Bauman (1989)
called the ―bureaucratic definition of the Holocaust‖ when he contended that ―except for
the moral repulsiveness of its goal . . . the activity did not differ in any formal sense . . .
from all other organized activities designed, monitored and supervised by ‗ordinary‘
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administrative and economic sections‖ (p. 14). As such, the Final Solution ―fits well the
sober description of modern administration offered by Max Weber,‖ that efficiency and
productivity are ―raised to the optimum point‖ by an objective ―discharge of business
according to calculable rules and without regard for persons‖ (p. 14).
Since Bauman (1989) first advanced his thesis some twenty years ago, his insight
has made a signal contribution to Holocaust studies. First, in addition to centuries of
religious anti-Semitism, the modern development in Western culture of a capacity for
bureaucratic and technological organization must likewise be regarded as a necessary
condition for the Final Solution. Second, recognition that the Final Solution was a latent
potentiality of Western bureaucratic and technological culture—indeed, the reverse side
of a coin whose more familiar face is the ―progress‖ we so often admire—is a profoundly
important ethical insight. Yet no thesis is final. Bauer (2001) cogently pointed out that
Bauman constructed an ontologically prior entity called ―modernity‖ as the mainspring of
the Final Solution, leaving little room for individual actors and their motivations. Here
again we see—in reference to the Holocaust—the same ontological conversation found in
organization studies between functionalist scholars who give primacy to the organization
and other scholars who give primacy to organizational actors.
What, then, if we take the latter perspective? What if we look at the Final Solution
with a different ontology, an alternative way of seeing the world? What if we hold up a
different lens, one which looks with incredulity at grand narratives that—for all their
value to our understanding of the genocide—would ultimately reduce the Holocaust to
the monolithic singularities described above? And more specifically, what if we leave

3

behind the notion there are autonomous entities called ―organizations‖ and instead see
them as temporary clusters of consensus—fitfully negotiated and constructed through
members‘ communicative interactions—in the ongoing contest between larger historical,
cultural, and social discourses? Indeed, what if we see the individuals themselves—even
the bureaucratic murderers of the Nazi SS—not as fully integrated sites of intentionality
but, instead, as sites of contestation between multiple voices? What insights might this
shift of perspective impart to our understanding of the Holocaust and, in particular, the
organizational and technical communication of the Final Solution?
Such an ontological shift opens the way, I believe, to new perspectives that can
complement and expand our understandings of the genocide. We will better appreciate,
for example, how the Nazi SS—the organization with primary responsibility to execute
the Final Solution—was a fragmented hothouse of internal competition among highly
personalized fiefdoms and overlapping power bases ―that remained unresolved from the
beginning‖ (Langerbein, 2004, p. 41), inhabited by men schooled in Nazi doctrine ―to be
a fighter on principle, a fighter for fighting‘s sake‖ (Buchheim, 1965/1968, p. 322). We
will see how the goal of a rationally controlled genocide was constantly undermined by
an inherent contradiction within the project itself, as the SS was ―confronted with an
ongoing and intractable issue: How to stem wanton murder in an organization set up for
mass murder; how to stem widespread corruption in an organization set up for large-scale
looting?‖ (Friedländer, 2007, p. 544) And we will see, as Browning (1998) averred, that
the SS genocidal project was ―not a gradual or incremental program stretched over a long
period of time but a veritable blitzkrieg, a massive offensive requiring the mobilization of
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large numbers of shock troops‖ who then executed ―a short, intensive wave of murder‖
that was largely accomplished in eleven months (p. xv).
Polycratic, entropic, punctuated. These adjectives are not typically used to
describe the Final Solution. Many valuable studies (e.g., Allen, 2002; Aly, 2002/1991;
Hilberg, 2003; Orth, 1998; Segev, 1987; Westermann, 2005; Wildt, 2003) have looked at
the machinery of destruction from a functionalist ontology (as organization studies
scholars define functionalism) which emphasizes the shared organizational values of SS
members. But a shift in perspective—one that allows us to see the polycratic, entropic,
and punctuated qualities of the genocidal program—permits us to appreciate how two
other ontologies within organization studies, the interpretive and the postmodern, can add
to our understanding. The interpretive view (e.g., Allen, 2005; Heracleous, 2006) regards
organizations as ―social realities . . . constructed by the actors in those situations, acting
together‖ (Hatch & Yanow, 2003, p. 69). And postmodern scholars (e.g., Boje, Gephardt
& Thatchenkery, 1998; Burrell, 1988; Chia, 2003; Cooper, 1989; Cooper & Burrell,
1988; Gergen & Thatchenkery, 2006; Kilduff & Mehra, 1997; McKinlay & Starkey,
1998; Taylor, 2005) in organization studies deny Schein‘s (1992) classic formulation that
organizations are ―a pattern of shared basic assumptions‖ (p. 12), rejecting the metaphor
of organizations as ―containers of tasks, technologies, and job functions‖ in which
―communication is the way to attain message fidelity [and] organization is the means of
attaining productivity and efficiency‖ (Putnam, Phillips & Chapman, 1996, p. 395).
Instead they see organizations as fragmented and decentered constellations of temporary
consensus embedded in larger historical, cultural and social discourses, sites where
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knowledge is ambiguous and power is contested via multiple discourses.
A functionalist approach would see Nazi SS organizational and technical
communication as instruments for optimizing the organization‘s awful purpose. And
because functionalists ―assume that organizational communication is encapsulated within
the confines of an ontologically prior entity, the organization,‖ then ―communication so
situated is of course influenced if not determined by its pre-established [organizational]
wrapper‖ (McPhee and Poole, 2001, p. 503). But through an interpretive approach we can
see how communication was not just one of many things that the SS ―did‖ but was
constitutive of the organization itself, as its members negotiated and constructed a sense
of themselves. And through a postmodern approach we can grasp how the social spaces
SS members negotiated through their organizational and technical communications were
constantly in flux, riven by contests among multiple voices over power and knowledge.
In the end, as I will argue, we will see how Nazi SS communications—and in
particular, their everyday documents—functioned as what Star and Griesemer (1989)
called ―boundary objects‖ that span the interstices of organizations because they are
―both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties
employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites‖ (p. 393).
As such, these objects (in the Star and Griesemer study, the objects were geographical
maps, specimen collections, and museum displays) come ―to form a common boundary
between the worlds [of project participants] by inhabiting them both simultaneously‖ (p.
412). Wilson and Herndl (2007) recently extended the concept to demonstrate how a
boundary object (in their case, a project organization chart) can work rhetorically to
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negotiate differences when parties are driven by ―integrative exigence‖ to form a ―trading
zone‖ or ―temporary space of cooperation and exchange between different disciplines or
subdisciplines‖ (p. 132, citing Galison, 1997).
Similarly, this study will demonstrate how everyday documents of the Nazi SS
functioned as boundary objects in holding together a fragmented bureaucracy just barely
long enough to execute its genocidal blitzkrieg. As an alternative to the functionalist view
that organizational communications are primarily instrumental, I will show how the texts‘
rhetorical plasticity permitted competing SS interests to map their own interpretations
onto the documents, while at the same time marshaling a common fund of rhetorical
resources by which these interests—under the goad of an integrative exigence—
negotiated a temporary space of cooperation. This thesis is keeping with, and indeed
illustrates the value of, the interpretive and postmodern perspectives in organization
studies which, respectively, hold that communication is constitutive of organization and
that organizations are sites of contestation and consensus between multiple discourses.

Revisiting the Final Solution
The historiographical implications of an interpretive and postmodern view of the
organizational challenge faced by the Nazi SS—that is, a view that takes into account the
polycratic, entropic, and punctuated qualities of its genocidal project—are dramatically
suggested by the testimony of Franz Stangl, the former commandant of Treblinka. In a
1971 prison interview he could still recount in vivid detail his first sight of the death
camp in the late summer of 1942:
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I drove there, with an SS driver. . . . We could smell it kilometers away. The road
ran alongside the railway. When we were about fifteen, twenty minutes‘ drive
from Treblinka we began to see corpses by the [railway] line, first just two or
three, then more, and as we drove into the Treblinka station, there were what
looked like hundreds of them—just lying there—they‘d obviously been there for
days, in the heat. In the station was a train full of Jews, some dead, some still
alive—just lying there—they‘d obviously been there for days. . . . When I entered
the camp and got out of the car on the square I stepped knee-deep into money; I
didn‘t know which way to turn, where to go. I waded in notes, currency, precious
stones, jewelry, clothes. . . . The smell was indescribable; the hundreds, no,
thousands of bodies everywhere, decomposing, putrefying. Across the square, in
the woods, just a few hundred yards away on the other side of the barbed-wire
fence and all around the perimeter of the camp, there were tents and open fires
with groups of Ukrainian guards and girls—whores, I found out later, from all
over the countryside—weaving drunk, dancing, singing, playing music. (Sereny,
1974, p. 157)

Stangl‘s account beggars belief, conjuring a scene so fantastic as to recall the fevered
hellscapes of Heironymous Bosch rather than anything human. Treblinka opened its gates
July 22, 1942, and gassed its first victims the next day; within five weeks the operation
had murdered some 312,000 Jews (Friedländer, 2007, p. 357) and deteriorated into the
surreal tableau described by Stangl. Another SS officer who arrived about the same time
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corroborated the scene, adding that SS guards stood on nearby rooftops and shot
indiscriminately into arriving transports of Jewish victims in an improvised attempt at
crowd control. But the shooting elicited such screams and cries that the SS hastily
assembled a small orchestra in hopes of drowning out the noise and calming the new
arrivals (Evans, 2009, p. 290). At least in its opening phase, if the Nazis‘ own accounts
are to be believed, the lethal chaos of Treblinka belied Bauman‘s (1989) ―bureaucratic
definition of the Holocaust‖ (p. 14) in which

mass murder on an unprecedented scale depended on the availability of welldeveloped and firmly entrenched skills and habits of meticulous and precise
division of labor, of maintaining a smooth flow of command and information, or
of impersonal, well-synchronized coordination of autonomous yet complementary
actions: on those skills and habits, in short, which best grow and thrive in the
atmosphere of the office. (p. 15)

If we write a historical interpretation of the Final Solution that eschews a functionalist
ontology and instead emphasizes the polycratic, entropic, and punctuated aspects of the
genocide—that is, if we choose to proceed not from an assumption that organizations
such as the SS and the Nazi state and party are entities with autonomous existences, but
that organizations must be constantly negotiated and constructed by their members—then
we are compelled to address the question: How did the genocide progress from its initial
disorganization to its later organization? After all, on second thought would it not be

9

more reasonable to expect that, in an operation as massively unprecedented as the
Vernichtunglager, rapid deterioration and degeneracy should have been the norm?
Treblinka ―processed‖ 312,000 victims in its first five weeks; Belzec 75,000 in four
weeks; Sobibor 100,000 in three months; Chelmno 97,000 in six months (Friedlander,
2007, pp. 357, 363). Try to imagine the unimaginable: packed trains arriving daily,
hundreds or thousands gassed within hours of debarkation, heaping mountains of
decaying corpses, bulging warehouses of ownerless valuables, workers prying gold
fillings from dead teeth, captors increasingly desensitized to any restraints. Nothing like
this had been attempted in human history. Even the perpetrators lacked the cognitive
apparatus to assimilate such a fantasy world. ―Oh God, the smell. It was everywhere,‖
Stangl later recalled of a visit to Belzec in spring 1942, ―the pits . . . full, they were full. I
can‘t tell you; not hundreds, thousands, thousands of corpses.‖ His lasting impression
was the sight of a mass-burial pit filled so far above its capacity that ―putrefaction had
progressed too fast, so that the liquid underneath had pushed the bodies on top up and
over and the corpses had rolled down the hill‖ (Sereny, 1974, p. 111).
Belzec began receiving victims March 17, 1942, using gas chambers of crude
wooden construction that ―were constantly breaking down, leaving deportees waiting for
days without food and water,‖ and forcing the commandant to shut down the operation
during June and July while new concrete gas chambers were built (Evans, 2009, p. 286).
After Sobibor commenced killing operations in mid-May 1942 its mass graves, like those
at Belzec, soon overflowed; when the putrefaction also entered the water table and began
to contaminate the camp water supply the pits had to be excavated with a bulldozer (p.
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287). The Sobibor gas chambers were shut down more than two months for
reconstruction and expansion (Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p. 222). Treblinka started
gassings July 23, 1942, but the camp was even more inefficient than its predecessors as
―gas chambers frequently broke down, sometimes when the victims were already inside,
where they were forced to wait for hours until repairs were completed‖ and the inability
to dig new burial pits fast enough meant ―soon there were unburied bodies everywhere‖
(Evans, 2009, p. 291). To deal with the numbers, guards at times reverted to shooting
Jews on arrival rather than gassing them. Lack of housing for camp guards forced them to
pitch tents outside the fence, where they drank through the night with local prostitutes.
Likewise, the system of transports was often conducted through inefficient trial
and error. Many Jewish survivors tell stories of lengthy and circuitous train journeys to
the camps and of being made to wait for days at a time along the way. As late as 1943 the
SS was still experimenting with transport procedures—in June that year, victims in one
transport were stripped naked prior to departure in hopes of preventing escapes en route;
half of the fifty freight cars arrived without a single passenger left alive (Evans, 2009, p.
288). From the German point of view it was far more efficient for the victims to walk the
last mile themselves. Yet the influx of victims was at times so great, cattle cars packed
with Jews were left standing for hours or days on a siding until the victims—those who
had not died in the interim—could be processed. And the death camps themselves were
ad hoc responses to the mounting disarray of the genocide‘s first wave, what Desbois
(2008) has evocatively called ―The Holocaust by Bullets‖ in which the ranks of roaming
SS death squads experienced massive nervous breakdowns and even suicides as their
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execution-style killings escalated into the tens and hundreds of thousands. Although the
SS established nerve clinics for traumatized killers, ―Psychologically for the perpetrators,
and perhaps even more for their superiors, it became increasingly difficult to deal with
the repercussions of the mass executions‖ (Langerbein, 2004, p. 48).
The SS itself was the apotheosis of the unbureaucratic, personalized ―polycracy‖
that thrived in Hitler‘s Reich and gradually undermined the German civil service tradition
of rational state government. Even in 1943 when SS chief Heinrich Himmler was also
named Reich Interior Minister, he still ―struggled to control what was rapidly becoming
less an organization than a collection of disparate mini-empires,‖ prompting a key SS
leader to quip that Himmler was ―really organizing disorder‖ (Mazower, 2008, p. 256).
Though a broad consensus existed about the supposed reality of ―the Jewish enemy‖ and
the justice of its physical annihilation in wartime, SS bureaus competed bitterly with each
other and with outside agencies—the Party, the state apparatus, the military, the business
cartels—to control aspects of Jewish policy according to their own priorities on killing
methods, timing, labor utilization, and resource allocation. This struggle is symptomatic
of the very inability of the Nazi polycracy to economically (Overy, 1995) and politically
(Mazower, 2008) rationalize German territorial gains, which was a major factor in
Germany‘s defeat. Nazi strategy was founded on blitzkrieg victories rather than a long
war of attrition, and thus on exploitation rather than integration of conquered territories.
Then, too, even as the SS succeeded in murdering millions, its ―success‖ at
genocide and exploitation sowed seeds of disorganization through increased infighting,
looting, corruption, and barbarization in its own ranks. The Final Solution, like the Nazi
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system itself, constantly fought to control a restlessly destructive dynamism that animated
the entire enterprise in the first place. As it was, the major SS offensive against the Jews
spanned, by Browning‘s (1998) reckoning, only the eleven months between mid-March
1942 and mid-February 1943 (p. xv). In March 1942 the Jewish communities of Europe
were still largely intact and 80 percent of the Six Million still alive; eleven months later
Jewish communal life in Europe was destroyed and 80 percent of the Six Million were
dead. In fact, the Final Solution—if it is defined as the programmatic attempt by the Nazi
SS at physical annihilation of the European Jews on a continental scale—can be
conceived as three phases: (1) the initial period, roughly from the summer of 1941
through the summer of 1942, in which the operations of the SS mobile shooting squads
and then the openings of the death camps were characterized by widespread breakdowns;
(2) the most ―productive‖ period, roughly from the fall of 1942 through the voluntary
closing of most death camps between the spring and fall of 1943; and (3) the final period
in 1944 when the remaining camps were briefly revived for ―mop up‖ operations. Thus,
the middle period—the one that lives on in popular imagination as typifying vaunted
German efficiency—lasted little more than a year, albeit with the breathtaking destruction
documented by Browning. Chelmno was in operation for about 16 months (until April
1943, although briefly revived for three months in 1944); Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka
for about 15 months (until October 1943); Majdanek for about 13 months (until
November 1943); and only the gas chambers at Auschwitz kept going through the end of
1944 (Kogon et al. 1993/1983, pp. 220-224). By the fall of 1943 the signs of bureaucratic
breakdown were apparent. In October, Himmler publicly threatened capital punishment
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for camp officers who took ―even one fur, even one watch, even one Mark or cigarette,‖
and sacked the commandant and administration of Auschwitz after SS investigators
uncovered massive corruption and unauthorized killings of prisoners (Friedländer, 2007,
p. 544). By 1944 Himmler‘s control was starting to slip; when he ordered deportations
halted to curry favor with the advancing Allies, Eichmann‘s team spurned the new policy
and simply continued sending Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz (Cesarini, 2004).
In the end, however, Treblinka and the other death camps—Auschwitz chief
among them—experienced an initial chaotic phase but ultimately settled into a semblance
of lethally bureaucratic discipline. How did this happen? The outcome was not inevitable;
countering the inherently entropic tendencies of the Final Solution was contingent on
individual and corporate action. But what action? This study argues that communication
—specifically, organizational and technical communication—is the action that we must
examine, for ―organizations exist only in so far as their members create them through
discourse . . . the principle means by which organization members create a coherent
social realty that frames their sense of who they are‖ (Mumby & Clair, 1997, p. 181). The
Treblinka that confronted Stangl in the late summer of 1942 was not coherent; left in that
condition, the camp might have succeeded at its initial spasm of murder but been
incapable of organizing a sustained program of genocide. Yet somehow, communication
created coherence and imparted identity. That is the process this study aims to explore.
By proceeding from interpretive and postmodern perspectives that take into
account that polycratic, entropic, and punctuated aspects of the Final Solution, we can
reformulate our problem this way: How did SS organizational and technical
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communications manage, just barely long enough, to create a short-term social reality
that regulated the internal contradictions of its genocidal project and fragmented
bureaucracy? This study will demonstrate how SS documents served as boundary objects
onto which differing interests could map their own knowledges, triangulate mutually
acceptable rules of action and socially construct spaces for temporary cooperation,
thereby achieving the modicum of discipline and self-regulation (Deetz, 1998; Foucault,
1977, 1980, 1988; Jacques, 1996) required to mobilize and temporarily hold together a
short-term genocidal blitzkrieg.
While acknowledging the value of Bauman‘s functionalist ―bureaucratic
definition‖ of the Final Solution, the interpretive and postmodern perspectives also have
much to offer. For one, they fit the historical record which portrays the SS as a distinctive
social world characterized by constant struggle. The interpretive view recognizes that
organizations are created by their members‘ discourses, while the postmodern view
forsakes ―the premise that there is some pre-existing social object called ‗organization,‘
which is defined by formal features and cohesive behaviors‖ and allows the analyst to see
in SS organizational and technical communications ―an array of multiple meanings . . .
that require careful deconstruction in order to reveal the concealed and marginalized
elements within them and thereby open them up for alternative interpretations‖ (Grant,
Hardy, Oswick & Putnam, 2004, p. 17). In fact the functionalist, interpretive, and
postmodern approaches can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive—as
suggested by Martin‘s (1992, 2002; Martin, Frost & O‘Neil, 2006) observation that at any
given time organizations manifest the three dimensions of integration (what organization
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members share), differentiation (how members inhabit different values, practices, and
subcultures that must be negotiated), and fragmentation (how members forge temporary
and issue-specific consensus amidst organizational change, confusion, and ambiguity).
Given the complex interplay of these three dimensions, organizational texts may
have surface structures that appear stable and centered but also reveal structural processes
by which ―subjectivity and social reality are (re-)produced in an organizational milieu.‖
Collaboratively authored texts ―are not singular, stable, or consensual‖ and potential
meanings for stakeholders are ―both precarious and prolific‖ (Taylor, 2005, p. 122).
Surface consistency is belied as organizational interests splinter ―into networks based on
tasks, relationships, information, and functions‖ and members ―create many belief
systems or subcultures‖ so that ―competing assumptions and values create a fuzziness
where assumptions and values are contradictory‖ (Keyton, 2005, p. 37). How are these
contradictions reconciled, if only temporarily? As I endeavor to show, organizational
actors can generate boundary objects to meet the needs of their integrative exigences.

Sample, Method, and Chapter Organization
In exploring the organizational and technical communication of the Final Solution
it is, of course, impossible to survey all surviving documents. A sampling is necessary,
one that it is both manageable in size and yet representative. Such a sampling is found in
surviving documents from SS Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei or ―Sipo‖) Technical
Matters Group that administered the so-called Sonderwagen or mobile gas van program.
When mobile SS shooting squads or Einsatzgruppen proved psychologically unprepared
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and logistically too few as the killing of Soviet Jews escalated, the SS attempted the
expedient of bringing poison gas to their victims—before later settling on the method of
bringing their victims to the gas. Browning (1991) has thus suggested,

Though the gas van was in retrospect a temporary solution to some of the
technological and psychological problems facing the Germans in carrying out the
Final Solution, it was not an insignificant episode. The fall of 1941 and spring of
1942, when the gas van was being developed and produced, spanned a crucial
period in the evolution of Nazi Jewish policy when systemic mass murder of Jews
outside Russia was just getting underway. . . . In this regard the history of the gas
van reveals at least some continuity between the Einsatzgruppen operations and
the subsequent attempt to extend the Final Solution to the rest of European Jews,
and rather extensive cooperation by central authorities in Berlin. (pp. 57-58)

After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the SS Einsatzgruppen roamed
behind the advancing front to liquidate Jewish communities in the East. Though the death
squads had received their charge from Berlin and were supplied with munitions and
vehicles, SS field commanders decided their own movements and targets. The gas vans,
however, represented a transition to the primacy of central administration, for the Sipo
Technical Matters Group ―was not only responsible for the constructions of the gas vans,
but it directed/orchestrated centrally . . . the operations of the gas vans, providing the
vans, drivers, and . . . parts/equipment; it controlled/supervised and coordinated the
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operationing [sic] of the vehicles‖ (Beer, 1987, p. 415). Although in postwar trials the
automotive and chemical experts of the Sonderwagen program disclaimed knowledge of
the vehicles‘ purpose, noted Browning (1991), ―Their own documents portray a different
picture‖ in which Berlin technicians were ―kept fully abreast of the problems arising in
the field,‖ responded with innovative adjustments to garner acceptance from superiors
and internal clients, blamed others for what could not be fixed, and ―developed the
euphemistic code language so typical of the Final Solution—it hid reality from [private
subcontractors] and at least partially from themselves‖ (p. 67). Here we see, in the first
attempt by the SS to centrally administer its Final Solution, the role of organizational and
technical communication in—as Mumby and Clair‘s (1997) thesis would predict—
creating a coherent social reality and framing members‘ identities.
Thus, an analysis of documents from the Sipo Technical Matters Group offers,
first of all, the opportunity to examine a sampling of the Final Solution in microcosm at
the moment when decentralized killing was giving way to central administration. Second,
the gas van program was of limited duration and run by a single, relatively small SS
bureau, so that its surviving paper trail—seven documents in all—is manageable. Yet,
third, the Sonderwagen program was large enough to yield a representative cross-section
of documents (a routine letter, field report, engineering proposal, requisitions, replies—
all replete with visual cues, filing codes, and often extensive handwritten marginalia) and
SS personnel (executive, expert, managerial, non-managerial, clients). Fourth, extensive
testimony from gas van program participants at all organizational levels was taken for
postwar trials and their ―organizational stories‖ (Boje, 1991, 1995, 2001; Pacanowski &
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O‘Donnell-Trujillo, 1983) offer much information on the organizational life of the Group
and its personnel. Fifth, by examining a corpus of documents from the same bureau—
rather than analyzing single texts in isolation—the analyst can see the flow of documents
in light of their historical and cultural contexts and the biographies of the actors,
permitting an attempt to reconstruct (or deconstruct) the organizational discourse of
which the texts were a part. And sixth, the lengthiest of the documents has received wide
attention in the technical communication literature (e.g., Dombrowski, 2000a; Katz,
1992a) so that new insights from this study may be compared with other scholars.
The literature on technical communication also furnishes an appropriate
methodology for this study, namely Longo‘s (1998) proposal that cultural research into
the object of technical writing be delimited in five ways: (1) the object as discourse; the
object within its (2) cultural and (3) historical contexts; (4) the object as ordered by its
analyst; and (5) the object‘s relationship to its analyst. In operationalizing this method,
this study will rearrange Longo‘s ordering of her five delimiters. The study will begin by
providing the historical context of the SS gas van program (Chapter 2); move next to the
cultural contexts by proceeding in descending order from the integrative dimensions of
Nazi German national culture and the institutional culture of the Nazi movement, and the
differentiating dimensions of the organizational culture of the SS and its various bureaus
(Chapter 3), to the fragmenting dimensions of local organizational subcultures and their
various actors and interests (Chapter 4); explore the discourses of the Sipo Technical
Matters Group by first introducing and describing the gas van documents (Chapter 5) and
then analyzing the killers‘ use of textual and visual rhetorics (Chapter 6) and language
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(Chapter 7) to do the ―boundary work‖ (Wilson & Herndl, 2007) required to temporarily
bridge their differing interests and (re)produce their rhetorical community; follow the
different orderings imposed on the most notorious of the gas van documents by tracing
the surprising postwar provenance of the distinctive translation that Katz (1992a) first
introduced into the technical communication literature (Chapter 8) and by tracing how the
document has since become a boundary object in bridging the diverse interests and
motivations of technical communication scholars around a consensus interpretation of the
document‘s ethical implications for their discipline (Chapter 9); and finally suggest the
ethical implications of the ―ontological shift‖ proposed by present research in which the
document is viewed in social rather than solely individual terms (Chapter 10).

The Importance of the Study
Continued study of the Holocaust is important because factors that contributed to
the Final Solution—bureaucratic specialization and the technology to wield power at a
distance from its consequences—are accelerating in our own generation beyond what
could be imagined even in the Third Reich. Investigating the extreme case of the Final
Solution puts into stark relief the dynamics by which organizational and technical
communication can be employed to regulate and control even self-contradictory and
ultimately destructive ends, thus furnishing an extreme-case sample of great significance
for denaturalizing this regulatory dynamic in contemporary organizations.
This project likewise has significance for Holocaust Studies. I am not aware of
any close studies of the organizational and technical communication of the Holocaust,
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certainly none that meaningfully bring to bear the relevant literatures. In the twenty years
since the sociologist Bauman published Modernity and the Holocaust (1989), his thesis—
that the genocide was not an aberration of Western modernity but a result of potentialities
latent in its capacity for bureaucratic and technological organization—has gained broad
acceptance. As it happens, I agree with Bauman that the Holocaust ―uncover[ed] another
face of the same modern society whose other, more familiar, face we so admire‖ (p. 7).
But I cannot go so far as his assertion that ―the very idea of the Endlösung [Final
Solution] was an outcome of the bureaucratic culture‖ (p. 15). This is the functionalist
view that organizational imperatives ultimately drive individual actions, a view that is
increasingly questioned within organization studies. Thus, against Bauman‘s contention
that organizational cultures drive ideas, my study suggests that ideas construct
organizational cultures as those ideas are communicated among organization members.
A similar rejoinder to Bauman‘s thesis was advanced by the eminent Holocaust
historian Bauer (2001). The German bureaucracy, he noted, ―often was a fumbling,
ineffective, contradiction-ridden machine, where each fiefdom in the Nazi state had its
own interests and fought against everyone else to preserve them,‖ so that ―the unique
efficiency they showed in destroying the Jews, often for pseudo-pragmatic reasons, really
showed the remarkable impact of ideology on them‖ (p. 78). My study illustrates how
competing desk-murderers negotiated spaces for consensus. Thus, the Holocaust is not
evidence for the capacity of modern bureaucratic culture to produce either progressive or
destructive ideas, but rather the capacity of progressive or destructive ideas to cohere as
social realities through the communications of modern bureaucrats.
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CHAPTER TWO
FROM DARWIN TO DEATH WAGONS

Origins of European Anti-Semitism
What destructive ideas, then, ultimately cohered as social realities through the
communications of the SS gas van bureaucrats? Because ideas and ideologies are
historical rather than natural—although the dominant interests in organizations would
wish it to appear otherwise—then an answer to this question must excavate the historical
discourses that formed the ideologies. Such is the kind of broad inquiry that Kynell and
Seely (2002) advocated for employing historical methods in technical communication
research—an inquiry that broadly explores historical contexts and interpretations, while
generating a framework for gathering data and evaluating their relevance so that the
analyst can identify patterns, construct a narrative, and advance an interpretation. Piecing
together a narrative of the Sonderwagen program can provide a working set of facts from
which to contextualize the murders. Even more, the exercise permits the cultural critic to
historicize that which had become the naturalized ―common sense‖ of the Sipo Technical
Matter Group—exposing axioms that, because they broadly and unconsciously resonated
among the Group‘s competing interests, enabled members to produce texts which could
become boundary objects and temporarily bridge intraorganizational differences.
Such bridging was required in part because the SS desk-murderers ―clearly
understood that their deeds were not positive except in the value system of the Third
Reich‖ (Lozowick, 2000, p. 8) and needed a countervailing ideology to overcome longheld and traditionally ingrained Christian beliefs against the killing of innocent life. By
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the time of the Final Solution, however, history had produced such an ideology, one that
ultimately made Judeocide the ―common sense‖ of a vast modern bureaucracy. What was
this history?
Though the Jews of Europe created over two millennia a rich and vibrant culture,
their story is indelibly marred by tragedy and victimization that culminated in the greatest
crime of the age. Their culture and identity were shaped by a diasporic history in which
they faced ongoing pressures and hostilities from the dominant cultures in which they
resided. ―Jewish history cannot be told as the history of the Jews only, because they have
nearly always lived within the context of other civilizations‖ (Dimont, 1962, p. ix). And
nearly always they have lived within the context of anti-Semitism. In Christian Europe
the roots of anti-Semitism ―can be traced back to New Testament teaching,‖ noted Cohn
Sherbok (2002), for whether or not one believes ―the Gospels and Paul‘s epistles are
inherently anti-Jewish, there is no doubt that the Church has used Scripture as a
framework for its teaching of contempt‖ (p. 34). And further, as Crossan (1996)
observed, ―Without that Christian anti-Judaism, lethal and genocidal European antiSemitism would have been either impossible or at least not widely successful‖ (p. 35).
Dimont (1962) has divided Jewish history into six phases, each of which
presented challenges that threatened the Jews‘ survival: their encounters with ancient
Egypt and the Mesopotamian empires; with the Greco-Roman empires; with diaspora
throughout the Mediterranean world; with the Islamic empire; with the Christian Europe
of the Middle Ages; and with the modern age of virulent anti-Semitism. Similarly,
Carroll (2001) has characterized Jewish history as defined against the three genocides
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committed against the Jews by ancient Babylonia and Assyria, by the Roman empire, and
during the European Holocaust.
While the history of the Jewish nation extends more than four thousand years, one
place to begin the story of European Jewry is the year 63 BCE when the Jews of Palestine
were first confronted by a European power. That year Rome conquered Jerusalem and
instituted a brutal colonial occupation. When the Jews revolted through a series of three
wars in 66-73, 113 and 132-35 CE, the Romans first destroyed Jerusalem and its Jewish
Temple, and finally expelled all Jews from Palestine. Estimates of the Jewish population
at the time range from half a million to 2.5 million, but ―the ratio of Jewish dead in
Palestine at the hands of Rome may well approximate the twentieth-century record of one
in three‖ Jews worldwide who died in the Holocaust (Carroll, 2001, p.79). Thus the
Roman genocide may have killed as many as 800,000 Jews before selling the survivors
into slavery and exiling any escapees from their homeland. ―In the second century CE, the
majority of Jews were stateless and dispersed into every corner of the Roman world, from
India to the Atlantic Ocean, over three continents‖ (Dimont, 1962, p. 118-119).
And they were cast into a world that regarded them with hostility disproportionate
to their numbers. In Greco-Roman times, noted Johnson (1987), ―the specific hostility
towards the Jews was a function of Jewish monotheism and its social consequences.‖
Their custom of male circumcision ―was regarded by the Greco-Roman world as
barbarous and distasteful,‖ while Jewish laws of diet and cleanliness discouraged social
intercourse with Gentile society and ―perhaps more than any other factor, focused
hostility on Jewish communities‖ (pp. 133-134). Riots against the Jews broke out in
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many cities and the Jews were excoriated by Cicero (for being ―superstitious
barbarians‖), Horace (―proselytizing and credulous‖), Livy (―atheists‖), Seneca
(―accursed race‖), Quintillian (―a curse‖), Apion (ritual murderers), Martial (lechers and
beggars), Tacitus (―base and abominable‖), and Juvenal (mercenary beggars); thus the
Romans ―had already concocted all the libels, issued all the slurs, made all the jokes, and
promulgated all the misunderstandings that would cause the Jews of Europe twenty
centuries of suffering . . . [and] laid the groundwork for classic European anti-Semitism‖
(Konner, 2003, pp. 83-89).
How did Jewish culture and identity survive the destruction of its capital, the end
of its historic political and religious system, and the genocide and dispersion of its
people? ―They responded to this new challenge with another formula for survival:
Diaspora Judaism‖ (Dimont, 1962, p. 118). Thus the stage was set for the subsequent
history of the Jews of Europe—a people without a national territory, keeping themselves
apart from their hosts, thereby retaining a religious and racial identity but also inspiring
the suspicion and hostility of others who regarded the Jews as aliens in their midst. This
situation was then cemented by two critical developments. First, the Jews replaced the
destroyed Temple system of national leadership, which had been based in Jerusalem, with
a decentralized rabbinical or Diaspora Judaism in which rabbis (teachers) presided over
local synagogues. Their ―creation of a religious-legal code, the Talmud . . . served as a
unifying force and a spiritual rallying point . . . [that] almost invisibly ruled the Jews for
close to fifteen hundred years‖ (Dimont, 1962, p. 17).
The second development that shaped the subsequent history of the European Jews
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was the rise of Christianity. With ―Greco-Roman antipathy . . . as the background for the
emergence of Christian hostility towards the Jewish nation‖ (Cohn-Sherbok, 2002, p. 17),
the Roman Empire‘s conversion to Christianity under Constantine in the fourth century
made the Church heir to the pagan world‘s anti-Jewish prejudice. ―The virulence of
Christian Jew-hatred stemmed from grafting the blame of the Gospels [for allegedly
killing Christ] onto a trunk and root already thick and deep‖ (Konner, 2003, p. 89). And
when the once-powerless Christian church became an imperial institution, its animus
against the Jews was no longer ―relatively benign propaganda‖ but instead ―turned lethal‖
(Crossan, 1996, p. 152). Thus developed an uneasy coexistence as separatistic Talmudic
Judaism and a Christian host culture that was largely anti-Jewish were thrown together in
the same geographic space.
Over the ensuing centuries the two cultures could at times coexist in relative
peace. Jews were invited to settle in Italy, France, and Germany during the sixth through
eighth centuries to help found cities and encourage trade. By the eleventh century, a
sophisticated Sephardic Jewish culture emerged in Moorish Spain and Portugal, and a
vibrant Yiddish-language Ashkenazic Jewish culture arose in France and Germany. But
in time, the pendulum again swung back toward persecution. Jews fled the Rhineland in
1096 when Crusaders slaughtered Jewish communities on the way to the Holy Land and
―blood libel‖ accusations arose that charged Jews with the ritual murder of Christian
children. By the fourteenth century Jews were blamed for the European outbreak of
bubonic plague—because, perhaps due to their cleansing regulations, they survived in
proportionately greater numbers than their gentile neighbors. Jews fled to Poland and the

26

Slavic lands after more than 350 Jewish communities in Germany were destroyed by
mobs (Dwork & Van Pelt, 1996, p. 33), even as Jews were banished from England and
France and forcibly baptized in Spain. The Spanish Inquisition was instituted in 1478 to
root out ―converted‖ Jews who secretly practiced their first religion, until the Sephardic
Jews were expelled altogether from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1497.
Official ghettoization of the Jews began in 1555 when Pope Paul IV mandated the
creation of a sealed Jewish enclave in Rome (Kertzer, 2001, pp. 27-28). Europe‘s Catholic
rulers followed suit in their own countries throughout Southern Europe and then Protestant
lands in Northern Europe took up the trend. These walled ghettos, invariably situated in
the least desirable quarters of a city, were intended to prevent all but narrow commercial
contacts between Jews and Christians. The ―solution‖ of sealed ghettos occurred naturally
to the European mindset of the age since the continent‘s polity was based on selfadministering dukedoms, baronies, and guilds. Councils of ghetto elders, charged with
collecting heavy taxes and raising the funds to support community services, soon evolved
into corrupt oligarchies that shifted the burden to the peasantry. The Ashkenazi Jews of
Eastern Europe were also ghettoized. But because Poland (then an imperial federation of
Poland, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania) had few large cities, segregation evolved
into the founding of exclusively Jewish villages and hamlets, which were administered by
regional councils of elders that also favored their own cliques. ―While the Jews enjoyed
communal autonomy . . . they could not participate in political life‖ so that, as the Polish
empire began to pull apart under a welter of competing ethnic elites, the Jews‘ already
weak situation worsened over time (Dwork & Van Pelt, 1996, p. 34). The desperation of
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Jewish life gave rise to Hasidism, a mystic and revivalist variant of the Judaism that in
time became dominant in Eastern Europe.
The Protestant Reformation weakened the power of a Catholic Church implacably
opposed to Jewish influence (Kertzer, 2001). For a time, many Reformers defended Jews
as people under a covenant with God (Cohn-Sherbok, 2002, pp. 157-163). Thus in the
sixteenth century, ―a small numbers of Jews ventured a return to Central Europe‖ but
found ―their reception was not congenial—not in an age of religious turmoil‖ where ―they
encountered the animus of Protestant Reformers and Catholic Counter-Reformers alike‖
(Sachar, 2005, p. 4). Only after the Protestant-Catholic Thirty Years War (1618-1648)
ended ―with religious passions largely exhausted . . . did Hapsburg Emperor Ferdinand III
allow substantial numbers of Jews to resettle‖ in imperial cities such as Prague, Budapest
and Frankfurt, so that ―other German princes also then relaxed their bans on Jews‖ (p. 4).
But permission for Jewish resettlement in Central and Western Europe was not motivated
by humanitarian concern. Since Jews were viewed as aliens and denied participation in the
European feudal land system, they had instead developed alternative vocations in trade
and moneylending. ―Determined to exploit this Jewish talent for producing liquid wealth,
substantial numbers of rulers were willing intermittently to protect ‗their‘ Jews as
dependable sources of taxes and loans‖ (p. 5).
By the mid eighteenth century, the Jewish population of Central and Western
Europe may have totaled 300,000 to 400,000 persons. But with the feudal system in
decline and the powerful trade guilds alarmed by Jewish immigration, local rulers ensured
that Jews remained confined to vocations disdained by gentile society. ―Perhaps as many
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as three-fourths of the Jews in Central and Western Europe were limited to the precarious
occupations of retail peddling, hawking, and . . . moneylending‖ (Sachar, 2005, p. 5). And
because most Jews struggled to survive, ―they generated a sizable underclass of beggars,
fencers, pimps, even robbers, thereby creating a self-fulfilling gentile scenario of Jews,
one that would be endlessly invoked by Jew-haters throughout the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries‖ (p. 5). In Eastern Europe, meanwhile, the end of the eighteenth
century saw the breakup of the Polish federated empire and partition in 1772 by Prussia,
Austria, and Russia. The latter restricted Jews to remaining within the ―Pale of Settlement‖
in former Polish lands and prohibited immigration further east into Russia proper.
Yet as the nineteenth century dawned, though ―in the East, the circumstances of
Jewish life were steadily worsening . . . in the West there was tentative prefigurement of
better times to come‖ (Sachar, 2005, p. 17). This was the culmination of trend which had
begun in Western Europe as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. National
identities had emerged as monarchs asserted control over previously autonomous feudal
lords, thus providing for centralized governance, language, military, universities, coinage,
weights and measures, maps, and roads. ―These ambitious projects ensured royal wealth
by creating the conditions for sustained economic growth and consolidated royal power by
creating loyal subjects‖ (Dwork & Van Pelt, 2002, p. 10), a development that by the end
of the early modern period impacted Western and Central European Jews in two ways.
First, the Jews‘ experience in moneylending and trade now offered a ―wider vocational
leeway‖ so that ―as trade and manufacturing moved beyond traditional guild jurisdiction,
Jews began moving into occupations substantially more diversified than moneylending
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and peddlery‖ and emerged as leading dealers in cattle, timber, textiles, silks, satins, gold,
silver, and gems (Sachar, 2005, p. 21). Second, some ―Enlightenment philosophers took
the principle of homogenization and universalism to its logical conclusion: social equality‖
(Dwork & Van Pelt, 2002, p. 10). Emergent democracy, however, proved a two-edged
sword for Jews. On the one hand, they were offered equal rights of full citizenship as
―emancipatory movements quickly spread throughout western and central Europe in the
wake of the French revolution and Napoleonic conquests‖ of 1799-1813 (p. 13). But the
revolutionaries favored reason over religion and national community over ethnic identity,
so that the expected requirement for full citizenship was assimilation into the dominant
Christian culture. The vistas opened by the twin prospects of enlightenment and
emancipation prompted a split in the Jewish culture of Western and Central Europe.

The Haskala, the Jewish Enlightenment, opened new avenues of study, new
possibilities for intellectual engagement. For the first time, the study of traditional
Jewish texts was joined by a pursuit of general knowledge: science, mathematics,
contemporary world affairs, the languages and literature of the gentile world.
These enlightenment Jews steadily increased in numbers throughout the second
half of the eighteenth century. They developed radically different ideas from their
traditional co-religionists about scholarship and education, communal organization
and leadership, and, ultimately, lifestyle. They wished to establish a new
relationship with the gentile world, to be citizens of the country in which they
lived. Emancipation was their goal. (Dwork & Van Pelt, 2002, p. 11)
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Though the 1814 defeat of Napoleon led to a rejection of French-imposed Jewish
emancipation in the nations he conquered, the humanist ideals unleashed in the French
Revolution could be not altogether stopped. In the Potato Famine year of 1848, for
example, democratic revolutions—though quickly put down—broke out in France,
Germany, and other European countries. The second half of the nineteenth century
witnessed the demise of Jewish ghettos in Western and Central Europe and the emergence
of Jews into significant roles in commerce, banking, science, art, academia, and the free
professions. In a survey of the most important figures of art and science throughout human
history, Murray (2003) noted that between 800 and 1800 CE only eleven figures were
Jewish—but between 1870 and 1950 the world Jewish population, just 2.2 percent of the
global total, produced 12.4 percent of the 1,277 leading figures.
The emancipated Jews of Western and Central Europe were also, in their turn,
impacted by increasing contact with the dominant Christian culture during the nineteenth
century. ―This long-awaited and eagerly sought development was bittersweet. Many Jews
who cared about their distinctive identity as Jews saw here a profound dilemma: how to
both accept the offer to join the body politic on equal terms and to remain meaningfully
Jewish‖ (Dwork & Van Pelt, 2002, p. 13). Some clung to Orthodox Judaism, while the
many Polish Jews who began migrating into Central Europe maintained their Yiddish
language and mystic Hasidic faith. Others were inspired by the Jewish Enlightenment to
launch Reform Judaism and translate the sacred texts and liturgies of their religion into
vernacular languages. In 1897 Theodor Herzl of Hungary founded the secular Zionist
movement and urged Europe‘s Jews to prepare for a return to the Holy Land, while in
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1898 the Bund (League) of revolutionary Jewish socialists was founded and attracted even
greater support (Gilbert, 2001, pp. 20-29). Meanwhile, masses of ordinary Jews simply
assimilated into the dominant culture by either becoming secularized and nonobservant
while still retaining a Jewish identity, or by intermarriage or outright conversion to
Christianity. Thus ―when the twentieth century opened there were three main ways of life
which Jews followed or aspired to,‖ namely the settled life of assimilation, or emigration
away from ongoing social barriers and economic hardships, or ―bringing about a
revolutionary change in the Jewish situation‖ through Marxist socialism or through a
Zionist rebirth of Jewish nationalism (pp. 19-20).
But the nineteenth century emancipation of Western and Central European Jewry
also prompted a reaction among the Christian majority. Most gentile Europeans retained
their traditional anti-Semitic animus against an outgroup. To that animus was added a
growing resentment against what seemed to be a disproportionate representation of Jews
in merchandising, retailing, finance, and the free professions such as academia, law, and
medicine. As Europe rapidly industrialized in the nineteenth century, traditional small
merchants, artisans, and rural smallholders were being left behind. Jews were an easy
target for their resentment, especially when Jews were their creditors or when Jewish
department stores—then a new retailing concept—displaced small independent merchants.
Many Europeans, for whom religious anti-Semitism had long been a settled fact of their
culture, now gave heed to stories of supposed Jewish economic domination and began to
speak of a ―Jewish problem.‖ Yet an even more ominous development was also on the
rise: an anti-Semitism based not on religious or economic discrimination, but on race.
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The Rise of Racial Anti-Semitism
On the one hand, religious anti-Semitism envisioned a solution to the ―Jewish
problem‖ through conversion to Christianity; on the other, liberal anti-Semitism pushed
for Jewish emancipation that would lead to assimilation into the national community.
Both solutions sought the eventual disappearance of the Jews, though both addressed the
―problem‖ by believing Jews would voluntarily change when offered the self-evident
blessings of Christian religion or society. Yet racial anti-Semitism held that Jews could
not change. Religious confession and social integration were mutable qualities but race
was immutable. For racial anti-Semites it followed that the ―Jewish problem‖ could only
be solved by the segregation, exclusion, and ultimate removal of racial aliens from the
racial community.
How did such a pernicious doctrine arise? While religious anti-Semitism is as old
as the Common Era and economic discrimination had been practiced since at least the
feudal era, racial anti-Semitism was a modern development. The 1859 publication of
Charles Darwin‘s On the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life inspired a worldwide intellectual
ferment. The sensation brought wide attention to an 1855 work, Essay on the Inequality
of the Human Races, by the French ethnologist Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau. His thesis,
which ―obsessed on the idea that history was entirely determined by race,‖ had little
impact in France but was widely endorsed in Germany where many local Gobineau
Societies were established (Dwork & Van Pelt, 2002, pp. 20-22). Germans were attracted
by Gobineau‘s argument that ―racial vitality‖ is the engine of human history. Since this
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vitality varied among the races, these races are innately unequal with the white race—and
especially the putative Aryans—occupying the top of the hierarchy. Retaining that
position required Aryans to avoid interbreeding with lower races.
In 1869 an English cousin of Darwin, Sir Francis Galton, published Hereditary
Genius in which he coined the word ―eugenics‖ and contended that inherited intelligence
levels are distributed across populations in the same way as the inherited physical norms
of height and weight. A leading German popularizer of Social Darwinism, the zoologist
Ernst Haeckel, claimed in his General Morphology of 1866 that nation-states may be
compared to biological organisms and thus subject to the laws of natural selection and
survival of the fittest. By century‘s end his views had gained such currency within
German society that his Social Darwinist paean, The Riddle of the World, ―became a
runaway bestseller when it was published in 1899‖ (Evans, 2003, p. 36).
The word ―anti-Semite‖ was coined in an 1873 pamphlet, The Victory of Judaism
over Germanism, written by Wilhelm Marr. Between 1870 and 1900 an estimated 1,200
publications were printed in Germany on the ―minority‖ question, more than all other
political topics combined, and the vast majority of these from an anti-Semitic perspective
(Goldhagen, 1996, p. 64). Yet all the anti-Semitic tracts then in circulation ―were
overshadowed by the Anglo-German writer Houston Chamberlain‘s The Foundation of
the Nineteenth Century‖ published in 1899. Chamberlain, the son-in-law of famed
German composer and anti-Semite Richard Wagner, ―argued that the antiquity and
mobility of the Jewish people illustrate the confrontation between superior Aryans and
parasitic Semites‖ (Cohn-Sherbok, 2002, p. 215). The significance of Chamberlain is that
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he popularized a connection between the ―scientific‖ Social Darwinist ideas swirling
through Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century and the emerging popular
resentment against the recent legal emancipation of Jewry. ―It took Wagner‘s circle to
introduce explicit anti-Semitism into racist discourse‖ by simplifying Gobineau‘s view of
history as a racial struggle into ―a struggle between the Aryan or Nordic type and the
Jew, the race and counter-race‖ and connecting that struggle with German national
destiny (Dwork & Van Pelt, 2002, p. 23). No longer could the ―Jewish Question‖ be
solved through baptism and conversion; the Jews were not redeemable for, while they
could change their religion, they could not change their race. In contrast to nineteenthcentury liberals who legislated Jewish emancipation in the hope that the Jews would
disappear through assimilation, racial anti-Semites believed the only solution was
exclusion of Jews from Aryan society.
Onto this stage strode Adolf Hitler, leader of the National Socialist German
Workers Party and, from 1933, chancellor of the German Reich. The degree to which
Hitler either reflected or shaped the society around him is debated by Holocaust scholars
(e.g., see Rosenbaum, 1998), although historians on all sides agree that his movement
constructed its political maxims out of German nationalist and völkisch themes which
long predated National Socialism. Hitler‘s (1925/1943) own manifesto, Mein Kampf,
cobbles together such themes with its assertion, for example, that ―all the events of world
history are but the expression of the racial instinct for self-preservation‖ (p. 406). In the
dictator‘s cosmology, finite individuals were nothing and could only find their fulfillment
in the eternal life of the race and, in particular, the state which is ―the living organism of a
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people‖ and ―safeguards the preservation of that people‖ (p. 595). Because it is ―racial
primal elements which, providing culture, create the beauty and dignity of a higher
humanity‖ (p. 595), the races may be classed, from highest to lowest, as either culturefounding, culture-bearing, or culture-destroying. The highest races preserve themselves
by safeguarding their blood against intermixture with lower races, while the lower seek to
raise themselves by diluting the blood of their betters. As such, life is a ―struggle for
existence‖ and the ―two powerful life-instincts‖ (p. 391) of hunger and love are the
engines of human action. For by satisfying their hunger humans can live today, and by
satisfying their love-instinct humans can live on tomorrow in their offspring.
Yet even while Hitler was rising as a political figure during the 1920s and early
1930s, the eugenics movement represented cutting-edge science throughout Europe and
North America (Friedlander, 1995; Black, 2003). Thus when the Nazis came to power
their program of ―positive‖ and ―negative‖ eugenics (i.e., encouraging the fit to breed and
discouraging the unfit) gained significant support among the German elites who shaped
public opinion. Government loans to encourage fecundity were widely applauded by the
masses. A law authorizing sterilization of the handicapped—long advocated by
eugenicists and seriously considered prior to the Nazi takeover—was promulgated in July
1933, less than six months after Hitler was appointed German chancellor. An estimated
300,000 persons were sterilized in the years before the war (Friedlander, 1995, p. 30). As
a leading German physician wrote at the time, ―All work has only one great meaning: the
Volk‖ and to ignore this reality would reduce medicine to mere technique. Nazi reform of
medical education must therefore begin ―by refashioning the curriculum to include such
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new disciplines as demographic policy and racial eugenics‖ so that institutions can ―teach
the student that the health of the Volk stands above the health of the individual as the
ultimate aim of the art of medicine, [and] hence to be a doctor to the [collective] people is
more important than science itself!‖ Physicians thus had a ―holy obligation‖ and ―duty as
an alert biological soldier‖ to implement the sterilization law as ―a pillar of the National
Socialist state‖ and to ―be concerned not only with the present generation, but should
strive to transcend it and direct its efforts toward the health of the eternal Volk‖ (Löhr,
1935; reproduced in Mosse, 1966, pp. 233-234).

Development of the Gas Vans
As early as 1935 Hitler told intimates that, when the time came and under the
cover the war, he would move from sterilization of those deemed unfit toward their active
euthanasia (Friedlander, 1995, p. 39). Then in 1938 when Hitler was petitioned by a
Leipzig couple to grant a ―mercy death‖ to their incurably deformed infant, the dictator
took the occasion to authorize secret planning toward a general child euthanasia program.
This program, run by his personal chancellery, commenced in the summer of 1939 even
as war broke out that September. The following month Hitler signed a general remit—
symbolically backdated to September 1, the start of the war—for his chancellery head to
initiate euthanizing of handicapped adults. But Hitler‘s personal chancellery was too
small to run such a large operation. Additional staff were hired and housed in a
confiscated Jewish villa at Tiergarten Strasse 4, so that the program became known
among intimates simply as ―T4.‖ And because a number of chancellery officials were
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members of the SS, they called upon the Black Corps for assistance.
―Euthanasia‖ centers were secretly established at sanitoria and other converted
buildings across the Reich. Rooms in these centers were sealed and outfitted to admit gas
from carbon monoxide canisters. Officials in the program estimated 70,000 ―eligible‖
adults lived in German lands and by the summer of 1941 achieved their goal. But the
need to transport victims on public roads, and afterwards to issue suspiciously faked
death certificates to their families, sparked widespread rumors. Protests, often voiced
through the churches, were heard. Hitler decided in August 1941 that, because the
euthanasia program had achieved its numerical goal and now domestic tranquility was
needed as the war expanded into the Soviet Union, it was time to quell popular discontent
and end the ―official‖ euthanasia project. Besides, euthanasia operations could
surreptitiously continue among SS concentration camp inmates. This program, codenamed ―14f13‖ after a paragraph in the camp regulations, claimed some 20,000 lives
(Friendlander, 1995, p. 150). And as the SS moved toward its ―final solution of the
Jewish question in Europe,‖ the experienced euthanasia personnel were instrumental in
setting up stationary gas chambers at the SS death camps.
Gas vans were initially used in the euthanasia program and likely originated with
the Criminal Technical Institute, an SS police lab that could obtain the gas canisters
needed for the child and adult euthanasia programs (Friendlander, 1995, p. 139). Who
invented the vans is unclear, but by 1940 they were used by a special SS commando to
kill asylum patients in Polish territory annexed to the Reich—territory that included the
village of Chelmno where, in December 1941, the first operational death camp—and the
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only one to kill with mobile gas vans rather than stationary gas chambers —was
established. But the vans employed in 1940 used carbon monoxide gas from canisters
rather than exhaust gas. Such vans would have been difficult to operate in Soviet lands
invaded by Germany in June 1941 since the bulky, heavy, and expensive canisters could
not practicably have been supplied from factories in the German Reich to the distant East.
Shortly after the invasion, however, the notion arose of employing mobile gas
vans that used their own exhaust gas, rather than carbon monoxide canisters, to kill
victims. The idea was a response to a growing ―problem‖ being experienced by special
SS shooting squads, the notorious Einsatzgruppen, which since June 1941 had fanned out
across the conquered lands with a mandate to massacre Soviet Jews. That problem came
to a head on August 15, 1941, when Himmler visited Einsatzgruppe B in Minsk and
asked its commander, Arthur Nebe, to execute 100 Jews so that the Reichsführer-SS
might see an Aktion for himself. When Himmler was visibly disturbed, he was told of the
mounting psychological strain experienced by the shooters. Later that day Himmler asked
Nebe to devise a less unnerving procedure for killing Jews (Hilberg, 2003, p. 343). So the
SS commander asked for and received permission from the Reichsführer to attempt
dynamiting a test group of victims. As it happened, though, Nebe was an administrator
from Berlin on temporary assignment to gain field experience. His normal position was
head of the Reich Criminal Police Main Office, Germany‘s plainclothes detective police
force which operated as a branch of the mammoth Reich Security Main Office headed by
Himmler protégé Reinhard Heydrich. Nebe asked a deputy to have a chemist at his
bureau‘s police lab, the Criminal Technical Institute, procure the dynamite and conduct
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the experiment (Browning, 2004, p. 354).
Yet the month before Himmler‘s visit, Nebe had experienced his own close call
with death after driving home drunk from a party and falling asleep in his car with the
motor still running. He mentioned to lab director Walter Heess the possibility of using
exhaust gas to kill Jews rather than the bottled gas used in the euthanasia program. Heess
relayed the idea to his chief chemist, Albert Widmann, when the two were riding the
Berlin subway together (Browning, 2004, p. 355; Dwork & van Pelt, 2002, p. 276). Thus
when Nebe summoned the Widmann to bring both dynamite and hoses for experiments in
Minsk, the latter knew what was in prospect. For the dynamite procedure, mental patients
from a nearby asylum were rounded up. ―The gruesome experiment required two
explosions to kill all the test victims locked in a bunker and left parts of bodies strewn
about and even hanging from nearby trees‖ (Browning, 2004, p. 355). By contrast, mental
patients were more ―satisfactorily‖ killed after being placed inside sealed rooms into
which exhaust gas was introduced via hoses from vehicles parked outside.
Based on these impromptu results Heydrich decided to move forward with more
tests. But the Criminal Technical Institute was primarily a police lab. So the task was
assigned to Walther Rauff, head of the Technical Matters Group within the Heydrich‘s
Administration and Finance Office. Rauff oversaw five separate divisions, among them
the Security Police transportation service headed by Friedrich Pradel. In turn, Pradel
supervised the Berlin motorpool whose 4,000 vehicles were maintained by foreman
Harry Wentritt. Since Rauff was preoccupied with ongoing high-level negotiations with
the Wehrmacht High Command to obtain munitions for the Einsatzgruppen shooting
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actions—while also splitting his time in Prague performing special tasks for Heydrich—
practical execution of the project fell to Pradel. He asked Wentritt if it was feasible to
vent exhaust gas into a closed van and received an affirmative reply. Rauff then
suggested to Pradel that he acquire truck compartments from Gaubschat, a Berlin factory,
on the pretext that the specially sealed boxes were needed to transport dead victims of a
spotted fever epidemic. The company also agreed to mount the superstructures onto truck
chassis that Pradel would provide (Beer, 1987). But the latter‘s initial attempt to acquire
five truck chassis from the Wehrmacht was turned down, necessitating Rauff‘s personal
intervention to secure the vehicles (Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p. 53).
Once the chassis and bodies were assembled by Gaubschat, the vans were taken to
Wentritt‘s garage. There in secrecy his mechanics ran a removable hose from the exhaust
pipe to a hole drilled in the van compartment. To find out how long it took for carbon
monoxide levels to reach 1 percent, trials were conducted by police lab chemists wearing
gas masks. A prototype van was then tested on a group of about 30 Russian POWS from
the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Results were ―satisfactory‖ and, by November or
December 1941, about twenty Sonderwagen (―special vans‖) were ready for service.
Three were furnished to the Higher SS and Police Leader of the Warthegau (a Polish
district annexed by Germany) at the request of its Gauleiter (Nazi regional governor) in
order to liquidate the Lodz ghetto (Kershaw, 2008, 60-88) and make room there for new
shipments of Jews deported from the West; the remaining vans were dispatched for field
service with the Einsatzgruppen in Soviet territory (Kogon et al. 1993/1983, p. 53;
Browning, 2004, p. 355). At the same time Rauff hired August Becker, a chemical expert

41

who had worked with the Criminal Technical Institute in the earlier euthanasia program,
to act as field inspector for the gas van program. In time a fleet of about twenty gas vans
was in operation, about half on Soviet territory and the rest in Eastern Europe.
Yet even as vans were being supplied by Rauff‘s office to the Einsatzgruppen and
the Chelmno death camp, competing alternatives for ―humane‖ killing methods were
being devised by other SS bureaus. During the Final Solution a total of six killing centers
were operated: one (Chelmno) by the Higher SS and Police Leader of the Posen Region
which encompassed the Warthegau; three (Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka) by the SS and
Police Leader of the Lublin District, who had originally been charged by Himmler with
establishing a ―Jewish reservation‖ in Polish territory not annexed by the Reich; and two
(Auschwitz, Majdanek) by the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office as
extensions of its concentration camp system, so that its two killing centers also housed
prisoners for slave labor (Friedlander, 1995, p. 287). While the Posen camp employed gas
vans, the Lublin camps procured former euthanasia personnel to install gas chambers
using carbon monoxide pumped in from stationary engines (Treblinka used a diesel
engine from a captured Russian submarine). And the Economic and Administrative Main
Office camps employed prussic acid pellets; because its camps also housed slave labor,
supplies of Zyklon B were already on hand as a pesticide to keep down vermin.

Operational Challenges in the Field
The importance of the Sonderwagen project is suggested by the fact that
Heydrich‘s former personal chauffeur was assigned to be its first driver (Breitman, 1991,
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p. 214). But in this hideous competition, the gas vans were seriously ―disadvantaged.‖
From the first, the vehicles created unanticipated problems. Given their specialized use,
Pradel had to acquire chassis and truck bodies from separate sources. The exigencies of
wartime meant that he could not always obtain chassis from the same manufacturer.
Work on the bodies had to be outsourced to Gaubschat. Then to preserve secrecy, final
modifications were made by SS welders in Wentritt‘s garage.
Once the gas vans entered service in the field, complaints quickly mounted. A
memo dated 27 April 1942 discussed how the ―cargo‖ might be unloaded more quickly if
vans could be modified with equipment to tip up the truck compartment or its floor (Beer,
1987). Then a report sent by Becker (Hochstadt, 2004, pp. 137-138) from Kiev and dated
16 May 1942 stated, ―The trucks . . . get stuck in the rain‖ and ―The place of execution ...
[lies] off traveled roads and is thus by its location already hard to reach, in damp or wet
weather not at all.‖ When ordinary wear-and-tear occurred, parts could only be obtained
―by persuasion and bribery‖ since ―transport to Berlin [for repairs] would be much too
expensive and require too much fuel.‖ Then, too, ―Because of the uneven land and the
indescribable condition of the roads, the seals and rivets came loose over time.‖ Thus
during Aktionen the SS personnel had to be ―kept as far away as possible . . . so that their
health won‘t be harmed by leaking gases.‖ Even then, SS personnel who unloaded the
bodies ―complained to me about headaches which appear after each unloading.‖ Nor
were prisoners conscripted to do the unloading, for ―fear that [they] . . . would use an
opportune moment to flee.‖ Finally, reported Becker:
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The gassing is without exception not properly done. In order to finish the action
as fast as possible, the drivers fully open the throttle. With this method those to be
executed suffer death by suffocation and not, as planned, by being put to sleep.
My instructions have shown that by proper use of the pedal, death comes more
quickly and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. The distorted faces and
excretions, which have been seen previously, can no longer be noticed.
(Hochstadt, 2004, p. 138)

By the time of Becker‘s report in May 1942 the SS had already been engaged for at least
half a year in its ―Final Solution,‖ or an organized programmatic attempt (rather than ad
hoc or sporadic persecution) at the physical elimination (rather than the mere removal
and deportation) of the Jews on a continental scale (rather than only Soviet Jews). But
this SS program was also competing for resources—building materials, rolling stock, fuel
supplies, budget allocations—with the Wehrmacht (which was in the midst of the largest
military invasion in history) and civilian agencies that advocated conservation of Jewish
labor until after the war. Voices competing to control aspects of Judenpolitik were many:
regional Gauleiter such as the demagogic Streicher; Goebbels‘ propaganda ministry;
Goering‘s Four Year Plan office; Ribbentrop‘s Foreign Office; Frank‘s General
Government of occupied Poland; Rosenberg‘s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories; the Interior Ministry; the Justice Ministry; the Economics Ministry; the
Armaments Ministry; the Plenipotentiary for Labor; the Party Chancellery; the Führer
Chancellery; various regional and local agencies; and Himmler‘s SS. Even to run the gas
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vans, the SS depended on the Wehrmacht for allocations of motor fuel and therefore had
to compete with other military priorities (Tooze, 2007, p. 481).
In the spring of 1942 as the Sipo Technical Matters Group discussed among
themselves various technical improvements to remedy the gas vans‘ operational
shortcomings, other SS bureaus—relying on the experienced T4 experts—prepared to
open extermination camps with stationary gas chambers. Soon the SS would discover it
was vastly more efficient to transport the victims to the gas than vice versa. And other
momentous events beyond the Group‘s control also intervened. Heydrich was attacked by
a car bomb in Prague on May 27 and died eight days later, so that Rauff lost his powerful
sponsor. A month later Rauff decided his future was not in running the Sonderwagen
program. Better to prove himself again in the field. In late July he accepted command of
an Einsatzcommando that was being formed to travel behind Erwin Rommel‘s Afrika
Korps; if the planned conquest of Palestine was achieved, his unit could liquidate Jews in
their own homeland. Thus, the gas van program Rauff left behind began to wind down.
Though twenty vans had been built by the end of June, an order for ten more special
compartments remained unfilled (Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p. 54). By fall, Rauff had
officially relinquished his position as head of department II D (Nizkor, 2002). In
September 1942 Becker wrapped up his inspection tour. About that time, the
Wehrmacht‘s second and final offensive against the Soviets was bogging down near
Stalingrad, thus limiting the scope for new Einsatzgruppen operations. Besides, ―By the
end of 1942, the Einsatzgruppen and their SS cohorts had largely fulfilled their mission‖
(Rhodes, 2002, p. 257). Then, too, the stationary gas chambers had proven their superior
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―efficiency‖ and were manufacturing death at horrifically unprecedented rates.
Heydrich‘s Reich Security Main Office had failed in its bid to directly conduct the
exterminations through its gas van technology. Compared to the millions murdered in the
gas chambers of Poland—or even the estimated 1.5 million executed in mass shootings—
the mobile vans were retired from their deadly service with ―only‖ some 150,000 victims
―credited‖ to their account, along with another 150,000 murdered by the vans assigned to
Chelmno (Greif, 2001. p. 231).
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CHAPTER THREE
THE PEOPLE‘S COMMUNITY

Organizations as Open Systems
Boundary objects, as we saw in the opening chapter, can bridge the interstices of
organizations because they combine plasticity with elements ―robust enough to maintain
a common identity across sites‖ (Star & Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). And as we learned in
the previous chapter, one of the integrative elements for the gas-van murderers of the
Sipo Technical Matters Group was a shared culture of anti-Semitism whose religious and
economic basis had a long history in European society and which, since the emergence of
Social Darwinism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had intensified by
acquiring a racial animus. Thus, the basis of anti-Semitism shifted from the mutable trait
of religious confession to the immutable trait of racial identification, an historical
development that helped the killers overcome more traditional inhibitions against murder.
In time, the Nazi establishment developed what Browning (2004) called a
―chimeric anti-Semitism.‖ Yet this chimera gained directive force because it
intersubjectively cohered with an even more powerful schema in German culture, that of
the Volksgemeinschaft or racial people‘s community. Thus, the commonplace slogan THE
JEWS ARE OUR MISFORTUNE (Die Juden sind unser Unglück) may have interlocked with
Germans‘ self-perception as an historically exceptional if ill-starred community of fate,
while the common metaphor JEWS ARE PARASITES may have gained resonance by offering
a neatly symmetrical contrast that instantiated Germans‘ communitarian view of
themselves. The chimera of the wandering Jew (an age-old myth), of the ―rootless
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cosmopolitan‖ (a common phrase of the time), may have interlocked with Germans‘
cultural schemas regarding their own metaphoric vision of a Volksgemeinschaft that was
organically bound through Blut und Boden (blood and soil)—and which therefore
excluded not only Jews but other Fremde (strangers) such as the Sinti and Roma, while
frowning on such nonconformist or ―asocial‖ Germans ranging from homosexuals to
Jehovah‘s Witnesses. For that reason,

Popular support for National Socialism was based on ideological norms which
had little directly to do with anti-Semitism and persecution of the Jews, and which
can be summed up most adequately by the sense of social, political, and moral
order embodied in the term Volksgemeinschaft (―National Community‖), ensured
by a strong state which would suppress conflict to guarantee strength through
unity. (Kershaw, 2008, p. 185)

Exploring the cultural touchstones of Nazi German society is important for grasping how
the everyday documents of the Sipo Technical Matters Group functioned as boundary
objects to create spaces for its competing interests to temporarily cooperate. The broader
picture of Third Reich culture matters because, as postmodern scholarship in organization
studies asserts, organizations are not closed systems (as in the traditional ―container‖
metaphor). Organizational cultures absorb and appropriate elements of the discourses
going on in the larger culture of the surrounding society. As Alvesson (2002) explained,
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Organizations can be understood as shaping local versions of broader societal and
locally developed cultural manifestations in a multitude of ways. Organizational
cultures are then best understood not as unitary wholes or as stable sets of
subcultures but as mixtures of cultural manifestations of different levels and
kinds. (pp. 190-191)

Martin (2002) demonstrated how drawing boundaries around organizational cultures
(again, as in the container metaphor) is problematic because boundaries are ―moveable,
fluctuating, permeable, blurred, and dangerous‖ (p. 315). Rather, ―an organization is a
nexus, in which a variety of internal and external cultural influences come together‖ (p.
339) and where the latter may be related to race, gender, socioeconomic status, national
culture, industry, and profession. Indeed, suggested Keyton (2005), it is ―more accurate
to think of any organizational culture as being many cultures that are blurred, overlapped,
and nested to create an organizational multiculture‖ so that ―the way in which subcultures
relate to one another is the organization‘s culture‖ (p. 67).
Everyday documents are, as this study endeavors to demonstrate, vital means for
organizational subcultures to negotiate their relations. Using as a framework Martin‘s
(1992, 2002; Martin, Frost & O‘Neil, 2006) ―three-perspective theory‖ which suggests
that organizational cultures manifest aspects of integration, differentiation and
fragmentation, this chapter begins by exploring those cultural aspects (national,
institutional, organizational) that may have been integrative for the SS gas van program
participants, and ends by introducing an key differentiating aspect of SS organizational
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culture (namely its unsuccessful attempt, as an ideologically driven Party formation, at
absorbing Germany‘s professionally driven regular police forces). Then the next chapter
picks up the differentiating aspect of the Sipo Technical Matters Group‘s subcultures,
before finally exploring the fragmenting aspect of individual members‘ motivations and
the shifting nature of their interrelations. For if we can see the killers‘ organizational
milieu not as a stable ―container-like‖ unity, but as a fluid environment of constantly
shifting consensus and dissensus that reflected larger as well as local discourses, we can
begin to see their documents as objects that worked across boundaries when the
integrative exigence of the Final Solution arose.

Unifying Principles of Institutional Culture
Elsewhere (Ward, 2008) I have argued that, based on my discourse analyses of
autobiographies by ordinary Germans who lived through the Third Reich, Germans of the
period may have broadly shared a cultural schema in which humans are seen primarily as
objects rather than initiators of action. Thus at a broad societal level, this cultural view of
human activity may have been an integrating aspect of organizational life for members of
the Sipo Technical Matters Group and provided one basis for negotiating their relations
and constructing at least a short-term coherent social reality that encompassed genocide.
This assertion is based on the assumption that one function of culture is to
cognitively organize shared knowledge into schemas that permit culture members to
swiftly derive cultural meanings enchained to words, phrases, images, and concepts.
These skeins of meaning may cohere into cultural models as they become ―organized into

50

prototypical event sequences enacted in simplified worlds‖ (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p.
22). By triggering shared schemas that delineate concepts and the relations between them,
culture members swiftly communicate inferences, listeners quickly fill in missing
information to accurately interpret those inferences, and members are provided with
mental scenarios with which to frame their encounters and experiences with the world.
As cultural models coalesce—perhaps around expert opinion, folk theories, intrinsic
persuasiveness, lived experience, conformity with observed conditions, or cultural
sanction—they gain broad acceptance and become socialized until the models accord
with individuals‘ views of themselves, what they find motivationally satisfying, and what
they experience as obligations.
Thus, a cultural model that saw humans as the objects of action may have
gathered directive force for Nazi-era Germans because the model was built on schemas
that ―hung together‖ and had coherence for their lived experience. That lived experience
is repeatedly expressed in the autobiographies I analyzed, through recurring references to
the severe dislocations caused by the First World War (1914-18), the Communist
revolution (1918-19) and monetary hyperinflation (1922-23) which followed, and the
Great Depression (1929-32). These events are touchstones for the majority of life stories
examined. The cultural model that underlies these accounts is a simplified world where
the prototypical sequence of events reveals the action of external forces over which the
individual has no control. Given the stability of this schema, as suggested in the
autobiographies, the momentous events of ―national reawakening‖ during the Third
Reich and emergence of a heroic leader may have instantiated for ordinary Germans the
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cultural model INDIVIDUALS ARE OBJECTS and thus ―facilitated the task of communicating
familiar inferences about the world‖ and ―allowed these inferences to be made swiftly
and accurately in the first place‖ (Quinn & Holland, 1987, p. 52). Just as my earlier
research suggested a connection between this cultural model and the willingness of SS
field personnel to accept killing orders, in the same way the model may have contributed
to the willingness of SS headquarters personnel—including members of the Sipo
Technical Matters Group—to administer those orders and, under the integrative exigence
of orders from above, at least temporarily negotiate among their own competing interests
the consensus required to do so.
The cultural model INDIVIDUALS ARE OBJECTS may also help explain the popular
salience, as described above, of the Volksgemeinschaft myth. At bottom, the concept of
the racial people‘s community formed the basis of what Koonz (2003) has called the
―Nazi conscience.‖ She pointed out, ―Although it may be repugnant to conceive of mass
murderers acting in accordance with an ethos that they believed vindicated their crimes,‖
the Nazis were ―modern secularists‖ who ―followed a coherent set of severe ethical
maxims derived from broad philosophical concepts‖ which ―they saw as appropriate to
their Aryan community.‖ In ―assert[ing] the superiority of their own communitarian
values,‖ they fostered a racial-ethnic public culture that offered not just ―its savage
hatreds but its lofty ideals,‖ ―relied not only on repression but also an appeal to
communal ideals of civic improvement,‖ and built ―a vibrant public culture founded on
self-denial and collective revival‖ (pp. 1-3). Thus, Koonz concluded, ―The road to
Auschwitz was paved with righteousness.‖ In his recent exposition of modern political
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religions, Burleigh (2007) describes how ―the fundamental structure of the Nazi creed
was soteriological, a redemptive story of suffering and deliverance, a sentimental journey
from misery to glory, from division to mystic unity based on the blood bond that linked
souls.‖ Indeed, ―Even when Nazism appeared most indebted to modern science, namely
in claiming that its racism was ‗scientific,‘ this discourse was as much cultural and
religious, as anyone . . . can readily establish‖ (pp. 105-106). The power of this story, of
the reawakening and redemption of the mystic People‘s Community, was such that
―Hitler‘s personal hold on the vast majority of Germans stemmed from and expressed, as
far as the content of his message went, three different and suprahistorical creeds: The
ultimate purity of the racial community, the ultimate crushing of Bolshevism and
plutocracy, and the ultimate millennial redemption (borrowed from Christian themes
known to all)‖ (Friedländer, 2007, p. xx).
The concept of Volksgemeinschaft—variously translated into English as either
national community, people‘s community, or racial community—also instantiated in the
German mind a binary opposition between Gemeinschaft (―community‖) and
Gesellschaft (―society‖). The former was associated with Kultur and the organic life of a
people, while the latter was linked the Zivilisation and the atomistic tendencies of urban
and industrial modernity. Thus, Volksgemeinschaft became the unifying conception for
the institutional culture of the National Socialist movement. For Hitler and his circle saw
National Socialism as a great popular movement. The Party was only the political
expression of that movement, while the Volksgemeinschaft embodied the ―socialist‖ side
of National Socialism and its goal of creating a racially-based national community in
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which class privilege was leveled and all citizens of German blood could advance by
merit. Such a ―national reawakening‖ struck a responsive chord in a people who had
been—unjustly, they believed—defeated in war and devastated by hyperinflation and
depression. By the same token, the regime stoked this popular sentiment with myriad
measures to increase racial consciousness (e.g., see Koonz, 2003; Fritzsche, 2008;
Burleigh & Wipperman, 1991). For example, after the September 1935 enactment of the
Nuremberg Laws, ―By 1936 almost all Germans—all who were not Jewish—had begun
to prepare for themselves an Ahnenpass, or racial passport,‖ carefully filling out blank
forms ―that could be purchased in any bookshop‖ and then using the document ―to enroll
in a Nazi youth group, serve in the Wehrmacht, get married, or take a [state-subsidized]
vacation trip‖ (Fritzsche, 2008, p. 76). The literature on the place of the ―people‘s
community‖ in Nazi thought and popular discourse during the Third Reich is vast. But as
regards the Nazi institutional culture that may have influenced the discourses of the Sipo
Technical Matters Group, two facets of the Volksgemeinschaft may stand out.
First, Nazi institutional culture advocated a distinctive view of technology which
redescribed technological pursuits as aesthetic expressions of Volksgeist or the spirit of
the people‘s community. This explains how the Nazis could have preached a seemingly
preindustrial vision of blood and soil while at the same time embracing the technological
fruits of rational Enlightenment means-end calculation. Schoenbaum (1966) argued the
Nazi stance toward technology was a ―double revolution‖ (pp. xxi-xxii) in which the
Nazis cynically employed technological means to achieve non-technological ends, thus
using technology in a tactical sense but without really believing in it. By contrast, Herf

54

(1986) convincingly argued that the Nazis did believe in technology, but by reinscribing
its meaning. Technology became under National Socialism not a rational manifestation of
Enlightenment values but an aesthetic expression of Volksgeist. Every dazzlingly modern
autobahn and train, every model factory and farm, every people‘s car (Volkswagen) and
people‘s radio (Volksempfänger), expressed the national will-to-power. There was no
disjunction for the Nazis between industrial and agricultural virtues, for they incorporated
technology into their romantic ideology.
Thus as ―reactionary modernists,‖ Herf (1986) contended, the Nazis rejected
Enlightenment rationality while embracing its technological fruits. They ―succeeded in
incorporating technology into the symbolism and language of Kultur—community,
blood, will, self, form, productivity, and finally race—by taking it out of the realm of
Zivilisation—reason, intellect, internationalism, materialism, and finance‖ (p. 16). As
Adorno and Horkheimer‘s (1944) dialectical theory might suggest, National Socialism
responded to the alienating effects of the post-Enlightenment myth of ―rationality‖ by
positing a new communitarian myth of its own. Indeed, as Allen (2002) documented, the
many industrial enterprises run by the SS were known to install machinery that was
operationally inefficient but satisfied an aesthetic desire to glorify the Volk by employing
the most ―modern‖ devices. In the same way, the automotive and chemical experts of the
SS gas van program operated in an institutional milieu where technical skill was lauded
for its contribution to the people‘s community.
Second, according to the Nazi Führerprinzip (―leadership principle‖), Hitler
proclaimed that ―the chief purpose of the state was to promote higher personalities to
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positions of authority: It builds not upon the idea of majority, but upon the idea of
personality‖ (Overy, 2004, p. 100). In the same way, the Leader of the nation would
emerge from the people and, in the ―truest‖ sense of democracy, rise naturally as an
expression of the national will. The dictator cribbed his Prinzip from a vulgarized reading
of Nietzsche that was popular in fin de siécle Europe (p. 103) and promoted by the PanGerman movement that Hitler followed as a young man in Vienna (Hamann, 1999, pp.
243, 236-237). In Germany, too, ―Notions of ‗heroic‘ leadership had been part of the
political culture of the nationalist Right in the years before the First World War‖ whereby
―a rebirth of the nation was promised through the subordination to a ‗great leader‘ who
would invoke the values of a ‗heroic‘ (and mythical) past‖ (Kershaw, 1998, p. 180).
Thus the Nazi Führerprinzip ―was not something grafted on to German political
culture, but derived its appeal from a wide, though by no means universal, expectation of
a German redeemer‖ (Overy, 2004, p. 105). In his autobiography Mein Kampf, written in
1924 while Hitler was still a fringe politican, the future dictator declared,

The movement must promote respect for personality by all means; it must never
forget that in personal worth lies the worth of everything human; that every idea
and every achievement is the result of one man‘s creative force and that the
admiration of greatness constitutes, not only a tribute of thanks to the latter, but
casts a unifying bond around the grateful. Personality cannot be replaced;
especially when it embodies not the mechanical but the cultural and creative
element. (Hitler, 1943/1925, p. 352)
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Further, wrote Hitler (1943/1925), the importance of the outstanding personality is seen
in the fact that ―The prerequisite for the creation of an organizational form is and remains
the man necessary for its leadership.‖ Organizational forms are useless without ―the
suitable leader‖ whose personality is needed ―to direct and drive it forward.‖ For that
reason, while leadership requires ability, ―greater importance must be attached to will and
energy than to intelligence as such, and most valuable of all is a combination of ability,
determination, and perseverance‖ (p. 349). The Führerprinzip was seen as antidote to the
dysfunctional special-interest politics of the Weimar Republic. Interminable
parliamentary wrangling and decision-by-committee would, according to Hitler‘s theory,
give way to a system in which the ablest leaders would naturally emerge, not by birth or
wealth but by merit, as an expression of the group‘s collective will, thereby establishing
clear lines for action, responsibility, and accountability.
In Hitler‘s own practice of the Führerprinzip he set in motion a ―polycracy,‖ a
Social Darwinist jungle world where Nazi satraps competed for power and Hitler‘s
approval. Both before and after his accession to power Hitler deliberately put followers
into overlapping offices (see Read, 2003). This tactic served five purposes: His followers
competed with each other rather than potentially combining against him. Disputes could
only be settled by Hitler, preserving his power. The ―ablest‖ followers rose to the top.
Meanwhile, since Hitler was famously reluctant to make decisions, he could bide his time
to see which side prevailed and back the winner. And the system freed Hitler, a notorious
bohemian who detested regular hours and working habits (see Speer, 1970), from daily
involvement in the minutiae of state affairs. These factors combined with horrific effect
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to bring about the Jewish Holocaust as the dictator let it be known he desired solutions to
the ―Jewish question‖ (Judenfrage), his subordinates competed in ―working towards the
Führer,‖ and the competition produced a ―cumulative radicalization‖ that resulted in
bulging Jewish ghettos and, ultimately, mass murder. Hitler himself—or at least the myth
of the Leader—functioned as a boundary object for temporarily holding together the
polycratic Nazi system. Thus, ―working towards the Führer‖ was

a key to how the Third Reich operated. . . . Hitler‘s personalized form of rule
invited radical initiatives from below and offered such initiatives backing, so long
as they were in line with his broadly defined goals. This promoted ferocious
competition at all levels of the regime . . . In the Darwinist jungle of the Third
Reich, the way to power and advancement was through anticipating the ―Führer
will,‖ and, without waiting for directives, taking initiatives to promote what were
presumed to be Hitler‘s aims and wishes. (Kershaw, 1998, pp. 529-530)

While the leader cult around Hitler is well known, the Nazis advocated the Führerprinzip
as the organizing principle for all levels of society. The peculiarly egalitarian rank
systems of the Nazi Party, Hitler Youth, SA and SS, in which virtually every rank is
designated a Führer, is but one expression of the leadership principle. A similar trend has
been noted in contemporary organizations. Citing Deetz‘s (1995, p. 87) observation that
modern corporations engage in ―managing the ‗insides‘—the hopes, fears, and
aspirations—of workers, rather than their behaviors directly,‖ Alvesson and Wilmott
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(2004) reported how organizations strive to regulate employees‘ self-identities and
―produce the appropriate individual‖ by employing ―the now widely used terms ‗leader‘
and ‗team leader‘ . . . which appeal to the positive cultural valences assigned to
discourses of supremacy and sport‖ (p. 437). In the Third Reich, the historian Peukert
(1987/1982) affirmed, ―Not the least of the achievements of National Socialist mass
organizations was that . . . they provided a considerable number of people with tasks and
jobs which boosted their sense of self-esteem and even offered real if limited
opportunities for promotion‖ (p. 72). And as we will see below, the Nazi ―leadership
principle‖ was an important integrative element within the cultures of the SS and the Sipo
Technical Matters Group. The principle facilitated the rhetorical boundary work of their
documents by bringing into being an organizational culture that provided explicit frames
for the roles of senders and receivers while simultaneously giving implicit sanction to the
competition between them over power and knowledge. As boundary objects, then,
documents created zones that could accommodate both custom and contestation.

Aspects of SS Organizational Culture
The Führerprinzip, with its idea that outstanding personalities should by their
merits rise to leadership as an expression of a group‘s collective will, introduced the
broader cultural theme of Volksgemeinschaft into the organizational life of the Third
Reich. Eighty years before Alvesson and Wilmott noted how organizations tap into
attractive cultural themes by employing the terms ―leader‖ and ―team leader,‖ thereby
channeling employees‘ aspirations into ―appropriate‖ self-identities, the SS was already
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doing so. Thus the personnel of the Sipo Technical Matters Group included a ―senior
storm unit leader‖ (Rauff), ―main storm leader‖ (Pradel), and ―junior storm leaders‖
(Wentritt and Becker). Such SS rank titles not only affirm the place of the Führerprinzip
in its organizational culture, but also highlight two others aspects of that culture which
are especially salient for the present study: the valence given to ―fighting spirit‖ and the
ongoing internal friction that resulted from the absorption of Germany‘s civil-service
professional police forces into the ideologically-driven Party organization that was
Himmler‘s SS.
As described at the outset, the SS was the archetype of Nazi polycracy. The
practical outworking of the Führerprinzip in SS organizational culture resulted in
ceaseless internal competition among overlapping power bases. Because the SS grew ad
hoc as Himmler accreted new offices and powers, SS personnel often held multiple
positions within different SS sections—or combined SS activity with positions in state
government or the Nazi party—to consolidate their personal power. And because the
Schwarzecorps (Black Corps) styled itself as a kind of elite third branch of government—
not the state, not the party, but the Leader‘s personal executive (Krausnick, 1968/1965)—
Himmler sought to cultivate a kaempfende Verwaltung (―fighting administration‖) by
recruiting university men, many of whom held doctorates, with Faehigkeit zur Hingabe
an den absoluten Wert einer Idee or the ability to devote themselves to the absolute value
of an idea (Wildt, 2003, pp. 205, 129). Reflecting the Social Darwinist worldview of the
Nazi movement, SS training programs urged each member ―to be a fighter on principle, a
fighter for fighting‘s sake‖ (Buchheim, 1968/1965, p. 322) and cultivated an ―open‖
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leadership style through training that ―abandoned overly simplistic indoctrination in favor
of . . . inventiveness‖ and initiative (Aly, 2000, p. 55). Substantive doctrine and theory
―was astonishingly meager‖ and educational materials ―no more than . . . vaporizings‖
(Buchheim, 1968/1965, p. 319); in fact, because the SS had no central animating vision
except to be elite defenders of the National Socialist state—and since it operated as a
―irregular‖ executive within the regime‘s extralegal sphere—then ―all that mattered was
maximum readiness and ability on the part of the SS man for certain concrete and
specific purposes‖ and the emphasis on fighting spirit really meant that ―in practice
success was all that mattered‖ (p. 327). The SS mentality, then, stressed ―heroic realism,‖
―soldierly bearing‖ and ―hardness,‖ but grounded these concepts in the Nazi worldview
of Volk and Führer in order to uphold the movement‘s ideal of the ―political soldier‖ (pp.
319-348). Thus could Himmler, in his infamous Posen Speech of October 1943, extol the
―glory‖ of genocide as expressing the ―fundamental principle‖ that SS members could
remain ―honest, decent, loyal, and comradely‖ by practicing ―the most important virtues‖
of loyalty, obedience, bravery, truthfulness, honesty, fellowship, acceptance of
responsibility, industry, and abstinence (Westermann, 2005, p. 93).
However, the culture of the SS (a Party organization) collided with that of
Germany‘s regular police forces (a State apparatus) when the two were merged after
1936. Browder (1990, 1996) has written extensively on Himmler‘s accumulation of
power: his 1931 appointment as leader of the Party‘s Schutzstaffeln (Protective Squad)
that guarded Hitler; his competition with Goering and Goebbels to build a Party security
service; his 1934 ascendance over the Sturmabteilung (SA stormtroopers) when the
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unruly brown-shirts were brought to heel by Hitler; and his gradual takeover of the preNazi political police forces of the various German states. But the key moment was
Himmler‘s June 1936 appointment by Hitler as Chief of the German Police, at one stroke
freeing Himmler from interference by the Reich Interior Ministry and allowing him to
consolidate the SS and regular police into a single entity. Yet the melding of SS
subculture and professional police subculture never quite ―took.‖ Himmler himself
expected it would require a generation to mold the organizational culture he envisioned.
Prior to Himmler‘s 1936 appointment there had never been a national police body
in Germany, not even an equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Police
forces answered to the various state and municipal governments—although the Reich
government mandated adoption of some common standards as a condition for receiving
federal subsidies. Thus most state‘s police forces were divided into uniformed Order
Police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo), which encompassed the metropolitan Protective Police
(Schutzpolizei or Schupo) and the rural Gendarmerie; and the plainclothes Criminal
Police (Kriminalpolizei or Kripo) for ordinary detective work, and political police for
combating the political street violence, strikes, putsch attempts, and other threats to
public order that were rampant in Weimar Germany. The political police in Prussia, the
German state that occupied two-thirds of Reich territory, were called the Secret State
Police (Geheimestaatspolizei or Gestapo). Each of these branches had, as Browder (1990,
1996) has documented at length, their individual subcultures, training requirements,
professional standards, rank titles, and career paths. At the same time, by 1936 the SS
had, as a Party organ, created its own Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) under
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Heydrich as an intelligence bureau for monitoring threats to the state. The SD had
developed its own subculture, appealing to individuals who were drawn to espionage and
the ideological mission of shaping the new Nazi state. When Himmler became Chief of
the German Police he allowed the regular uniformed police (Orpo) to retain a separate
organization. But he put Kripo and Gestapo under a new umbrella to be called the
Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo), which was then placed under Heydrich. Thus
the professional plainclothes detectives of the Kripo and Gestapo were thrown together
with ideologically motivated Party spies of the SD to create an entity known as ―Sipo and
SD‖ whose subcomponents were often in friction. Himmler‘s overarching vision was to
combine SS and police into a single State Protection Corps. But as Höhne (1969/1966)
has described, the Sipo and SD were as difficult to combine as oil and water.

The members of the Sipo and SD were drawn from different backgrounds. The
Sicherheitspolizei consisted primarily of the traditional police officials and
administrative law experts; the SD intelligence organization, on the other hand,
was a bustling, heterogeneous collection of men thrown up by the arbitrary SS
career regulations—a further reflection of the fact that the SD was a Party
organization and the Sicherheitspolizei a State institution. (p. 253)

The SD did not have access to State funds and its budget was chronically in deficit.
Thought was given to abolishing the SD but Himmler feared that other Party rivals might
rush in to fill the void. SD personnel not only feared losing their jobs if the Service was
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disbanded, but also feared losing their positions if merged with the trained professional
detectives of the Gestapo and Kripo. By the same token, Heydrich was concerned that a
merger of SD and Sipo would bring an influx of legal-administrative personnel who
would hinder the SD‘s freedom of action. Then, too, Himmler‘s soundings of the Nazi
inner circle ―convinced him that the Party leadership would never permit a combination
of a Party organization with a State institution to form a new official super-authority‖
(Höhne, 1969/1966, p. 256). Party leaders did not want an intelligence agency backed by
State authority looking into their affairs. Thus in September 1939 Heydrich at last created
a ―Reich Security Main Office‖ (Reichssicherhietshauptamt or RSHA) that amounted to
―no more than a feeble compromise‖ (p. 256) since the Sipo and SD retained separate
organizational identities and budgets, the one still a State organization and the other
dependent on the Party. So as not to alarm Party leaders, the RSHA

was never allowed to use the name in public; the instructions laid down that the
letter-heading ―Reichssicherheitshauptamt‖ was not to be used in correspondence
with other authorities. The RSHA, in fact, led a shadowy existence; officially no
one was supposed to know of it. It remained an organization valid for internal
purposes only; the only title appearing on the surface was that of ―Chief of the
Sicherheitspolizei and SD‖ (CSSD). Even the dream of combining the SD with
the Sicherheitspolizei came to nothing. Party and State refused to mix. (p. 256)

Thus, members of the SD and the Gestapo continued to compete with each other in the
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field of intelligence (even as both competed with the intelligence operations of the
Wehrmacht and the Foreign Ministry). The inability to mix Party and State is seen in
microcosm with Walter Rauff who simultaneously headed the Technical Matters Group
of the Security Police (RSHA Amt II D) and of SD foreign intelligence (RSHA Amt VI
F). And as the men of the SD who had come up through SS recruiting standards feared
merging with regular police professionals, the latter also were confronted with a perhaps
unwelcome array of confusing new rules after their organizations were brought into the
SS. These included pressure on career police professionals to apply for membership in
the SS, the conditions under which membership and an SS rank equivalent to their police
rank would be granted, expectations that those accepted into the SS would quit their
membership in other Party organizations, and requirements to wear SS service dress and
insignia. Numerous and often confusing and conflicting directives were issued. In
practice, however, those who served in the regular uniformed Order Police received
nearly automatic acceptance into the SS at an equivalent rank; but for the plainclothes
professional detectives of the Security Police, rank parity ―was contingent upon a whole
series of conditions‖ (Buchheim, 1968/1965, pp. 203-213).
Police personnel, who often had years or decades of professional training and
experience in their duties, were also subjected after 1936 to ideological training designed
to instill in them the ―soldierly‖ SS ethic and to ―create an organizational culture in which
anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism emerged as institutional norms‖ (Westermann, 2005,
p. 98). Those police accepted into the SS thereby submitted themselves to the
organization‘s requirements for physical stature and mental aptitude, documented
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―Aryan‖ ancestry (both for the SS member and any woman he proposed to marry),
attainment of the SS sports badge, and regular participation in SS membership activities
in addition to their police jobs (p. 101). Some police veterans no doubt disapproved of
special treatment given to police candidates who came up through SS recruitment
channels so that ―preference in recruiting police officers [was] given to those men who
were members of the Hitler Youth, the SA [storm troops], or the SS‖ (p. 95). Under 1937
guidelines issued by Himmler, police were to receive ideological training from the Race
and Settlement Main Office (RuSHA) in coordination with SS training directors and
special lecturers. When the RuSHA became overwhelmed by the large scale of the
program, indoctrination of police was taken over by the SS Training Office (pp. 103104). Nevertheless, training was intended to be practical rather than strictly doctrinaire:

The guidelines encouraged the selection of a speaker with a previously
established personal relationship with the listeners. The latter measure was
intended to encourage questions and the free exchange of ideas between comrades
united in a shared mission. The ability of the lecturer to relate the material to the
everyday life and experience of his listeners was also viewed as critical to
successful instruction. Guidelines for these presentations, however, reminded the
lecturer of his responsibility to ―reflect on the fact that he is neither political
prophet nor priest but rather stands as a political soldier in front of political
soldiers.‖ (Westermann, 2005, p. 105)
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Again may be seen the SS emphasis not on theory and dogma but on practicality,
initiative, and ―soldierly‖ freedom of action within the framework of the general Nazi
worldview—an unfamiliar mix for police veterans who had made their careers before the
advent of the new regime. These organizational contexts may help explain why, in the
Sipo Technical Matters Group, the career police officer and transport manager Pradel
insisted on being addressed according to his police rank and—as we will learn in the next
chapter by exploring the biographies and motivations of the Group‘s individual actors—
why Pradel disliked and did not get along with Rauff. How the values, practices, and
subcultures that each man inhabited were differentiated within the Group is important to
understand, for they are the two main players in its discourse on the gas vans.
Where then did Rauff and Pradel, and the other senders and receivers of the
Sonderwagen documents generated in the spring and summer of 1942 by the Sipo
Technical Matters Group, fit within the organizational structure of the SS? Or perhaps,
we might rephrase the question as it pertains to the rhetorical work of the boundary
objects they produced. We have seen how the institutional culture of the Nazi movement
and the organizational culture of the SS provided many integrative elements, and also
how the clash of SS and civil service cultures generated a tacit and ongoing element of
differentiation within the newly created Sipo and SD. But what were the formal divisions
in the organization that differentiated the gas van killers into their various subcultures and
created the formal boundaries which their texts were required to span?
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Lines of Organizational Authority
By the time that the Sonderwagen program was ordered in the late summer and
early fall of 1941, the SS comprised the Allgemeine SS (―General SS‖) and Waffen-SS
(―Armed SS‖). The latter were military formations that participated in frontline duty,
while the former was concerned with internal security through its police powers,
intelligence operations, camp system, and slave-labor industries. Power bases within the
Allgemeine SS that were significant players in the Final Solution included the Reich
Security Main Office (RSHA) headed by Reinhard Heydrich, the Economic and
Administrative Main Office (WVHA) headed by Oswald Pohl, and two regional SS
officials—Wilhelm Koppe and Odilo Globocnik—who held regional posts in the system
of SS and Police Leaders (SSPFs) that Himmler established as his personal
representatives in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
The RSHA conducted ―The Holocaust by Bullets‖ (Desbois, 2008) through its
mobile Einsatzgruppen shooting squads that operated in captured Soviet territory from
June 1941 through the end of the war, though most mass executions were completed by
1943. In response to Himmler‘s August 1941 order that a less psychologically stressful
method of mass killing be devised the RSHA, as described in Chapter 2, launched a fleet
of mobile gas vans that ultimately numbered about 20 vehicles and operated throughout
the occupied Soviet lands and in the Balkans. Gas vans were also furnished to Koppe
who in December 1941 set up the first operational death camp at Chelmno in former
Polish territory that had been annexed to Germany proper. Arthur Greiser, the Nazi
governor of the territory, wanted to make his district Judenrein (―Jew-cleansed‖) as soon
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as possible; as a condition for accepting 20,000 Jews and 5,000 Gypsies to be deported
from Germany he asked Himmler and Koppe for assistance in liquidating 100,000 Polish
Jews from the overcrowded Lodz ghetto, thus saving him the expense of feeding them.
The vans offered certain advantages for the RSHA because they could be quickly
built and Einsatzgruppen personnel were already in the field to employ the vehicles.
Permanent gassing facilities would take months to construct and would not easily fit into
the RSHA organizational structure. However, stationary gas chambers that killed with
prussic acid were developed by the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office
(WVHA) and its Concentration Camp Inspectorate which ran the dual slave-labor-andextermination camps at Auschwitz and Majdanek. And gas chambers that killed with
carbon monoxide were built by Globocnik, a Himmler favorite and the SS and Police
Leader of the Lublin District in occupied Poland, at the extermination-only camps of
Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor. Thus the Final Solution ultimately encompassed some
1.5 million shootings and 150,000 gas van murders committed under the aegis of the
RSHA by the Einsatzgruppen in the field; an estimated 150,000 murders at Chelmno
overseen by Koppe and conducted with gas vans supplied by the RSHA; and some 4
million gassings at the two WVHA camps (which also held prisoners for hard labor) and
the three Aktion Reinhard camps (built solely for exterminations) managed by Globocnik.
Nevertheless, the RSHA had a presence in all the extermination facilities since, under its
internal security mandate, its Gestapo units selected those to be detained in the camps and
then monitored potential resistance activities by the inmates.
The SS chain of command for the Final Solution began with Reichsführer-SS
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Heinrich Himmler. All those in charge of killing operations—Heydrich of the RSHA,
Pohl of the WVHA, and the system of SS and Police Leaders—reported to Himmler. The
RSHA itself was comprised of seven divisions: Amt I, Personnel; Amt II, Administration
and Finance; Amt III, Domestic Security Service; Amt IV, Gestapo (Secret State Police);
Amt V, Criminal Police (plainclothes detective force); Amt VI, Foreign Security Service;
and Amt VII, Ideology (Hilberg, 2003, pp. 284-285). During the war Heydrich was also
named Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, or governor of occupied
Czechoslovakia—where he was assassinated by Czech partisans and died June 4, 1942.
Until then Heydrich engaged in constant turf battles with the SS Order Police (regular
uniformed police), while his Security Service struggled for supremacy with the
intelligence services of the Wehrmacht and Foreign Ministry.
Amt II Administration and Finance, headed by Hans Nockemann, was comprised
of four departments. Among these was II D Technical Matters led by Walther Rauff. The
SS lieutenant colonel, however, reported directly to Heydrich—going over the head of
Nockemann—and was responsible for negotiating with the Wehrmacht High Command
for allocations of munitions and vehicles with which to supply the Einsatzgruppen. It was
not uncommon in the RSHA for important subordinates to work directly with Heydrich,
as did Adolf Eichmann. In contrast to the ―banal‖ bureaucrat famously portrayed by
Arendt (1963), Eichmann displayed—in keeping with SS officer training—considerable
independent initiative and dexterity when at Heydrich‘s direct request he organized
Jewish deportations to the death camps, even though he technically reported to Gestapo
(Amt IV) chief Heinrich Muller.
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Under the nomenclature of the RSHA the units responsible for the gas van
program were II D (Technical Matters Group, headed by Walter Rauff, of the
Administration and Finance Office), IID3 (Sipo transportation, directed by Friedrich
Pradel), and IID3a (Berlin main garage, managed by Harry Wentritt). Rauff‘s brief
included IID1 (film, photography, criminological equipment), IID2 (telephone and
teleprinter communications), IID4 (armory), and IID5 (supplies). He was also head of the
Technical Matters Group (VI F) of the Foreign Security Service (Amt VI), in which
capacity he performed personal tasks for Heydrich in occupied Czechoslovakia. In the
initial testing of the gas vans Group II D received assistance from the chemical experts of
the Criminal Technical Institute, a detective police lab designated Group V F of the Reich
Criminal Police Main Office (Amt V). Internal clients for the mobile gas vans were
officially the Sipo and SD Regional Offices which the RSHA had set up in the occupied
Eastern territories. These offices nominally oversaw the Einsatzgruppen so that orders for
the vans were initiated by Sipo and SD regional officials. In turn, the Sipo Technical
Matters Group furnished both the vans and their drivers, along with any spare parts that
might be needed during operations. When these ―special missions‖ were completed then
the vans and drivers were returned to the motor pool in Berlin. In addition, the Technical
Matters Group employed a field inspector (August Becker) to check on operations, alert
Berlin to any problems, and recommend options to remedy the deficiencies.
Thus, we see a number of formal boundaries relevant to any consideration of the
Group‘s documents. Rauff was the executive conduit between the gas van program and
its stakeholders—the top echelon of the RSHA, the program staff, the internal clients, the
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vendors and suppliers. Pradel was the midlevel managerial conduit between Rauff and
the motor pool employees. Wentritt was the junior-level conduit between Pradel and the
Berlin mechanics. Becker was the conduit between Rauff and the program‘s field
operations. And in contrast to the executive, managerial and technical staff who worked
in Berlin, Becker and the drivers were deployed in the field and worked with the end
users of the vans. In numerous ways the organization was subdivided ―into networks
based on tasks, relationships, information, and functions‖ (Keyton, 2005, p. 37) that
could—and did—lead to multiple and contradictory realities. Or as Martin‘s (1992, 2002)
theory holds, we now see the outlines of organizational differentiation as members
inhabited differing subcultures that had to be negotiated.

German Bureaucratic Document Protocols
Understanding the lines of organizational authority within the SS, and in
particular Heydrich‘s Reich Security Main Office, is important for another reason. For
the authorship and routing of the gas van documents produced by the Sipo Technical
Matters Group cannot be grasped without a knowledge of its organizational relationships,
imperatives, and prerogatives.
On June 1, 1940, a directive was issued and circulated to all RSHA offices that set
out exacting guidelines for document creation. These included explicit instructions on
filing codes; the bureaucratic implications of letterheads and departmental symbols; who
had authority to sign documents in his own name, who had authority to sign for his
immediate superior, who did not have such authority, and how authority or non-authority
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should be indicated; how handwritten notations should be made in colored pencils
according to rank; and that ―Long, complicated sentences should be avoided, and margins
should be left for comments‖ (Lozowick, 2000, p. 48). These RSHA guidelines also
reflected standard bureaucratic protocols observed in German governmental organs from
the First World War through the Third Reich. As Lozowick explained,

The signer of a document generally was not the person who wrote it, and often the
writer was not the person who initiated it. In many cases, there is great doubt
today as to the identity of the document‘s creator, which is to say the person who
determined what the content would be. This is a major stumbling block for
historians because the tendency is to conflate these processes and attribute them to
the person who signed the document. The signer was indeed responsible for what
the document says, but the question is whether he was the only one responsible.
(p. 44)

Document protocols reflected the common assumption that:

The head of the system expresses his will, at the middle levels it is translated into
detailed instructions, and at the junior levels it is carried out. When underlings run
into a problem or into new possibilities, they notify their superiors at the middle
level, who in turn draft new proposals for action, and present them to the top man.
He approves, and proposals return to the working level in the form of instructions.
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The assumption is that this method integrates in a maximal way the broad outlook
of the senior official with the lower officials‘ view of reality in the field. The midlevel officials must be an efficient pipeline in both directions—they must transfer
principles of policy from above to below, and report the difficulties or
opportunities for action from below to above. (p. 45)

Rauff held a position at the rank of Referent and, because he therefore served as ―chief
technical adviser and aide of the Minister, Secretary, and Division Director, he was in
charge of a particular field of work . . . [and was] actually in control of most current
business, once policies have been approved by his superiors‖ (Brecht & Glaser, 1940, p.
25; quoted in Lozowick, 2000, p. 46). Thus, for example, in the German original of the
technical proposal which various scholars (e.g., Dombrowski, 2000a; Katz, 1992a) have
analyzed, the signer of the document—the dispatcher Willi Just—signed by hand his last
name only. Above his name, Just also handwrote the initials ―I.A.‖ This means Just was
signing im Auftrag, as opposed to in Vetretung or ―I.V.‖ Only the agency head under
whose institutional symbol a document was issued could sign in his own name. A person
one rank below was permitted to sign I.V. or ―as the representative of‖ his superior,
which in fact meant he was ―signing at his own discretion, under the authority that his
commander had granted him‖ (Lozowick, 2000, pp. 48-49). By contrast, ―A person
signing I.A., ‗at the direction of,‘ was not signing at his own discretion, but rather by
order of his commander, who did not want to be bothered signing himself. The source of
authority for the signature is not the rank of the signer but the rank of the person who
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gave the order to sign‖ (p. 49). Thus, Lozowick pointed out,

The greater our sensitivity to these author codes, the greater our accuracy in
describing the shaping of policy—and, when the issue is creation of policy within
a bureaucratic system, there is no objective testimony. This is even more true with
regard to the testimony of bureaucrats of murder . . . Decisions were not made by
a specific person, but rather sprouted from within an undergrowth of senior
officers who could make decisions and subordinates who knew what to propose.
. . . [T]hey all understood their mission clearly and pursued it out of choice. When
they faced groups of officials with other intentions, they reacted in a way that was
meant to advance, as best they could, the policy that they had chosen. (p. 56)

Thirty years after the fact, Rauff in his postwar deposition still placed great stress on the
matter of representational authority.

How the issue of Heydrich‘s representation was regulated when I returned to the
RSHA at the beginning of 1941 [and Heydrich was posted to Prague as Deputy
Reich Protector of occupied Czech territory], I don‘t know. I can only assume that
someone represented him in his absence, without however being able to say who
that could have been. Also for the time of his activity in Prague and for the time
after his death, I don‘t know what the representation regulation was. I can only
assume that during this time the heads of department were directly subordinated
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to Himmler. Furthermore a man like, for instance, [Gestapo chief Heinrich]
Mueller would never have subordinated himself to . . . another head of department
at the same level. I neither know anything about whether there was a regulation
regarding the representation of one head of department by another. I would
personally say that, in case of impediment affecting one head of department, the
respective head of division became active under his own responsibility or turned
directly to the head of the main office. (Nizkor, 2002, p. 13)

Rauff was shown a document by postwar investigators and immediately interjected, ―I
cannot explain why in the letter from section IIA2 of 19 November 1942 shown to me,
Dr. Siegert is mentioned as ‗head of department in representation‘ and why this letter is
also signed by Streckenbach ‗in representation‘‖ (Nizkor, 2002, p. 13). He also observed
how, in 1939 before his stint as Technical Matters head and when he held a junior rank,
―Although I am mentioned as a participant in most of these [department head] meetings
and although the initial under the protocols [meeting minutes] is without doubt my own, I
have no memory at this time of having taken part in these meetings. . . . I consider it
possible that . . . being the youngest of those present, I was put in charge of writing the
protocol‖ (p. 8).
Another vital clue for understanding the origins of RSHA documents is their
filing codes, which were regulated by the June 1, 1940, directive. Thus the notation on
the technical proposal signed by Willi Just—―IID3a(9) Nr. 214/42 g.Rs.‖—is a filing
code that means:

76

File under Department IID3a [Pradel‘s motor pool] (9) [Just‘s identification]
214 [subject code; documents presented at Nuremberg suggest the 200s may have
referred to Sonderwagen matters] 42 [year] g.Rs. [classified Geheime
Reichssache or ―Secret Reich Matter‖].

These insights into German bureaucratic protocol in general, and RHSA practice in
particular, highlight the importance to heed Lozowick‘s (2000) warning and avoid the
tendency ―to conflate these processes and attribute them to the person who signed the
document‖ and instead realize that ―The signer of a document generally was not the
person who wrote it, and often the writer was not the person who initiated it‖ (pp. 44-45).
Keeping in mind, then, that German bureaucratic documents were usually
collaborative products that emerged from a thicket of junior, midlevel and senior
personnel—who were the members of the Sipo Technical Matters Group? If we imagine
for a moment that organization and fragmentation represent two poles of social existence,
the first a state of (at least temporary) consensus and the second an opposite state of
complete fragmentation into individual interests, it is relevant to ask: What were those
individual interests that the Group held at bay, via the rhetorical work of their boundary
objects, to stave off fragmentation—and thereby collaborate on documents of such
stunning calculation and callousness toward the mass murder of other human beings?
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR MOTIVES

Personnel of the Gas Van Program
Organizations at any given time manifest, as we learned earlier, the three
dimensions of integration, differentiation, and fragmentation (Martin, 1992, 2002;
Martin, Frost & O‘Neil, 2006). Perhaps boundary objects might therefore be conceived as
putting forth integrative discourses that strive to resonate with what organization
members share, in order to negotiate those members‘ differentiated values, practices, and
subcultures in a way that, when prompted by an integrative exigence, can produce
temporary and issue-specific consensus amidst the change, confusion, and ambiguity of
organizational fragmentation. Thus, to illuminate the integrative dimension of the Sipo
Technical Matters Group we have so far followed Longo‘s (1998) cultural research
methodology by first exploring the historical and cultural contexts that the killers broadly
shared—the long history of religious and economic anti-Semitism and modern history of
racial anti-Semitism, and German cultural touchstones about the natures of human
activity and community as these were subsequently picked up and expressed in the Nazi
doctrines of Volksgemeinschaft and Führerprinzip. These historical and cultural contexts
are salient, we discovered, because organizations are open systems that absorb larger
societal discourses and then shape local versions. Next we investigated the differentiating
dimension of the Sipo Technical Matters Group by exploring the varieties of values,
practices, and subcultures its members inhabited—the differentiation between ideological
Party followers and career police professionals, and the myriad organizational divisions
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of the SS and its Reich Security Main Office (RSHA).
Now we can move onto the dimension of fragmentation within the Sipo Technical
Matters Group, how competing interests dealt with change, confusion, and ambiguity as
they contested, negotiated, or resisted attempts at temporary and issue-specific consensus.
Exploring the flux of their consensus and dissensus also brings us to the next level of
Longo‘s (1998) methodology, as we begin to see the texts they produced as a discourse.
The roster of gas-van murderers begins with Walther Rauff. In his role as head of
the Sipo Technical Matters Group, he was to ―The Holocaust by Bullets‖ (Desbois, 2008)
what Adolf Eichmann was to the Holocaust by gas. Once the Final Solution had become
policy, Eichmann was the executive manager who implemented the gassing phase by
negotiating with agencies such as the Reichsbahn (national railway administration) and
arranging the logistics of transporting Jews to the death camps. In the same way Rauff
was the executive manager of the initial shooting phase of the Final Solution, negotiating
on Heydrich‘s behalf with the Wehrmacht High Command to obtain the munitions
required to gun down an estimated 1.5 million Jews. Both held the rank of SSObersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel). Yet Eichmann is better known to the postwar
world because Auschwitz, rather than Babi Yar, came to symbolize the Holocaust. The
liberation of the camps exposed the gas chambers and crematoria for all to see, while the
dead of the Einsatzgruppen shootings remained scattered across vast territories and their
locations often unknown. The film footage taken by the Allies at Dachau and BergenBelsen have shocked the world since they were first shown at the Nuremberg Trials in
1946. By contrast, the Einsatzgruppen officers reentered postwar German society, many
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to respected positions in civil service and industry. When put on trial in the 1960s and
early 1970s they were prosecuted only as accomplices to murder and many were
acquitted or given light sentences. For his part, Rauff fled to South America and lived out
his days under the protection of the Chilean government until his death in 1984.
Born in 1906, Rauff was the son of a banker who raised him with martial
discipline. Too young to see service in the Great War, he joined the German Navy in
1924 and rose to first lieutenant and the command of a minehunter. When charges of
adultery and a messy divorce compelled his resignation from the navy in 1937, Rauff was
befriended by a former shipmate and reserve naval officer who simultaneously held a
commission in the SS. In fact, Rauff was so desirable as an SS recruit that he suffered no
obstacles from his ―hurried‖ remarriage to a woman whose former husband was Jewish.
―Rauff repaid his benefactors with a zeal that always earned the highest accolades in his
personnel file‖ (Browning, 1991, p. 60). Through his personal connection Rauff was
hired in 1938 by the SS Security Service and made a mobilization expert in preparation
for the 1939 German invasion of Poland. Heydrich was organizing Einsatzgruppen to
follow behind the Wehrmacht and murder Polish leaders and intelligentsia. Thus Rauff
joined a specially created bureau charged with compiling a personnel card file ―to
provide a comprehensive list of SS and police personnel who could be called on to form a
special command for action in Poland‖ and later to ―select SS officers who would work
‗ruthlessly and harshly to achieve National Socialist aims‘‖ (Rossino, 2003, pp. 11-12).
He was present at numerous high-level meetings and at least once entrusted with
preparing the minutes (Nizkor, 2002)—much as Eichmann assisted Heydrich in drafting
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the infamous Wansee Protocols.
Rauff ―was thus very well informed about the mass murder taking place in Poland
since the beginning of the war‖ (Mallmann & Cüppers, 2005, p. 4). After the success of
the Polish campaign Rauff received permission in 1940 to volunteer for a naval tour as
commander of a minehunter squadron in the English Channel, a potentially important
posting as Hitler weighed a seaborne invasion of Britain. But Operation Sealion was
abandoned as Hitler decided instead to prepare an invasion of the Soviet Union. Heydrich
personally interceded with Admiral Raeder, the commander-in-chief of the Navy, to have
Rauff returned to the RSHA in early 1941. His Polish experience would be valuable as
Heydrich was mobilizing Einsatzgruppen for the upcoming Russian campaign. Then, too,
Heydrich had likewise joined the SS (in 1931) after being cashiered from the Navy over
charges of sexual impropriety and breach of promise, so that he and Rauff had their naval
backgrounds in common. Rauff was put in charge of the technical department that would
supply the Einsatzgruppen preparing for ―special tasks‖ in conquered Soviet lands. In
that capacity he quickly ―rose on the SS ladder‖ and became ―one of those most centrally
responsible for the mass murder of the Jews‖ (Mallman & Cüppers, 2005, p. 5).
At the same time, his boss Heydrich had been appointed—in addition to his
RSHA post—by Hitler as the chief civil administrator of occupied Czech territory. Thus,
while retaining his RSHA positions, ―Rauff followed his superior Heydrich to Prague
when the latter was appointed Deputy Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia [in
September 1941]. Rauff‘s job there was to direct organizing the technical intelligence
service in Heydrich‘s new office‖ (Mallmann and Cüppers, 2005, p. 5). As a
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consequence, Rauff split his time between Berlin and Prague.
The project of adapting the concept of gas vans, used previously in the
―euthanasia‖ program, was given to Rauff‘s Technical Matters Group since the Berlin
motor pool was already supplying vehicles to the Einsatzgruppen. The vans entered
service by December 1941 but were attended by constant breakdowns and unanticipated
operational difficulties. And within six months the mass shootings and mobile gassings
were beginning to wind down, especially as purpose-built extermination camps would
soon be coming online. After Heydrich was assassinated in June 1942, the following
month Rauff took an SS field command in Africa. Eventually he ran a slave labor camp
in Tunis and by war‘s end headed Gestapo operations in Milan, Italy.
Friedrich Pradel, who reported to Rauff as head of the Sipo transportation service
(IID3), was born 1901 and went on to attain his Abitur and briefly attended university. He
trained three years for a career in sales but in 1925 changed direction and entered officer
training for the Prussian municipal police force, where Pradel achieved the rank of major
and became a specialist an automotive affairs. After the absorption of German police
forces into the SS in 1936, a year later he was brought to the Berlin headquarters of the
regular uniformed police. Soon, however, he was transferred to Heydrich‘s Security
Police and put in charge of its four thousand motor vehicles (Browning, 1991, pp. 6061). Rauff testified after the war about the friction between them:

For the provision of the motor vehicles of the Security Police my subordinate
Pradel was responsible. Pradel, who had come from the Order Police, didn‘t like
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me and was in a certain conflict with me. As to whether I had differences with
him regarding the [gas vans] . . . I consider that possible, but cannot remember it
exactly. (Nizkor, 2002)

The friction between the two men is suggested by an incident regarding Pradel‘s transfer
from the Order Police to the Security Police. A year after Pradel came to Berlin he was
granted an SS rank equivalent to his rank of major in the municipal police. That same
year, 1938, he was granted Nazi Party membership retroactive to 1937 (Browning, 1991,
pp. 60-61). But Pradel continued to identify professionally with the uniformed police.
The gas van field inspector, Becker, testified after the war that even though Pradel was
given the equivalent SS rank of Hauptsturmführer (captain) he preferred to be addressed
by his police rank of ―Major‖ (Klee, Dressen & Riess, 1991/1988, p. 69). In fact, Pradel
did not officially request a transfer from the regular uniformed police to the Security
Police until February 1942. Rauff supported the transfer but damned Pradel with faint
praise. He lacked leadership qualities, Rauff asserted, and neither could his ―inner
attitude‖ (political reliability) or ―Weltanschauung‖ (ideology) be vouchsafed. But Pradel
managed automotive affairs ―with considerable success,‖ Rauff allowed, and the Security
Police could not develop such expertise on its own any time soon (Browning, 1991, pp.
60-61). The transfer was granted but not until December 1943. Pradel‘s limited
leadership skills and initiative are also seen in the fact that he was unable to secure the
chassis needed for the first gas vans so that Rauff had to intervene with the Wehrmacht.
Since the superstructures would have to be outsourced to a contractor, it was also Rauff

83

who suggested the ruse of ordering the specially sealed truck compartments on the
pretext of needing them to transport corpses infected with spotted fever (Beer, 1987).
The nature of Rauff‘s orders to Pradel for the gas vans were disputed by the two
men after war. ―Pradel claimed he protested to Rauff, but was told that any difficulties he
made would have to be reported to Heydrich. Rauff denied that he threatened Pradel; the
latter was so ambitious, he said, that that was totally unnecessary‖ (Browning, 1991, p.
101). In any event, Pradel had already organized vehicle supply for the Einsatzgruppen
and had heard from drivers of the mass shootings. Since he had also seen a number of the
Einsatzgruppen daily situation reports, he knew of the mass murders occurring in Soviet
territory (p. 61). As for his ambition, Pradel‘s may have been of a different sort than
Rauff‘s since he was arrested by the SS in 1944 for black marketeering. Accused with
several co-workers of trading gasoline for liquor, he was sent to the Oranienburg
concentration camp but then released in January 1945 to serve on the Eastern Front with
the Waffen-SS. ―Thus Pradel fell far short of the Nazi ideal but was useful for his
technical expertise until he succumbed to the temptation of corruption‖ (p. 61). After the
war Pradel resumed his police career, until his 1961 arrest and subsequent trial for his gas
van activities. He and Wentritt were tried together and both convicted in 1966, Pradel
receiving a seven-year sentence and Wentritt three years.
Harry Wentritt was born 1903, the son of a Berlin trolley driver, and at age
sixteen entered vocational training to become an electrical mechanic. He was an ―old
fighter‖ who joined the Nazi Party in 1932, before Hitler‘s accession to power, and was
active in the National Socialist Motor Corps and a motorized SA stormtroop. Wentritt in
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1935 found work with the Gestapo as an auto welder and subsequently transferred a year
later from the SA to the SS (Browning, 1991, p. 61). In June 1941 when the chief
mechanic at the Sipo garage in Berlin was transferred to similar duties at the Sipo and SD
Regional Office in Minsk (Langerbein, 2004, p. 107), Wentritt was appointed to the job.
Within three months Wentritt—who held the rank of SS-Untersturmführer (second
lieutenant)—learned from Pradel about the orders to construct mobile gas vans. ―Though
admittedly not endowed with a quick mind, in the course of time he too realized that the
proposed gas vans were for killing Jews‖ (Browning, 1991, p. 61).
August Becker was born 1900, the son of a factory owner, and after brief service
in World War I went on to earn a Ph.D. in chemistry in 1933. His political reliability was
unimpeachable, having joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and the SS in 1931, serving in the
Gestapo in 1934 and in an armed SS regiment in 1935-38, and then moving to the
Security Service (SD) in Berlin where he was put in charge of the bureau responsible for
replicating inks and photocopies. In December 1939 he was loaned to the T4 euthanasia
program (Friedlander, 1995, pp. 210-211), where he participated in the first test of a gas
chamber and then organized distribution of carbon monoxide canisters to the killing
centers (Browning, 1991, p. 58). Among T4 personnel he was known as ―Red Becker‖
for his hair. When T4 was officially closed in August 1941, Himmler recalled his SS
personnel in order to use their newfound expertise. As field inspector for the program,
Becker left Germany in January 1942 and over the next nine months visited each of the
four Einsatzgruppen operating in Soviet territory, keeping in frequent contact with Rauff
(pp. 68-71; Beer 1987). Yet even Becker‘s dulled ethical threshold was finally exceeded
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at the end of his inspection tour. In September 1942 he arrived in Minsk where SS units
were in the midst of clearing the Jewish ghettos of the Ukraine and Ostland. In the last
major operation of the gas vans, some 55,000 Minsk Jews were killed (Rhodes, 2002, pp.
255-256). This was too much even for Becker, who after three days in Minsk hitched a
ride on a truck bound for Warsaw and then back to Berlin (Klee et al. 1991, p. 71).
Becker was promoted in 1943 from SS-Untersturmführer (second lieutenant) to SSObersturmführer (first lieutenant), worked for a time at a state-sponsored agricultural
products company in the occupied East, and returned to Berlin with the RSHA Foreign
Security Service (Amt VI). After the war he was sentenced by the Allies to three years in
a labor camp for his membership in the SS—deemed a criminal organization—and
remained free until 1960, when he was condemned by a German court for his role in the
T4 and gas vans murders. But his ten-year sentence was commuted for health reasons and
Becker was released to a nursing home; he died seven years later.
Albert Widmann was born 1912; though the son of a locomotive engineer, he
managed to earn a 1938 doctorate in chemistry from Stuttgart‘s respected Technische
Hochschule. During his student days Widmann worked during his vacations for Dr.
Walter Heess, a Stuttgart police lab chemist who in 1938 was appointed head of the
Criminal Technical Institute (KTI) of the Reich Criminal Police Main Office (RKPA) in
Berlin. Heess brought along his protégé Widmann, who had just graduated, and made
him head of the KTI chemistry section. Active in the National Socialist Motor Corps
since 1933, Widmann was granted Nazi Party membership in 1937 and then entered the
SS in 1939. When the KTI was asked to advise the T4 euthanasia program, Widmann
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performed animal tests. His recommendation that pure carbon monoxide gas be used as
the killing agent was accepted. Once the Einsatzgruppen mass shootings commenced and
Himmler in August 1941 asked that a less stressful killing method be devised, RKPA
chief Arthur Nebe summoned Widman to make tests—conducted on asylum patients—of
dynamiting victims and of killing through vehicle exhaust gas. Later in Berlin when
Heydrich ordered construction of a gas van fleet, Widman rounded up Soviet prisoners
from nearby Sachsenhausen concentration camp and conducted tests to determine what
level of carbon monoxide would be lethal. ―Attracted by tasks ‗more important to the war
effort‘ than fighting crime, Widmann would subsequently become involved not only in
the gas van but also in demolition, poison gas grenades, and poison bullets‖ (Browning,
1991, p. 58).
Willi Just, born 1899, was older than the youthful ―up-and-comers‖ such as Rauff
(born 1906) who were prized by the SS, and also had been professionally surpassed by
the younger Pradel (born 1901) and Wenttrit (born 1903) to whom he reported. His SS
personnel file shows that Just saw frontline duty during the First World War, worked as a
welder, and in 1920 joined the Schutzpolizei (Schupo) or regular municipal police. These
experiences may have distinguished Just from the younger Rauff, Pradel, and Wentritt.
For one thing, those who were born too late for frontline service often felt cheated of a
defining life-experience and sought other ways to compensate. Also, Just obtained steady
postwar civil-service employment that insulated him from the hyperinflation of 1922-23,
a time when younger persons often struggled to establish themselves—as was the case
with Pradel. After the Schupo was absorbed by the SS, Just went to work in 1937 as a
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welder for the Gestapo. He was ―expected‖ to seek SS membership and was accepted in
1938, but did not join the Nazi Party until 1941. The overall picture of Just is a steady
blue-collar worker who was content with the job security afforded by civil service and
not driven as much by ideological or professional zeal (Browning, 1991, p. 102 n33).
Wilhelm Findeisen had been Heydrich‘s personal chauffeur until assigned to be a
gas van driver. In prior years, however, his career had been both colorful and checkered.
During the hyperinflation that wrecked the German economy after the First World War,
Findeisen left his apprenticeship to a designer and instead worked a series of jobs as a
driver, newspaper deliveryman, and oil factory worker. Even before the Nazis came to
power, Findeisen felt he had at last found secure work when the SA hired him as a driver.
After the Nazi takeover in 1933 he obtained a permanent post as the personal driver for
the Berlin police chief. But when the SS Security Service offered higher pay he joined the
Black Corps in time to serve as a driver for the Einsatzgruppen during the 1939 German
invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Then followed a brush with fame: On
November 9, 1939, Hitler narrowly missed an assassin‘s bomb and the SS suspected
(erroneously) that two British agents were involved. The SS lured the agents to a café just
across the Dutch border and conducted a daring abduction. Findeisen, the driver for the
raid, was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class by Hitler himself and promoted to be
Heydrich‘s personal driver. Soon, however, Heydrich sacked him for habitual drinking
and returned Findeisen to his old post in the RSHA. Later that same month, in November
1941, Findeisen‘s superiors gave him a chance at rehabilitation by assigning him to the
top-secret Sonderwagen project. He would operate one of the vans being furnished to the
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Sipo and SD Regional Office in Ukraine. Though he kept his position, Findeisen was
among the minority of specialists who never attained SS officer rank (Langerbein, 2004,
pp. 108-109). After the war Findeisen testified that he refused orders to shoot victims:
―My job was simply to drive the van‖ (Klee, Dressen & Riess, 1991/1988, p. 72).
Thomas Gevatter (not his real name; Langerbein, 2004, p. 108) was reassigned to
drive gas vans in June 1942 after serving during the previous year as a driver for the
Einsatzgruppe B shooting squad. An SS-Hauptscharführer (technical sergeant), he was
drafted in the summer of 1941 for active SS duty in Russia, leaving his position as a
driver for the State Police in occupied Czechoslovakia. Gevatter had apprenticed ten
years earlier as a truck driver but lost his job during the Depression. He launched an
independent trucking business and also joined the SS in 1931 in hopes of bettering his
employment prospects, attracted also by the group‘s smart uniforms and elite image.
Gevatter‘s business nevertheless failed but, when the Nazis came to power in 1933, he
was made an auxiliary police officer to help round up leftist opponents of the regime, and
then awarded a permanent position as a driver with the State Police in Dresden. After war
broke out in 1939 he subsequently served as a driver in Czechoslovakia and Russia
before his transfer to the gas van program.
Emanuel Schäfer appears in the surviving gas van documents as an internal client
of the program, the Sipo and SD chief in occupied Yugoslavia who requested a gas van
for a ―special mission.‖ A member of extreme rightwing paramilitary Freikorps units that
were active after the First World War, in 1925 he earned a doctorate in jurisprudence but
remained involved in rightwing organizations and joined the SS in 1931. After the Nazi
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seizure of power in 1933 he held top police positions in Breslau, Oppeln, Kattowitz, and
Cologne. At the Kattowicz posting he was the first Gestapo chief with jurisdiction over
the newly established Auschwitz concentration camp (Langbein, 2004, p. 287), and in
1941 he oversaw the first deportations of Jews from Cologne. Heydrich transferred him
in January 1942 to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, where Schäfer, by then an SS-Standartenführer
(full colonel), headed the Sipo and SD Regional Office. There he made a ―thoroughly
humane impression‖ and, unlike the usual ―pigheaded SS man,‖ was seen as ―reasonable‖
and ―very accommodating,‖ even ―beloved‖ by his immediate staff. After the war,
judicial authorities noted his high education and described Schäfer as a ―correct and
honest official‖ who was ―not to be viewed as an evil Gestapo functionary, rather as an
official who—to be sure an enthusiastic National Socialist with early knowledge of the
criminal practices—did his duty, but showed humane tendencies and endeavored to
remedy the excesses of the regime‖ (Browning, 1991, p. 59). Nevertheless, he was
condemned to six-and-a-half years in prison for ordering the gas-van murders of nearly
7,000 Jewish women and children.
These, then, are among the key players in the SS gas van program. They represent
each subculture of its organization—executive, expert, mid and junior level management,
technicians, field personnel, clients. But beyond recounting individual biographies for
each representative figure, we must now turn to their interactions. If ―the way in which
subcultures relate to one another is the organization‘s culture‖ (Keyton, 2005, p. 67), we
must explore the interrelationships within the Sipo Technical Matters Group to grasp the
rhetorical boundary work their texts were required to perform.
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Individual Relationships and Motives
For the personnel of the Sipo Technical Matters Group, their experiences of
organizational life were governed in large measure by their working relationships with
each other and with those in whom the organization had contact. A framework for their
relationships was provided by the RSHA organization chart (see Figure 4.1): SS leader
Himmler was equivalent to a Minister of Police Affairs and Heydrich as head of the
RSHA was equivalent to a ministerial director-general. The heads of the seven RSHA
divisions, including Amt II Administration and Finance chief Hans Nockmann, were
equivalent to deputy directors-general. One level below was Rauff, who as head of II D
Technical Matters held the rank of Referent, a post that functioned as chief technical
adviser ―in charge of a particular field of work . . . [and] actually in control of most
current business, once policies have been approved by his superiors‖ (Brecht & Glaser,
1940, p. 25; quoted in Lozowick, 2000, p. 46). In turn, Pradel was equivalent to a
department commander as head of IID3, the Sipo transportation service.
For his Sipo brief (II D) Rauff oversaw five bureaus, one of which was the Sipo
transportation service (IID3) managed by Pradel, who in turn supervised chief mechanic
Harry Wentritt of the main Berlin motor pool (IID3a). Handwritten notations on the back
of a gas van document show that one of Wentritt‘s employees, Willi Just, acted as a
dispatcher in routing vehicle repair orders. Becker, the expert field inspector, reported
independently to Rauff. The drivers, including Findeisen and Gevatter, were on the
Berlin payroll but worked in the field so that their primary relationships were with the
Group‘s internal clients, namely the Sipo and SD regional offices and the individual

91

Figure 4.1: Reich Security Main Office and Technical Matters Organization Charts
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Einsatzgruppen units to whom the gas vans were furnished.
Though Rauff, as head of technical matters for both the Security Police and the
Foreign Security Service (i.e., head of II D and VI F) answered nominally to the directors
of those bureaus, he reported directly to RSHA chief Heydrich on the Einsatzgruppen
project and in the personal tasks Rauff performed when his Heydrich was also
namedNazi governor of occupied Czechoslovakia. That Rauff had minimal dealings with
his nominal superior is suggested in a voluntary deposition he gave in 1972:

If further confronted with the name [of] Dr. Nockemann, I can say that he also
was, as far as I remember, head of Department II. About Dr. Nockemann I
remember that he had a car accident at which his wife and his driver lost their
lives. Dr. Nockemann then left Department II and was later killed in action in
Russia. I cannot say, however, when the accident was and when he left
Department II. I would now say that Dr. Siegert was Dr. Nockemann's successor,
but I cannot state this with certainty (Nizkor, 2002, pp. 3-4).

When Rauff returned from his naval tour to the RSHA in 1941 and was named heard of
the Sipo Technical Matters Group, he recalled in 1972, ―Regarding the equipment of the
Einsatzgruppen in the Russian campaign I must have received my instructions from the
then-in-charge head of department, without being able to say if at the time it was Dr.
Nockemann or Dr. Siegert‖ (Nizkor, 2002, p. 9). Later, when Rauff was ordered to
construct a fleet of gas vans, he remembered, ―I don't think that Dr. Siegert was involved
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in these matters at the time, although he probably knew about them‖ (p. 12). That
Heydrich would deal directly with a Referent was not unprecedented since the literature
on Adolf Eichmann (e.g., Lozowick, 2000; Cesarini, 2004) has demonstrated that the
latter, as manager of the Jewish affairs bureau (IVB4) of the Gestapo, frequently had
direct dealings with Heydrich as well as his nominal superior, Gestapo chief Heinrich
Muller. For example, Rauff noted that negotiations with the Wehrmacht to obtain
supplies for the Einsatzgruppen ―were even conducted by Heydrich himself whenever I
was not getting any further‖ (Nizkor, 2002, p. 9). Even if Rauff was hazy in his memory
of his nominal Amt II superior, his recollections of Heydrich were clear and vivid:

Heydrich was an insanely ambitious man, a fox who was extremely suspicious
and tolerated no one next to, let alone above, him. He was also a person who
could not lose. Not even in a game. Accordingly the relation between him and all
other persons at a very high level . . . was very difficult due to Heydrich's
personality. I can thus repeat my statement mentioned above that an honest and
straight person . . . had a shocking effect on Heydrich. (Nizkor, 2002, p. 13)
. . . When confronted with the following characterization of Heydrich,
―Vindictive person, exceptionally fast on the uptake, always exactly informed.
Arguing with him was useless—he stuck to decisions that were often against any
reason—during such arguments he made tough and unjust statements to the point
of being insulting, leaving no room for opposition,‖ I would . . . myself
underwrite this statement word by word as being accurate. (p. 15)
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Rauff then related a telling organizational story about the RSHA chief:

I myself never tried to fight through an argument with Heydrich because that was
useless. . . . In this context I would like to repeat that Heydrich could not bear to
lose in a game and that therefore my comrades and I in Prague had agreed to let
him win at ―Doppelkopf‖ [a card game]. On the other hand it is certainly correct
that Heydrich could be a very charming and attentive host. (Nizkor, 2002, p. 15)

Yet another organizational story was told by Findeisen, who for a brief time served as
Heydrich‘s personal driver. During an outing on a cold winter night, the RSHA chief
smelled alcohol on Findeisen‘s breath and decided to teach him a lesson in hopes of
sobering up his chauffeur. Heydrich took the wheel, dropped Findeisen off at his quarters,
and commanded him that night to walk several miles through the snow and report back to
the office. When Findeisen quickly reappeared and was still visibly drunk, he admitted to
Heydrich that he had found a ride back to headquarters. Heydrich on the spot sentenced
him to ten days‘ arrest and sent Findeisen back to his former posting (Langerbein, 2004,
p. 109). This was the larger-than-life personality, the ambitious and vindictive boss who
could also turn on the charm, who set the tone for organizational life in the RSHA.
The relationship of Rauff with his own subordinate, Pradel, was shaped by the
former‘s jealousy for rank privileges, proximity to power and resultant sensitivity to the
larger sphere of SS power politics—and the latter‘s self-identification as a career police
professional, operations manager, and automotive expert. Rauff moved in circles where
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―Gradually I became aware that there were many intrigues inside the RSHA‖ (Nizkor,
2002, p. 5). To be successful in his post he also had to navigate the constant ―problem of
SD-Police and Wehrmacht [relations]‖ in which ―there were always quarrels‖ (p. 12)
over jurisdiction. Taking the side of his boss, Rauff implicitly accepted Heydrich‘s
rationale for the gas vans, recalling in his postwar deposition, ―Whether at that time I had
doubts against the use of gas vans I cannot say. The main issue for me at the time was
that the shootings were a considerable burden for the men who were in charge thereof
and that this burden was taken off them through the use of the gas vans‖ (p. 12). Yet in
his elevated organizational position, Rauff was only concerned with the big picture and
not the details: ―Regarding the annihilation of Jews in Russia I know that gas vans were
used for this purpose. I cannot say, however, from when on and to what extent this
happened‖ (p. 12). Though no doubt being evasive in his postwar testimony, Rauff
implied the Sonderwagen project was for him only a minor function:

I used to think that the thing with the gas vans started at the time when I was at
the navy. Today I have doubts about this and consider it possible that this matter
only got going after I had returned from the navy. At any rate I know that at some
time after my return I saw two of these gas vans standing in the yard, which
Pradel showed to me. Somehow I then also learned that the gas vans were used
for the execution of sentences and for the killing of Jews. (p. 12)
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Rauff was more fully and directly occupied with the Einsatzgruppen shooting actions,
which occurred on a far vaster scale than the gas van killings. As he explained in 1972
about his considerable administrative responsibilities, ―The fuel required by the
[Einsatzgruppen] was provided by the Wehrmacht. That had been agreed upon at the
highest level. The required ammunition was supplied directly to us by the Wehrmacht
pursuant to negotiations with the Wehrmacht, and we then sent it to the
[Einsatzgruppen]‖ (Nizkor, 2002, p. 9). For the gas van operations he had Becker in the
field to keep him informed: ―It is correct that I received something from Becker about the
use of gas vans. I myself had told Becker to send me a corresponding report‖ (p. 12). But
the Sonderwagen were only an adjunct to the much larger shooting actions. The vans
were an improvised stopgap measure, causing the Einsatzgruppen even more
psychological strain than shooting. The vans supplemented, but never replaced, the mass
shootings which continued unabated until the tide of war turned against the Germans.
Nevertheless, even regarding the gas vans, in his postwar deposition Rauff was
still jealous of his rank: ―I consider it impossible that Pradel should have carried out the
development of the gas vans on his own initiative. He must have received an order for
this either from me or from another superior standing above me‖ (p. 12). Pradel only
dealt with mid-level non-entities, Rauff suggested: ―The major . . . that Pradel mentions
[in postwar testimony] is not known to me,‖ while by contrast, ―I always dealt on a
higher level, i.e., with General Fellgiebel [Wehrmacht signals chief] in matters of
communication material. In matters of motor vehicles I dealt at a similar [top] level with
the OKW [Wehrmacht High Command]‖ (p. 6). As far as Rauff was concerned, Pradel
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was a nobody: ―I personally can thus not imagine that [the RSHA personnel chief] should
have told something about ‗Barbarossa‘ [the 1941 invasion of Russia] to a subordinate
like Pradel for negotiations with the Wehrmacht‖ or detailed Pradel to negotiate with the
National Socialist Motor Corps to obtain drivers (p. 9). Even thirty years later he bristled
at Pradel‘s postwar suggestion that Rauff was a latecomer: ―It is not correct that, as
Pradel states, I only returned to the department from the navy after the commencement of
the Russian campaign‖ (p. 6). From Rauff‘s perspective Pradel was only a subordinate,
one of five department heads he supervised. Moreover, as his comments regarding
Pradel‘s transfer from the regular Order Police to the Security Police confirm, Rauff
made clear that he regarded Pradel as a professional technocrat rather than a true SS man.
The arms-length and strained relationship between Rauff and Pradel provides an
important context for understanding the initial development of the Sonderwagen. As
described above, in postwar testimony Pradel claimed he protested the order to construct
gas vans and complied only after Rauff threatened to tell Heydrich, while Rauff claimed
that no prodding with needed to bring the ambitious Pradel into line. Yet the men agreed
on one point. Rauff testified it was ―impossible‖ that Pradel should have built the vans
without superior orders, a point also emphasized in Pradel‘s own postwar description:

Toward the end of 1941, my immediate superior, Rauff, ordered me to check with
Wentritt, the head of the motor pool, to find out whether it would be possible to
introduce exhaust fumes into the interior of a closed van. I executed this order,
and Wentritt confirmed that it was possible. Rauff then gave instructions that
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suitable vehicles should be found and adapted in this way. (Kogon, Langbein &
Rückerl, 1983/1993, p. 53)

Once the order was given and Rauff got the ball rolling, however, Pradel took it from
there and asked Wentritt about the technical feasibility of the project. At first Wentritt
―asked Pradel if there was a way out, but Pradel told him—‗in a friendly tone‘—to think
of his wife and children‖ (Browning, 1991, p. 61). Then he told Pradel that from a
technical standpoint the requested alterations would be simple. Wentritt testified at his
1960s trial that he was only a link in the chain of command. When the order to design
and construct gas vans came in the fall of 1941 he had only been on the job for a few
months and, at the relatively young age of age of 37 or 38, was replacing the respected
former chief mechanic who had served five years in the post. Thus, according to
Wentritt‘s interpretation,

Pradel did not go into further details . . . He instructed me to fix the vans in such a
way that the engine exhaust fumes could be introduced into the van. . . . Pradel
then told me that another pipe had to be fitted inside the van to prevent the
occupants from interfering with the admission of the gas. Thus the work carried
out in our motor pool was essentially determined by Pradel and his superiors.
(Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p. 54)

Was Pradel‘s admonition ―to think of his wife and children‖ a veiled threat? Just as

99

Pradel later claimed Rauff had warned that any ―difficulties‖ would be reported to
Heydrich, was Pradel doing the same to Wentritt? This seems possible, though another
interpretation may be conjectured. Both Browning (1992) and Goldhagen (1996) have
recounted how police reservists in Poland, when told by their commander of orders to
conduct a mass shooting of Jews, bade the men to think of their wives and children in
Germany who were being subjected to Allied aerial bombings. The men believed this
rationale and the purported link between unarmed civilian Jews in a remote Polish hamlet
and an alleged global Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy against Germany. Herf (2006) and
Fritzsche (2008) have both noted how ordinary Germans, from the frontlines to the home
front, increasingly believed this link as the war went on. When confronted with the
knowledge of German atrocities in the East, it was easier for Germans to turn the tables
and see themselves as victims.
In December 1941 as the first gas vans entered service, Becker entered the picture
as a chemical expert on loan to the Sipo Technical Matters Group. As he later testified:

Himmler wanted to deploy people who had become available as a result of the
suspension of the euthanasia program, and who, like me, were specialists in
extermination by gassing. The reason for this was that the men in charge of the
Einsatzgruppen in the East were increasingly complaining the firing squads could
not cope with the psychological and moral stress of the mass shootings
indefinitely. (Klee et al, 1991/1988, p. 69)
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After his posting to Rauff‘s department, Becker testified, ―[Rauff] explained the situation
to me, saying that the psychological and moral stress on the firing squads was no longer
bearable and that therefore the gassing program had started‖ (Klee et al. 1991/1988, p.
69). Rauff stressed the point that that gas van program was already in motion. Becker
stated, ―He said the gas-van drivers with drivers were already on their way to, or had
indeed reached, the individual Einsatzgruppen.‖ Thus Becker was appointed inspector for
the gas van program: ―My professional brief was to inspect the work‖ and ―ensure that
the mass killings carried out in the lorries proceeded properly‖ with ―particular attention
to the mechanical functioning of these vans‖ (p. 69). Becker left Germany in January
1942 and over the next eight months visited each of the four Einsatzgruppen operating in
Soviet territory. He began with Group D in the Crimea and ended with Group A on the
Baltic, keeping in frequent contact with Rauff (Klee et al., 1991, pp. 68-71; Beer, 1987).
As the surviving gas van documents confirm, operations were centrally
administered by Rauff and the Sipo transportation team. Internal clients, primarily the
Sipo and SD Regional Offices that oversaw the Einsatzgruppen, requested vans from
Rauff. When these requests were granted, the Sipo motor pool provided both vans and
drivers. When repairs and spare parts were needed, clients telegrammed their requests for
these as well. Handwritten notations on the telegrams show these requests were bucked to
Pradel and eventually down to Willi Just for coordination and fulfillment. And when the
―special missions‖ were completed, vans and drivers were returned to Berlin. These
operating procedures were a crucial change from the way that the Einsatzgruppen
conducted mass shootings, for historians are now learning the extent to which
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―commando heads were given free rein in terms of how to carry it out. The way the
[shooting] massacres took place depended on the circumstances—topography, the
presence of partisans—different factors that the Germans had to weigh‖ so that ―the
perpetrators of genocide used everything—cliffs, grain silos, beaches, irrigation wells,
ditches‖ as mass graves (Desbois, 2008, pp. 81, 98).
Still, even when the Sonderwagen project introduced central administration to the
genocide, the organizational life experienced by the gas van drivers reflected more of the
ad hoc nature of mobile field operations than the bureaucratic routines of Rauff, Pradel,
Wentritt, and Just at RSHA headquarters in Berlin. The drivers accompanied the
Einsatzgruppen over vast territories, but strove to confine their activities to driving and
avoided participating in the loading and unloading of Jewish victims. The odium of their
duties need not be recounted here in full. But their postwar testimony features
organizational stories of how their own organizational culture clashed with that of the
Einsatzgruppen. In the culture of the latter, everyone—drivers included—were expected
to participate in shootings so that all might be bloodied and bound together by their
shared complicity. Though specialists and technicians permanently assigned to the death
squads ―had a unique status in their units . . . because their job was crucial for the proper
functioning of the Einsatzgruppen‖ and this ―gave the specialists a sense of pride,‖ they
were often viewed by comrades with ―jealousy, suspicion, and at times contempt because
the specialists‘ knowledge was limited to a narrow and ‗secondary‘ function‖ to the
―soldierly‖ mission of killing the enemy (Langerbein, 2004, pp. 103-104).
Postwar testimonies of the gas van drivers feature organizational stories of how
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Einsatzgruppen officers attempted to coopt them into the squads‘ culture by pressuring
them into personally killing Jews—and how the Sonderwagen drivers resisted. The units‘
regular drivers typically participated in shootings—including Wentritt‘s predecessor who,
when transferred to field duty, soon became an enthusiastic volunteer (Langerbein, 2004,
p. 115). Gevatter testified after the war of his hesitation and distaste for driving the gas
van, to the point where he one day deliberately ran his vehicle into the mud to delay the
gassing—and was forced at gunpoint by an Einsatzgruppen officer to personally conduct
the killing on the spot without waiting to extricate the van (Langerbein, 2004, p. 117).
Findeisen also believed his orders set him apart: ―I was told that the whole operation and
the van itself were secret. It was expressly forbidden to photograph the vans and I was
not to let anyone near the van‖ (Klee et al., 1991/1988, p. 71). Even under intense
pressure he kept his distance:

One evening several officers appeared and ordered certain people to go with
them. They went into a private flat where they picked up a professor and his
daughter. These people were then taken to a spot close to a piece of open land
where a grave was dug. The people, i.e. the officers, then gave orders for these
two people to be shot. One of the officers said to me, ―Findeisen, shoot these
people in the neck.‖ I refused to do this as did the other men. The girl must have
been about eighteen or nineteen. The officer shot the people himself as the others
refused. He swore at us and said we were cowards, but apart from that he did not
do anything to us. (Klee et al., 1991/1988, pp. 71-72)
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Findeisen‘s relief at not having to kill face-to-face, at being able to maintain his specialist
façade and distance himself from personal responsibility, was palpable when he testified,
―My job was simply to drive the van. The van was loaded at headquarters . . . [and] the
door was bolted and the [gas] tube connected . . . I drove through the town and then out to
the anti-tank ditches where the vehicle was opened. This was done by prisoners‖ (Klee et
al., 1991/1988, p. 72). Another gas van driver, Erich Gnewuch, similarly testified, ―I
myself never shot a single Jew; I only gassed them‖ (Kogon et al., 1993/ 1983, p. 58).
Nevertheless, Findeisen‘s self-identification as a specialist spurred him to go the extra
mile and ―clean the gas chamber of his vehicle at the end of each action‖ and ―always
make certain that his vehicle was ready for its sinister purpose, even during the bitter cold
of winter, when he carefully nurtured a fire under the engine to prevent it from freezing‖
(Langerbein, 2004, pp. 117-118).
Altogether, a look at the complex of relationships that shaped the organizational
life of the Sipo Technical Matters Group reveals it was comprised of varied interests and
motivations. For Pradel, Wentritt and the automotive experts, Browning (1991) cited their
professional identities as a driving force, that ―The shortcomings of the gas vans were a
negative reflection on their workmanship that had to be remedied‖ or blamed on others,
so that ―Their greatest concern seemed to be that they might be deemed inadequate to
their assigned task‖ (p. 67). But the full panopoly of motives goes even deeper to an
individual level: Rauff, the convinced Nazi of upper middle-class origins who made a
Faustian bargain with Heydrich to resurrect his career. Pradel, the lower civil servant,
mid-level manager, and automotive expert who identified with the professional police
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forces rather than the SS. Wentritt, the working-class mechanic who was new on the job
and did not want to jeopardize his big break. Becker, the SS loyalist who did what was
asked of him. Widmann, the young self-made man who—like Albert Speer—saw a
chance to explore the professional opportunities made possible by the National Socialist
regime. Findeisen, the drunkard relieved that ―My job was simply to drive the van.‖
As individual identities and motivations intertwined in the Sipo Technical Matters
Group, conflicts emerged—from the friction between Rauff and Pradel as the respective
representatives of SS culture and professional police culture, to the friction between the
barbarized Einsatzgruppen and the gas van drivers sent out from Berlin who clung to
their identities as specialists. In assessing the organizational life of the gas van program,
however, Browning (1991) made a telling point:

[As] Pradel and his automotive experts [were] . . . occupied with procuring,
dispatching, maintaining, and repairing motor vehicles, their expertise and
facilities were suddenly pressed into the service of mass murder when they were
charged with producing gas vans. In the course of half a year, some twenty vans
passed through their shop, requiring only a moderate expenditure of time and
energy on their part—a minor episode interrupting their normal routine. (pp. 6667)

Boundary objects serve, as Wilson and Herndl (2007) demonstrated, to create a ―trading
zone‖ which by its is a ―temporary space of cooperation and exchange between different
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disciplines or subdisciplines‖ (p. 132, emphasis added). This study began with the
assertion that new insights might be gained by shifting our perspective from a
symbolically monolithic view of ―the Final Solution‖ and being willing to see the
genocide‘s polycratic, entropic, and punctuated aspects. The latter aspect, which sees the
Final Solution as a blitzkrieg burst of murderous intensity, accords with the notion that
boundary objects by their nature produce only temporary trading zones. Such spaces do
not endure unless continually negotiated. Browning‘s observation that the Sonderwagen
project endured just half a year affirms that the competing interests within the Sipo
Technical Matters Group only needed to produce a temporary cooperative space—and
further, that this consensual space quickly unraveled when events superseded the gas van
enterprise and members‘ integrative exigence was removed. They did not need an
ontologically prior entity called an ―organization‖ to provide them a stable ―container‖ of
shared values in which to function, but only a temporary interstitial zone in which to
cooperate—just barely long enough.
Analyzing how their everyday documents served as boundary objects in creating
such a zone is the next stage of our inquiry.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DOCUMENTS FOR DESTRUCTION

Setting up the Analyses
So far this study has suggested that a shift in perspective—of viewing ―The Final
Solution‖ not as a single, symbolically composite crime but as a contingent constellation
of locally polycratic, entropic, and punctuated events—might yield new insights into the
Nazi genocide. One such insight is in seeing the perpetrators‘ need to negotiate their own
competing interests long enough to create temporary spaces of cooperation and exchange,
an exigence that—as this study argues—could be met by production of organizational
texts to serve as boundary objects (Griesemer & Starr, 1989; Wilson & Herndl, 2007) for
bridging their differences. In turn, the suggestion that everyday documents can function
in this manner requires the view that organizational communications are not only
instruments of message clarification for maximizing productivity but are also means by
which members constitute, construct, and continually renegotiate their associations.
To analyze texts from this perspective necessitates a research methodology that
can account for the larger historical and cultural discourses that bear upon text
production—and such a methodology has been proposed by Longo (1998). Following
that method, we have to this point explored the historical and cultural contexts of the
mobile gas van program administered by the Sipo Technical Matters Group of the SS
Reich Security Main Office. In particular, since organizations reflect larger societal
discourses which they shape into local versions, the cultural contexts for their
communications must explore the surrounding national culture (in our case, that of Nazi
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Germany), institutional culture (of the National Socialist mass movement), and relevant
organizational culture (of the Nazi SS, its Reich Security Main Office, and the Sipo
Technical Matters Group itself). Further, we learned of Martin‘s (1992, 2002; Martin,
Frost & O‘Neill, 2006) thesis that at any given moment an organization simultaneously
manifests the three dimensions of integration (what members share), differentiation (the
various subcultures that members inhabit), and fragmentation (so that members must
continually renegotiate their association amidst organizational ambiguity, change, and
confusion). Thus, we have outlined what members of the Group shared (the historical
legacies of religious, economic, and racial anti-Semitism; the cultural heritages of the
―people‘s community‖ and the ―leadership principle‖), their differentiated subcultures
(convinced Nazis versus career police professionals; the descending levels of the
organization), and their fragmentation (the mélange of local and personal interests and
motives from which they had to forge temporary and issue-specific consensus).
All of this is a prelude, however, for the next phase of research which is called for
in our methodology, namely to analyze the texts of the Sipo Technical Matters Group as
an organizational discourse—the better to understand their function as boundary objects.
Discourse is ―an increasingly significant focus of interest‖ as researchers seek ways to
―theorize the increasingly complex processes and practices that constitute ‗organization‘‖
(Grant, Hardy, Oswick & Putnam, 2001, p. 1). Since the 1990s, reported Grant, Keenoy
and Oswick (2001), ―management and organizational theorists have started to show a
keen interest in discursively based studies of organizations,‖ thus establishing ―a field of
inquiry termed ‗organizational discourse‘‖ and sparking a ―proliferation of such research
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and associated publications‖ (p. 6). A diverse range of approaches has emerged as
researchers wrestle with the fact that ―discourse patterns fuse with organizational
processes in ways that make language and organizations a unique domain—one that
differs from the study of linguistics in general and discourse analysis in other social
settings‖ (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001, p. 78). With specific regard to technical
communication, Berkenkotter (2002) surveyed approaches for analyzing everyday texts
in organizational settings and reported that technical writing is chiefly analyzed via the
three methods of rhetorical criticism and theory, genre analysis, and discourse analysis
―as developed within the context of applied linguistics‖ (p. 48). These three approaches—
when combined with insights garnered from the recent and diverse scholarship in
organizational discourse studies—suggest three complementary methods for analyzing
the Nazi texts.
First, while Katz (1992a) has previously raised the possibility of critiquing the
killers‘ use of the Aristotelian topoi, other avenues of rhetorical critique are also available
to the analyst (e.g., see Burgchardt, 2010). Here I choose to employ three such avenues.
One is grounded in Miller‘s (1993, 1994) conception of the rhetorical community which
is held together by marshalling the rhetorical resources of metaphor, genre, and narrative;
a look at the Nazi documents from this perspective can yield a socio-rhetorical analysis
suited to seeing the organization as a site of both contestation and consensus. The next is
grounded in Sauer‘s (2003, 2006) conception of the Cycle of Technical Documentation in
Large Regulated Industries, which explains how embodied local knowledge is
rhetorically transformed into actionable engineering knowledge and again into
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generalizable and scientific standards. The last is suggested by the growing literature on
visual rhetorics (e.g., Hill & Helmers, 2004; Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). Katz
commented briefly on the paragraph structure of the gas van document he analyzed and
this important point can be extended through a detailed look at the visual rhetorics of the
five-page German original. From the filing code at the top, to the signature code at the
bottom, these visual aspects speak volumes about the origination of the documents
(Lozowick, 2000). The documents are replete with visual clues, from the use of officiallooking preprinted forms to the copious handwritten marginalia.
Second, Berkenkotter (2002) noted that Miller‘s landmark 1984 essay on genre as
social action has prompted many ―scholars and researchers . . . [to] become interested in
describing professional, disciplinary, and organizational genres‖ (p. 49). Miller and
Selzer (1985) also proposed a five-step method for discovering genre-specific and
institution-specific special topics in technical communications: (1) compare documents
with their accompanying internal directives; (2) compare multiple documents from the
same organization and checking for language that recurs on different occasions; (3)
examine any written guidelines the organization has issued for its writers; (4) check for
internal correspondence about a project or any marginalia and notes to writers that may
appear on documents; and (5) utilize interviews of the writers. All five of these steps will
be pursued to discover recurring genres in the Sonderwagen documents—of which there
are many. Eliciting the organizational genres of the Sipo Technical Matters Group can,
then, assist in unpacking the culture that informed its discourse.
Third, while Berkenkotter (2002) favored linguistically-based discourse analyses,
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the recent literature on organizational discourse suggests that researchers are pursuing a
wide range of approaches. This diversity stems from the fact that ―organizational
discourse is poorly defined‖ so that ―Despite numerous theoretical antecedents, it has few
clear parameters and, as a field of study, it incorporates a variety of diverse perspectives
and methodologies reflecting its multi-disciplinary origins‖ (Grant, Keenoy & Oswick,
1998, p. 1). Thus, Putnam and Fairhurst (2001) offered an open-ended definition whereby
―discourse is viewed as a way of knowing‖ (p. 79), while Grant, Hardy, Oswick, and
Putnam (2004) suggested that:

the term ―organizational discourse‖ refers to the structured collections of texts
embodied in the practices of talking and writing (as well as a wide variety of
visual representations and cultural artifacts) that bring organizationally related
objects into being as these texts are produced, disseminated, and consumed. (p. 3)

By this definition, the present study would explore the document traffic of the Sipo
Technical Matters Group and how its members‘ subjective experiences of this discourse
brought the organizational object of bureaucratic genocide into being. But viewing
―discourse . . . as a way of knowing‖ or ―texts . . . that bring organizationally related
objects into being‖ potentially opens the field to many approaches. To make sense out of
this diversity, Grant and Iedema (2005) distinguished between linguistically-based
organizational discourse analysis (―ODA‖) and organizational discourse studies (―ODS‖)
whose approaches have ―emerged from within organization and management studies [and
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are] highly varied‖ (p. 38). Thus, contra Berkenkotter, research into organizational texts
can legitimately follow ODS methods—which, Grant and Iedema argued, can be mapped
along five dimensions according to whether the focus is on: theory versus empirical data;
a monomodal versus a multimodal orientation; ―what is‖ (pattern analysis) versus ―what
could be‖ (marginal meanings); cognition versus practice; and critique/emancipation
versus pragmatic intervention. These five dimensions, however, do not offer researchers
five either/or choices. Rather, each dimension should be seen as a continuum along which
researchers can locate methodological combinations appropriate to their projects. Thus,
my study adopts the following locations within each dimension:

1. a theoretical focus that is ―oriented toward the philosophy of social
organization and representation, using discourse as an abstract explanatory
construct‖ (Grant & Iedema, 2005, p. 44) by introducing interpretive and
postmodern perspectives on organizing, while also plumbing the empirical
data of the SS gas van documents through linguistic analysis.
2. a multimodal orientation that investigates sense-making not only through
language but via such means as visual rhetorics and organizational stories.
3. an attempt to discern patterns by discovering organizational genres in the gas
van documents, while also excavating these texts to discern meanings—such
as any hesitations about the killing project—that were marginalized.
4. a commitment to ―the view that cognition is prediscursive‖ (Grant & Iedema,
2005, p. 52) so that culturally situated mental models may have influenced SS
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organizational experience, while also acknowledging that mental schemas do
not predetermine behavior; since discourse has both symbolic and material
dimensions, communities of practice must negotiate ―the tension between
human interaction . . . and the tools, technologies, language forms, and
artifacts that humans use in interaction‖ (p. 53).
5. a combination of critique and intervention that offers an account of
destructive power/knowledge at work in the Final Solution and also explores
the ethical insights this cautionary example affords to communicators today.

In particular, my methodological decision not to rely solely on language—but to
incorporate a theoretical focus and not view empirical data alone as sufficient explanation
for organizational phenomena—can help address an admitted limitation of my study:
namely, that I am an English speaker doing research on German documents. If
organizational discourse is seen as a way of knowing (Putnam & Fairhust, 2001, p. 79)
and of bringing organizationally related objects into being (Grant, Hardy, Oswick &
Putnam, 2004, p. 3), then items such as the SS document writers‘ word order or sentence
structure (in the original German) are not wholly decisive for my analysis of how the
killers‘ historical and cultural ways of knowing may have enabled them to bring
organizationally related boundary objects in being. Other scholars of technical
communication, for example, have offered useful analyses by working from English
translations of the lengthiest gas van text: Katz (1992a) pointed out how the German
technical writers unconsciously employed topics (i.e., a way of knowing) that are common
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to Western rhetorical policy deliberation (i.e., a bringing into being). Likewise,
Dombrowski‘s (2000a) review focused on how ―this document exemplif[ies] certain
values‖ (i.e., a way of knowing) and then ―puts into concrete action a whole set of values
[that stem] from its cultural context‖ (i.e., a bringing into being) (pp. 83-84).
Even a linguistics-based approach to analyzing everyday texts, Stillar (1998)
convincingly argued, is incomplete without rhetorical and social perspectives. Language
may instantiate textual resources that are dependent on (in our case) German language to
structure and organize information. But Stillar observed that language—whether German
or English or another tongue—also instantiates ideational resources (a text is ―about
something‖ in that it describes who are the participants and their roles and what are the
circumstances and time perspective) and interpersonal resources (a text, because it is ―to
and from somebody,‖ shapes interaction and constructs social relations as writers assign
roles to and express attitudes toward addressees) (pp. 20-21). Thus according to Stillar‘s
model, analyses of ideational and interpersonal functions of language are not wholly
dependent on the specific tongue of the writers. And because ―language is characterized
and analyzed in terms of its role in social practice‖ (p. 92), he noted, its ideational and
interpersonal aspects are necessarily elaborated through rhetorical and social theory.
To sum up, then, my analyses will proceed in the following manner: First, the
remainder of this chapter will be given over to the necessary prequel of introducing the
documents themselves by describing the specific circumstances of each text and
providing English translations. Chapter 6 will carry the rhetorical and genre analyses by
laying the theoretical groundwork and then offering interpretations of the texts. And
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Chapter 7 will offer an organizational discourse analysis through theoretical grounding
and then by interpreting the documents to reconstruct the discourse in which the deskmurderers created a temporary space for consensus. Throughout, we will see how the SS
documents functioned as boundary objects.

Introducing the Documents
Before moving to analyses—rhetorical, generic, discursive—of the gas van
corpus generated by the Sipo Technical Matters Group, a brief introduction of each
document is helpful. Seven surviving texts from the Group are included in this study
along with two others that, although not sent or received by the personnel of the Group,
are documents in which its clients refer to their usage of the gas vans. Each introduction
provides the document type, date, sender, recipient, stated purpose, and historical and
organizational settings. In this chapter, English translations for most documents are also
provided—translations that will serve as the bases for rhetorical analyses of the texts in
Chapter 6. The German originals are reproduced in Chapter 6 to accompany analyses of
their visual rhetorics.
The documents of the Group span the spring and early summer of 1942 and were
generated between late March and late June of that year. This was the period after the
vehicles had already been tested, built and placed in service, and when the Sonderwagen
program was at its most active—so that the documents deal with ―customer service‖ to
SS clients and with internal Group discussions about meeting the mounting challenges of
field operations that stretched from Poland and Yugoslavia to the Baltic States, Ukraine,
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and Russia. Over these three months, then, the competing interests of the Sipo Technical
Matters Group experienced their greatest integrative exigence for cooperation on the gas
van project. They satisfied that exigence and temporarily sustained a consensus, if only
for a few months until mobile gas vans were overtaken by stationary gas chambers
developed by other SS competitors, by generating texts to serve as objects with which to
negotiate trading zones across their intraorganizational boundaries. The nine documents
include the following texts:
A letter dated 26 March 1942 sent by Rauff and responding to a request from the
Mauthausen concentration camp for the temporary dispatch of a gas van (Figure 5.1).
The camp system was run by another SS division, the Economic and Administrative
Main Office (WVHA) and its Concentration Camp Inspectorate. Presumably the
Mauthausen request came up through the WVHA hierarchy and, because concentration
camps were officially classed as internal security facilities to detain enemies of the state,
the request was routed by the RSHA to the Criminal Technical Institute (KTI) of its
Reich Criminal Police Main Office (RKPA) because the KTI was a police lab whose
chemical section secured supplies of poison gas. Apparently the KTI inquired with
Rauff's II D about the availability of his department's gas vans, which killed by exhaust
gas rather than using expensive and cumbersome carbon monoxide canisters. Rauff
replied that vans were unavailable and, rather than wait, the Mauthausen camp doctor
should obtain gas canisters on his own.
A report dated 16 May 1942 sent to Rauff by Becker, field inspector for the gas
van program (Figure 5.2). A longtime SS officer with a Ph.D. in chemistry and
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Figure 5.1: English Translation of 26 March 1942 Rauff Letter
Source: Holocaust History Project (http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420326-rauff-sonderwagen)
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Figure 5.2: English Translation of 16 May 1942 Becker Field Report, Page 1 of 2
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 5.2: English Translation of 16 May 1942 Becker Field Report, Page 2 of 2
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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experience in the T4 euthanasia program, Becker was an expert on loan to the Sipo
Technical Matters Group and reported directly to Rauff. He left Berlin in January 1942
and over the next nine months visited each of the four Einsatzgruppen (denoted A, B, C,
and D) that were operating the vans on Soviet territory captured by the Germany since its
June 1941 invasion. As Rauff affirmed in a 1972 deposition, ―It is correct that I received
something from Becker about the use of gas vans. I myself had told Becker to send me a
corresponding report‖ (Nizkor, 2002).
An internal technical document dated 5 June 1942 that proposes for Rauff's
consideration a series of engineering improvements to enhance the killing capacity of the
gas vans (Figure 5.3). This is the document that Katz (1992a) set out to analyze. Given
what is known about Third Reich bureaucratic protocols and RSHA filing codes (see
previous chapter), it is unlikely that the signatory of the document, motor pool dispatcher
and welder Willi Just (Noakes & Pridham, 1988, p. 1202), was the author or instigator of
the proposal but instead was directed to sign the document.
A telegram dated 9 June 1942 and sent to Pradel by Schäfer, chief of the Sipo and
SD regional headquarters in occupied Yugoslavia, informing Berlin that two gas vans
and their drivers completed their “special mission” and were returning to Germany
(Figure 5.4). Partisans were particularly active in Yugoslavia so that by early 1942 the
Wehrmacht used the pretext of reprisals to have most Jewish males in Belgrade and
Serbia executed by shooting. More than 5,000 remaining Jewish women and children
were placed in a concentration camp; in April the military administration chief procured
an SS ―delousing van‖ with two drivers to ―clean out the camp‖ by the end of May
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Figure 5.3: English Translation of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 1 of 3
Source: Kogon, Langbein & Rückerl (1993/1983)
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Figure 5.3: English Translation of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 2 of 3
Source: Kogon, Langbein & Rückerl (1993/1983)
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Figure 5.3: English Translation of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 3 of 3
Source: Kogon, Langbein & Rückerl (1993/1983)
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Figure 5.4: English Translation of 9 June 1942 Schäfer Telegram, Page 1 of 2
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 5.4: English Translation of 9 June 1942 Schäfer Telegram, Page 2 of 2
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501

125

(Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p. 71). The victims were driven across town, asphyxiated in the
vans along the way, and buried in mass graves previously dug at a local shooting range.
After this ―special mission,‖ the telegram relates, the drivers and van were ordered home
by rail since one van had a broken axle. The document also contains handwritten notes—
dated 11 June, 16 June, and 13 July—attributed to Just which chart the repairs.
A request for more gas vans dated 15 June 1942 from Trühe, chief of the Sipo and
SD regional headquarters for the Eastern Territories (Reichskommisariat Ostland), the
office that controlled the activities of Einsatzgruppen A in the Baltic States and B in
Byelorussia and Smolensk (Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p. 56) (Figure 5.5). The telegram
also requested a supply of hose to repair gas leaks in the three vans already in operation.
In the summer of 1942 the SS was clearing the Jewish ghettos of the Ostland; from midMay through the end of July, A and B murdered some 55,000 Jews using gas vans
(Rhodes, 2002, pp. 255-256). Thus the local commandant reports his three vans were
―insufficient‖ to provide ―special treatment‖ for the weekly transports of victims. Pradel
(designation ―R 16/6‖) asked in a handwritten notation to be kept apprised of the matter.
A 22 June 1942 reply to the Ostland request from Rauff's office that promises
delivery of another van by mid-July along with a supply of hose (Figure 5.6). In several
notations Just (―II D 3a 9‖) is active in disseminating follow-up communications and
refers back to the Schäfer telegram to suggest the van used in Yugoslavia be refitted for
Ostland. The ghetto-clearing murders were observed in September by Becker at his last
inspection stop. Even the ―gassing expert‖ who ―euthanized‖ thousands from a distance
could not witness killing on this scale and returned to Berlin (Klee et al. 1991, p. 71).
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Figure 5.5: English Translation of 15 June 1942 Trühe Telegram
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501

127

Figure 5.6: English Translation of 22 June 1942 Rauyff Reply to Trühe
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Telegrams of 15 June 1942 from Trühe and 9 June 1942 from Schäfer retyped and
consolidated onto a single sheet of paper. From the handwritten notation at the top of the
sheet it was either seen by or referred to Pradel, while a notation scrawled next to the
Schäfer text makes reference to the ―final disposition‖ (Fertigstellung) of the matter.
Since this document contains the same texts as the earlier telegrams, no English
translation is presented here.
In addition, two other documents, although not sent or received by the personnel
of the Sipo Technical Matters Group, shed some light on the Sonderwagen project as the
Group‘s clients refer to their usage of the gas vans:
Sipo and SD situation report for Einsatzgruppe B dated 1 March 1942 and
covering the period 16-28 February 1942. The report described how two gas vans arrived
arrived 23 February 1942 in Smolensk and were then dispatched to two of the six
subunits that comprised Einsatzgruppe B. Notably, the report complained, ―Both vehicles
arrived at Smolensk with defects and, after the defects were remedied, were assigned to
the Einsatzkommandos‖ (Beide Fajrzeuge kamen defekt in Smolensk an un wurden nach
Behebung der Defekte den Einsatzkommandos zugeteilt). Since this is the key information
about the vans, no English translation is presented here.
Letter dated 11 April 1942 from SS major general Harald Turner, the German
administrative chief for occupied Serbia, to Himmler’s chief of staff Karl Wolff (Figure
5.7). The fifth paragraph describes how, with the help of the SD, he secured a ―delousing
van‖ that he expected would achieve in two to four weeks a ―definitive clearing out‖ of a
camp for Jewish women and children. The letter is important because Turner puts
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Figure 5.7: English Translation of 11 April 1942 Turner Letter, Page 1 of 2
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420411-turner-wolff
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Figure 5.7: English Translation of 11 April 1942 Turner Letter, Page 2 of 2
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420411-turner-wolff
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―delousing van‖ (“Entlausungswagen”) in quotation marks, acknowledging the term to
be a euphemism for killing by poison gas. The murders were subsequently carried out in
the ―special mission‖ referenced by Schäfer in his 9 June 1942 telegram to Pradel.
With such documents as those above did the bureaucrats and technicians of the
Sipo Technical Matters Group endeavor, as Browning (1991) noted, to hide reality from
themselves. But as we will see in succeeding chapters, the documents also served as
objects for the creation and legitimation of an alternative reality as those who trafficked
in these texts thereby bridged the boundaries between their differing perceptions and
constructed a community of killers.
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CHAPTER SIX
A COMMUNITY OF KILLERS

Constructing the Rhetorical Community
What are we to make of the horrifying documents we have just encountered? A
functionalist ontology would tell us that individual mindsets are superfluous, that
organizations are driven to optimize results, and thus organizational communications
must privilege clarity and accuracy because they are instruments to achieve the collective
purpose. But why, then, do all the writers employ recurrent euphemisms about ―special
vans,‖ ―special missions,‖ and ―special treatment‖? (In time, references to ―special vans‖
were simply shortened to ―S-vans.‖) Why did Rauff couch his letter on the gassing of
concentration camp prisoners within the context of a medical ―procedure‖? Why did
Becker refer to Jewish victims as ―prisoners‖ and their mass murder as ―executions‖?
Why did the men of the Sipo motor pool take such obvious pains to avoid mention that
the ―cargo‖ and ―load‖ carried by their vehicles was, in fact, human? That the language
served to distance these killers from their crimes is obvious and has been long remarked
by historians. But if the language distanced these bureaucrats away from the import of
their actions, did their discourse—through the boundary objects it produced—also draw
them toward a common identity and construct for them a shared coherent reality?
Or according to Miller‘s (1994) conception, the men of the Sipo Technical
Matters Group formed a ―rhetorical community.‖ Farrell (1991) similarly suggested that
what he called the ―rhetorical forum‖ instantiates ―two very different sorts of loci [that]
may always intersect there,‖ namely ―the cumulative weight of customary practice‖ and

133

―the inevitably uncertain fact of others‖ (p. 198). Miller (1994) then drew on Farrell‘s
―inclusion of sameness and difference‖ and defined the ―rhetorical community‖ to be

the community as invoked, represented, presupposed, or developed in rhetorical
discourse. It is constituted by attributions of characteristic joint rhetorical actions,
genres of interaction, ways of getting things done, including reproducing itself . . .
[by] structuring aspects of all forms of socio-rhetorical action. . . . It operates
more generally, however, as a site where centrifugal and centripetal forces must
meet . . . (pp. 73-74)

In this chapter we will approach the Sonderwagen documents as a rhetorical discourse—
for by Longo‘s (1998) methodology, analyzing discourse is the next phase of the study—
that ―invoked, represented, presupposed, and developed‖ the community of killers that
was the Sipo Technical Matters Group. In so doing we will follow Miller‘s thesis that
rhetorical communities marshal the resources of metaphor, narrative, and genre in order
to (re)produce themselves and will look for these phenomena in the Group‘s corpus. The
origins of her conception of the rhetorical community are seen in Miller‘s early essay,
―Technology as a Form of Consciousness‖ (1978), in which she argued that interpreting
action requires familiarity with ―both the personal formation of mental character and the
collective development of cultural character‖ (p. 229). In ―A Humanistic Rationale for
Technical Writing‖ (1979) she pointed out that effective writers must grasp ―the
concepts, values, traditions, and style which permit identification with [their] community
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and determine the success or failure of communication‖ (p. 617). And in ―Genre as Social
Action‖ (1984) Miller observed that exigence is at the core of rhetorical situation, and
this exigence ―must be located in the social world . . . [as] a form of social knowledge—a
mutual construing of objects, events, interests, and purposes‖ that functions ―neither as a
cause of rhetorical action nor as intention, but as social motive . . . [that] provides the
rhetor with a sense of rhetorical purpose . . . [and] a socially recognizable way to make
his or her intentions known‖ (pp. 157-158). Thus genres emerge ―as typified rhetorical
actions based in recurrent situations‖ (p. 159), so that ―as a recurrent, significant action, a
genre embodies an aspect of cultural rationality‖ (p. 165).
During the 1990s Miller developed her interest in culture through her conception
of the rhetorical community. In ―Rhetoric and Community: The Problem of the One and
the Many‖ (1993a) Miller described the ―social grounding‖ (p. 80) of rhetoric and cited
social constructionist insights from a wide range of scholars: Bakhtin, Booth, Burke,
Fish, Geertz, Mead, Rorty, Vygotsky. She quoted with approval McKerrow‘s (1989)
assertion that ―rhetoric constitutes doxastic rather than epistemic knowledge,‖ a view that
―allows the focus to shift to how the symbols come to possess power—what they ‗do‘ in
society‖ (pp. 103-104) as these opinions or ―good reasons‖ (Fisher, 1978, 1987) attain
communal validation. Then in ―The Polis as Rhetorical Community‖ (1993b), she built a
case that ―Aristotle‘s synthesis of sophism and Platonism shows rhetoric to be shaped by
community‖ (p. 235) because the polis ―is most centrally a site of contention‖ (p. 239).
Thus, she concluded the polis may be understood ―as a discursive projection, a set of
assumptions implicit in any argument; it is the community invoked, represented,
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presupposed, or developed in rhetorical discourse‖ (pp. 239-240). Finally, in ―Rhetorical
Community: The Cultural Basis of Genre‖ (1994) Miller tied together her interest in
community with her work in genre. The latter are cultural artifacts because, as
significantly recurring actions, they become ―bearers of culture . . . [that] literally
incorporate knowledge—knowledge of the aesthetics, economics, politics, religious
beliefs and all the various dimensions of what we know as human culture‖ (p. 69).
Analysts can therefore unpack this knowledge and make inferences about a culture by
unpacking its genres. In the end, Miller (1994) arrives at a definition of genre in which

Genre . . . [is] that aspect of situated communication that is capable of
reproduction, that can be manifested in more than one situation, more than one
concrete space-time. The rules and resources of a genre provide reproducible
speaker and addressee roles, social typifications of recurrent social needs or
exigences, topical structures (or ―moves‖ and ―steps‖), and ways of indexing an
event to material conditions, turning them into constraints or resources. (p. 71)

To connect genre with rhetorical community, Miller (1994) described genre as ―a midlevel structurational nexus between mind and society.‖ Therefore, rhetoric is implied
because generic social actions are always ―addressed‖ to others through linguistic
resources (p. 71). Next she returned to her earlier description of ―a discursive projection
. . . [which] is the community invoked, represented, presupposed, or developed in
rhetorical discourse‖ (1993b, pp. 239-240; 1994, p. 73) and ascribed this quality to the
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rhetorical community, which she went on to describe as

constituted by attributions of characteristic joint rhetorical actions, genres of
interaction, ways of getting things done, including reproducing itself. Like
Giddens‘ structures, rhetorical communities ―exist‖ in human memories and in
their specific instantiations in words; they are not invented anew but persist in
structuring aspects of all forms of socio-rhetorical action. (Miller, 1994, p. 73)

Thus rhetorical community precedes genre—or, as her article title put it, rhetorical
community is the cultural basis of genre. But genre also sustains community by
reproducing it and by reconciling its ―centrifugal and centripetal forces‖ (Miller, 1994, p.
74). These opposing impulses, of contestation and custom, make a community rhetorical.
And to ultimately sustain themselves rhetorical communities employ: metaphor and
figuration to bridge the gap between difference and similarity; narrative to create a field
in which differences may be converged into a shared project; and genre as ―ways of
marshalling rhetorical resources‖ (p. 75) in order to pragmatically structure communal
action. Following Miller‘s line, we would see the rhetoric of the SS gas van documents as
socially grounded and constitutive of doxastic knowledge, or communally validated
―good reasons.‖ Tragically, the rhetoric validated ―good reasons‖ for Judeocide. This
being so, the genre of Nazi organizational and technical communication is a cultural
artifact that incorporates the writers‘ knowledge of their national, institutional, and
organization cultures. As such, examination of their texts may, by revealing actions that
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were significant and recurring, allow us to draw inferences about their culture. As will be
described below, the gas van documents deployed genres as individual authors employed
their shared rules and resources, and thus institutionalized their organizational genres
through reproduction.
These generic rules and resources were efficacious for community members
because they provided ―reproducible speaker and addressee roles [e.g., the SS chain of
command], social typifications of recurrent social needs or exigences [e.g., the
competition among SS bureaus to control policy; the struggle of SS personnel for career
advancement], topical structures [e.g., the ‗moral‘ justifications for the Final Solution; the
duty to carry out the orders of legitimated authority]; and ways of indexing an event to
material conditions [e.g., the ‗need‘ to eliminate a perceived enemy in wartime], turning
them into constraints or resources‖ (Miller, 1994a, p. 71). Structurally, generic action
connects individual thinking to social exigence, thus implying rhetoric—because the
action is always ―addressed‖ to others—and creating a discourse which projects the
community it necessarily invokes. If we concede that gas van documents deploy
organizational genres, then we are likewise conceding they were preceded by a rhetorical
community which supplied the genres‘ cultural basis. In their generic aspects, the Nazi
documents as boundary objects constituted sites where speakers and addressees contested
their divisions and yet also practiced their identifications. The killers had their justifying
metaphors and narratives, and their genres—such as the technical documentation of their
murders—converted those cultural resources into lethally pragmatic social actions.
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Protean Metaphors and a ―Safety‖ Narrative
To sustain their community the desk-murderers would deploy metaphor and
figuration to bridge the gap between difference and similarity, narrative to create a field
in which differences might be converged into a shared project, and genre to marshal
rhetorical resources and thus pragmatically structure communal action. Because metaphor
and narrative establish conditions for genre to then structure action, this section will
analyze the metaphors and narratives found in the SS documents and in the next section
look more closely at the community‘s genres.
Upon inspection, it is striking how protean are the metaphors of this rhetorical
community as it negotiates each situation. Rauff‘s 26 March 1942 letter metaphorically
places the gas vans within the domain of public health (―I refer back to the procedure of
the garrison doctor‖), the domain of the vans‘ original usage during the T4 euthanasia
program; similarly, Turner‘s 11 April 1942 letter refers to the vehicles as ―delousing
vans.‖ Yet Becker, after five months behind the Eastern Front with Einsatzgruppen A and
B, metaphorically places the gas vans within the domain of a military or policing
operation by referring to Jewish victims as ―prisoners‖ to be ―executed.‖ The military
metaphor is likewise instantiated in the 9 June 1942 telegram from Schäfer, head of the
Sipo and SD regional office in Serbia, by a reference to completion of the ―special
mission.‖ By contrast, the automotive specialists at the Berlin motor pool metaphorically
place the gas vans within the domain of transportation by referring to victims as ―load‖
and ―cargo‖ in their 5 June 1942 proposal for technical improvements.
As it happens, though, none of the documents authored by members of the Sipo
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Technical Matters Group employ the word ―Jews‖; the only instances occur in the
correspondences of the Group‘s internal clients, as seen in the of the 11 April 1942
Turner letter and 15 June 1942 Trühe telegram. The overall impression corroborates
Browning‘s (1991) interpretation that the technical experts of the Group ―developed the
euphemistic code language so typical of the Final Solution [because] it hid reality from
[private subcontractors] and at least partially from themselves‖ (p. 67). Their documents
are extraordinary in the rhetorical gymnastics to which they go in avoiding mention of the
vans‘ true purpose. Their metaphors are protean in that the Group‘s members resort to the
metaphorical domains closest to hand—Rauff assenting to the medical metaphor when
responding to a request from the Mauthausen camp doctor; Becker utilizing the military
metaphor fostered by his immediate experience behind the Eastern Front; Just deploying
the transportation metaphor which is the currency of the motor pool.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) noted how metaphors aid cognition of abstract
concepts by grafting onto them familiar domains from the experiential world. The
documents authored by Group members are rhetorically striking in that the texts borrow
from the respective experiential domains of their authors in order to cognize the
abstraction of the Final Solution of the Jewish Question. Clients such as Turner and
Trühe who came face-to-face with killing could refer explicitly to ―Jews‖ in their
correspondences, but the managers and technicians who administered van operations
from Berlin could not. Even Becker, who for months had become inured to gassings in
the field, still could not commit to paper the word ―Jews‖ but wrote only of ―prisoners‖ to
be executed—a resistance that recalls the gas van drivers who, in clinging to their self-
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identities as specialists, kept their vehicles running while at the same time steadfastly
refusing to personally shoot any Jews. Thus did the rhetorical community that was the
Sipo Technical Matters Group employ metaphors to bridge the gap between similarity
and difference, as representatives of the Group‘s various interests—the executive, the
chemical expert, the automotive experts—agreed in their own ways to hide the reality of
mass murder and construct a more comforting shared reality of professional normality.
As a rhetorical resource of the community, narrative created a field on which
differing interests could converge in order to share a common project. That narrative was
the ―need‖ to ―ease the burden‖ on those SS men who were undertaking ―difficult‖ tasks
on behalf of the Reich. Even decades after the war, this narrative was uniformly cited by
members of the Sipo Technical Matters group—by Rauff, Pradel, Wentritt, Becker, and
Findeisen—in their postwar testimonies. They could have ascribed their actions to
careerism, superior orders, peer pressure, duress, or years of being propagandized. Many
did cite these factors, which are at least comprehensible if not exonerating, in their
actions. Yet at the time of their later trials and testimonies, at a time when claims to be
concerned about the psychological stress of the killers would have seemed (and still
seem) ludicrous in the extreme, it is striking that they still clung to this narrative.
Becker‘s field inspection report is the most explicit of the gas van documents in this
regard, with its concern for SS men being subjected to toxic gases and scenes of
grotesquely contorted corpses. But in its own more technical oeuvre, the Just proposal is
also centered on the same narrative. The document refers to safety instructions for
preventing explosions and proposed measures to regulate pressure build-up inside the
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vans, as well as measures to complete the killings more quickly and then streamline the
unloading of corpses and subsequent clean-up of the van compartment. Though the
Group‘s chemical and automotive experts disagreed on solutions, their concurrence on
the narrative created a field on which they could converge and join in a shared project.
Because the Group reconciled its differences around a narrative of occupational
safety, another helpful approach for understanding how the gas van participants
functioned as a rhetorical community is a return to the larger institutional context and see
the Final Solution as an ―industry.‖ In this regard, a productive framework for rhetorical
analysis is Sauer‘s (2003) Cycle of Technical Documentation in Large Regulated
Industries (p. 76) that identifies critical moments when the ―rhetoric of risk‖ is
transformed from one modality to another, so that documents created at different
moments may call on different rhetorical strategies. This framework is particularly
appropriate because Sauer‘s Cycle is meant to describe hazardous industries—and
perpetrators of the gas van murders saw themselves as contending with dynamically
hazardous work—and because her conception of a ―cycle of documentation‖ lends itself
to comparing multiple documents within the same schema. Thus, we can examine the two
lengthiest Sonderwagen documents—the Becker field inspection report and the Just
technical proposal—as parts of a Cycle of Technical Documentation that dynamically
strives, at different critical stages, to regulate risk through the rhetorical transformation of
embodied experience into technical writing.
Key to Sauer‘s model is the tension between ―idealized rhetorical models‖ and the
―capacity of individuals to document the knowledge to assess and manage risk‖ which
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they encounter in ―real environments [that] are dynamic, uncertain, and complex‖ (p. 16).
Sauer studied coal mining, a large regulated industry in which technical documentation
attempts to promulgate generalizable safety standards that can somehow cope with
dynamic and ever-changing environments whose conditions are highly localized.
Repellent as the notion may be, the SS gas van killers saw themselves working in
―hazardous‖ conditions. They operated in remote sites among hostile populations. Each
operation occurred in a new and unfamiliar location. The Einsatzgruppen were dealing
with a new and uncertain technology that was being stretched beyond the original limits
of its design. Their vehicles were ill-suited to local conditions, too cumbersome for offroad use or wet conditions, and subject to dangerous ―load‖ shifts. And the technology
tended to degrade over time and leak hazardous gases at increasing rates. The SS men
were dealing with toxic fumes that could inflict bodily harm and accumulations of
gaseous pressure that could explode. Not all of their Jewish victims went as proverbial
sheep to the slaughter; after the war SS men testified that many victims cried, pleaded,
begged, became hysterical, or attempted flight. The vehicle camouflage that was
supposed to obviate the problem was completely ineffective. The killers operated under
the delusion of what Browning (2004) has called ―chimeric anti-Semitism‖ and saw these
Jews as dangerous enemies, allied with partisan guerillas and carriers of disease and filth.
As Herf (2006) has shown, the Germans increasingly believed their propaganda about
―Judeo-Bolshevism‖ as the war went on. And as the SS killers prepared to unload their
―cargo‖ they had no idea what would be revealed when the doors were opened. But they
could expect billows of toxic gas and the psychologically damaging sight of hideously
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distorted corpses covered in excrement, vomit, and blood. The fact that drivers invariably
ignored instructions and instead ―floored‖ the gas pedal, to finish the killings as swiftly as
possible, testifies to their anxiety.
Sauer‘s (2003) thesis holds that ―three different types of warrants grounded in
embodied sensory experience‖ can be brought to bear in judging risk: (1) embodied
sensory knowledge acquired by workers who physically sense or perceive conditions in
specific local environment; (2) engineering experience acquired as engineers develop
material histories of each site by observing and recording physical signs and indices; and
(3) scientific knowledge, invisible to the physical senses, acquired as scientists interpret
inscribed data (p. 182). In turn, embodied sensory experience is rhetorically transformed,
by means of technical writing, from one modality to another at six critical moments
within the Cycle of Technical Documentation in Large Regulated Industries. According
to Sauer, these moments are:

1. When oral testimony and embodied experience are captured in writing
2. When information in accident reports is re-represented in statistical records
3. When statistical accounts are re-represented as arguments for particular
policies
4. When policies and standards are transformed into procedures
5. When procedures are re-represented in training
6. When training is re-represented to workers (pp. 75-76)
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In its entirety, the cycle is a process whereby stakeholders interact to bring locally
dynamic hazardous environments under the control of generalized safety standards. Thus
site-specific experience is in tension with the effort to standardize experience. Then, too,
the economic and safety interests of the stakeholders must be balanced. Sauer uses an
instructive analogy to highlight the inherent problem in a ―rhetoric of risk‖ that, she
theorized, cannot deliberate policy only in terms of probabilities but must acknowledge
an irreducible element of uncertainty. She describes three types of compliance: stopping
at stop signs, following doctor‘s orders to take pain medication as needed, and adjusting a
furnace or air-conditioner to maintain a constant room temperature as the weather
changes (pp. 50-51). Stop signs provide a clear rule to follow in all cases. Following a
doctor‘s orders to take pain medication ―as needed‖ requires us to ascertain when
compliance is appropriate. But ―In the third case, we may find ourselves technically out
of compliance even as we increase our efforts to bring conditions into compliance‖ (p.
51). In the same way, the constantly changing environment of a coal mine requires
constant monitoring and remedial adjustment to control risk levels and avoid disaster.
Sauer‘s framework offers an opportunity to reconceive the Final Solution from
the Nazi point of view as a ―large regulated industry‖ and grasp how its technical
documentation attempted to bring under control an inherently unstable and (from the
perpetrators‘ perspective) dynamically hazardous enterprise. Indeed, the historical record
of the Third Reich offers numerous testimonies—such as those cited at the outset of this
study—of camps operated on a ―wild‖ basis until standards were introduced. Historians
generally agree that, while anti-Jewish pogroms have occurred for centuries, it took the
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organizing capacity of a modern bureaucratic state to prosecute the Holocaust. Thus the
Just and Becker documents become, when viewed through Sauer‘s model, attempts to
rhetorically transform embodied sensory experience at different critical moments in the
Cycle of Technical Documentation. This is why examinations of two related documents
—rather than single documents in isolation—is a valuable exercise and enables us to
grasp an ongoing process. The rhetorics of the two documents are different because they
occur at different points in the Cycle. Indeed, Sauer‘s model lets us step back even
further and view the gas van program within the Nazis‘ overall project of experimenting
with different killing methods to find the least ―risky‖ and most ―productive.‖ Shooting
was the first experiment, gas vans the second, and stationary gas chambers the final
―successful‖ solution of their self-appointed problem.
In the Just and Becker documents are seen references to all the critical moments
in the Cycle of Technical Documentation. For example, the Just proposal refers to a
Sonderwagen explosion at the Chelmno death camp caused by human error and reports
how ―In order to avoid such incidents, special instructions have been addressed to the
services concerned. Safety has been increased considerably as a result of these
instructions‖ (Kogon et al. 1993/1983, p. 137). Here we see implied the entire Cycle:
local documentation; accident report; statistical report; policy and regulations; practices
and procedures; training and instruction. The Becker report also refers to different critical
moments in the Cycle and illustrates the tension between different forms of experience.
The IID3 inspector gathered local documentation by interviewing van drivers and other
personnel; he reported to Rauff on accidents that occurred in the field; and he described
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how practices and procedures were communicated to field personnel through training and
instruction, but that Einsatzgruppen resisted compliance by privileging their local
experiences and perceptions of risk. Thus the SS men open the throttle to hasten the
killings, and unload the vans themselves to prevent prisoner escapes.
The Becker report is an example of Point 1 in Sauer‘s (2003) Cycle of Technical
Documentation (―when oral testimony and embodied experience are captured in writing‖)
as Becker attempted to rhetorically transform embodied sensory experience into
engineering knowledge. The Just proposal is an example of Point 3 (―when statistical
accounts [and accident data] are re-represented as arguments for particular policies‖) as
the writer(s) attempted to rhetorically transform engineering knowledge into
generalizable standards based on ―scientific‖ knowledge (i.e., how the ―cargo‖ can be
―processed‖ more quickly if void air spaces are reduced, and how the ―load‖ will respond
to the stimuli of light or darkness and afford a ―natural‖ weight distribution). Thus the
Becker and Just documents, in their work as boundary objects, manifest different
rhetorics because they sought different rhetorical transformations at different critical
moments—but always as variations of the same narrative, a narrative of occupational
safety which created a field on which their respective interests could converge.

Discovering Organizational Genres in the Texts
We have explored, according to Miller‘s (1994) scheme, how the rhetorical
community of the Sipo Technical Matters Group reconciled its ―centrifugal and
centripetal forces‖ (p. 74) by deploying metaphor to bridge difference and similarity, and
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deploying narrative to create a field on which they might converge for a shared project.
Miller also posited genres as a third means of reconciliation by which the community can
marshal its rhetorical resources to pragmatically structure communal action. Here
Miller‘s work (1985a, 1987, 2000) on special topics (idioi koinoi or eide) is useful in
identifying genres in everyday organizational documents. For if genres are viewed not as
mere sets of formal requirements but as socio-rhetorical actions, then it necessarily
follows that invention according to topics which are special to a given rhetorical
community will carry much of a text‘s argumentative weight. Miller (1985a, 1987) dealt
at length with classical and historical treatments of special topics, a discussion that need
not be recapitulated here. Together with Selzer, the two argued in ―Special Topics of
Argument in Engineering Reports‖ (1985b) that in Aristotle‘s Rhetoric special topics are
both genre-specific and institution-specific, which then ―suggests a third kind of special
topic for contemporary theory, a kind based on specialized knowledge of disciplines‖ (p.
313). Through an analysis of arguments presented by two transit development plans they
illustrated three categories of ―specialized‖ special topics: generic special topics,
institutional/organizational special topics, and disciplinary special topics.
The category of institutional/organizational special topics is most germane to an
analysis of the SS gas van documents. For although the Becker and Just documents were
informed by disciplinary knowledge of chemical and automotive engineering, these
―objective‖ conventions were subordinated to the imperative of the Final Solution. Thus,
to discover why experts might place their knowledge at the service of genocide is to
understand their institutional milieu—for as we learned above, rhetorical community
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precedes genre and, in fact, provides the cultural basis for genre. Miller and Selzer (1985)
began their discussion of institutional/organizational special topics by quoting March and
Simon‘s (1958) observation that ―the world tends to be perceived by . . . organization
members in terms of the particular concepts that are reflected in the organization‘s
vocabulary‖ (p. 165). Thus, explained Miller and Selzer (1985), ―When such concepts
and vocabulary are sources of arguments, we call them institutional special topics‖ (p.
325). The two researchers examined two transit development plans for arguments whose
invention was grounded in institutional/organizational concepts and vocabularies. They
discovered that a Nebraska engineering firm, in drafting transmittal letters for two very
different Illinois transportation project proposals (an airport expansion and a highway
traffic study) employed similar language stressing the company‘s ―commitment‖ to
Illinois, its recent opening of a ―major office‖ there, and its intention to maintain ―close‖
relations with clients ―throughout the duration of the project‖ (p. 326). Examination of
the two transmittal letters demonstrated that ―these points thus become company-specific
sources of persuasion‖ (p. 327).
What points became ―company-specific sources of persuasion‖ for the men of the
Sipo Technical Matters Group? Easily the most recurring language is the adjective
―special‖ (Sonder).The term ―special van(s)‖ or the abbreviation ―S-vans‖ is used three
times in the Rauff letter, twice in the Just proposal, twice in the Schäfer telegram, three
times in the Trühe telegram, and once in Rauff‘s reply to Trühe. The term ―special
mission‖ appears in the Schäfer telegram, while the Trühe telegram references Jews to be
―treated in a special way.‖ Clearly, then, ―special‖ constituted an organization-specific
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source of persuasion. An internal directive to this effect is seen in a 20 September 1939
telegram issued by RSHA chief Reinhard Heydrich that stated, ―To avoid any
misunderstandings, please take note of the following: . . . a distinction must be made
between those who may be dealt with in the usual way and those who must be given
special treatment.‖ In fact, because the code word became so widespread it could no
longer camouflage the murders, in March 1943 Himmler ordered his chief statistician to
use the term durchgeschleust (―processed‖) in official reports of the killings (Kogon et
al., 1993, pp. 5-8; Hilberg, 2003, p. 1305). The Eichmann bureau used the term
Sonderbehandlung so frequently that it eventually had to distinguish between the term‘s
legitimate and metaphorical usages by coining the term SB-Fälle (―SB cases‖) as ―a
euphemism for the euphemisim‖ (Lozowick, 2000. P. 128). Through such recurring
everyday language within organizations, observed Oswick, Putnam and Keenoy (2004),
are exposed those metaphors—in the case of the SS, the metaphor of murder as
specialized handling or treatment—that resonate with members, become archetypes that
―provide rich summaries of the world and function as dominant ways of seeing,‖ and
thereby legitimate actions (pp. 109-116).
Another organization-specific source of persuasion that emerges from the
recurring language of the documents is that of a military ―operation,‖ ―action,‖ or
―mission.‖ These words recur in these and other documents from the gas van program,
such as a 1 May 1942 letter to Himmler from the Nazi governor of annexed Poland that
references ―the special treatment operation‖ to murder 100,000 Jews using gas vans at the
Chelmno death camp, a measure characterized by the official as an ―operation against the
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Jews‖ and a precedent for ―taking action against‖ native Poles (p. 6). The Becker field
inspection report refers multiple times to ―prisoners‖ and ―executions,‖ in keeping with
the overall justification for killing Soviet Jews. At the end of 1941 as the mass shootings
in Soviet territory gradually solidified into a general plan for exterminating all European
Jews, Himmler emerged from a December 18 meeting with Hitler and noted the
dictators‘s instruction in his appointment diary: ―Jewish question / to be extirpated
[auszurotten] as partisans‖ (Longerich, 2001, p. 155). The punctilious use of titles may
also be seen as evidence of a military ethos, as well as the organization‘s adherence to the
Nazi ―leadership principle.‖
Two more special topics suggested by the documents may be seen in the recurrent
titling ―Secret Reich Matter‖ (geheime Reichssache). First, we should not underestimate
the persuasive power of partaking in secret knowledge. Second, the application of
―Reich‖ to virtually everything in Nazi Germany had a subtle linguistic purpose for the
regime; as Fritzsche (2008) noted: the ―pretentiousness of Nazi vocabulary in which
Reich-this and Reich-that puffed up the historical moment of the regime‖ (p. 133). The
word ―Reich‖ does not readily translate in English and carries mystic connotations not
only of empire but also of German national history and greatness. Thus the documents
are prominently headed ―Secret Reich Matter‖ and ―Reich Security Main Office.‖
The military-style attention to forms and protocols was prescribed by a 1 June
1940 directive, circulated to all RSHA offices, which provided exacting guidelines for
document creation (Lozowick, 2000). As we learned in Chapter 3, the directive set forth
explicit instructions on filing codes, the bureaucratic implications of letterheads and
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departmental symbols, as well as who had authority to sign documents in his own name,
who had authority to sign for his immediate superior, who did not have such authority,
how authority or non-authority should be indicated, and even how handwritten notations
should be made in colored pencils according to rank. (Thus, Rauff is the only signatory
who, as Gruppenleiter of II D, is ―big enough‖ to sign documents without specifying his
rank; it is also interesting that Rauff‘s signature is larger than his junior colleagues.) The
directive further implores, ―Long, complicated sentences should be avoided, and margins
should be left for comments‖ (p. 48).
Marginal comments also provide clues for discovering organizational special
topics. In fact, even handwritten notes scrupulously follow RSHA protocols as writers
head their notes with their organizational identification codes—for example, Just‘s
identification was II D 3a (9)—and sign their names with the appropriate ―I.A.‖ (im
Auftrag) notation, while frequently enumerating their points 1, 2, and so on. This
reinforces the suggestion that bureaucratic procedure and convention was a powerful
organization-specific source of persuasion that served to normalize genocide. Rauff‘s
postwar testimony, as we have seen, expounded at length about the importance of rank
and protocol in the organizational culture of the RSHA.
Miller‘s (1993, 1994) conception of rhetorical communities and their genres is
echoed in the literature on organizational culture where ―it is common to identify cultural
forms‖ (Alvesson, 2004, p. 320) such as Trice and Beyer‘s (1993) oft-cited categories of
organizational language, symbols, narratives, and practices. According to the latter
scheme, the gas van documents reveal traces of an organizational culture whose forms
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encompass language (the metaphors deployed to legitimize murder), symbols (the visual
rhetorics of the documents), narratives (the saga of ―soldierly‖ and ―heroic‖ comrades
whose suffering through ―hard‖ duties on behalf of the ―people‘s community‖ should be
eased), and practices (observance of bureaucratic conventions and of the Nazi leadership
principle).
But by whatever names, having discovered a number of genres in the gas van
documents, what do we learn about the rhetorical community that produced/reproduced
them—and how it deployed genres to pragmatically structure social action? Recall
Miller‘s (1994) demonstration that genres are cultural artifacts. Because the Sipo
Technical Matters Group validated these significantly recurring actions, their genres may
be seen as having borne their culture and incorporated their knowledge. Genre is ―that
aspect of situated communication that is capable of reproduction, that can be manifested
in more than one situation‖ and thereby ―provide[s] reproducible speaker and addressee
roles, social typifications of recurrent social needs or exigences, topical structures (or
‗moves‘ and ‗steps‘), and ways of indexing an event to material conditions, turning them
into constraints or resources‖ (p. 71, emphasis in original). Further, genre connects the
individual mind and the larger rhetorical community, sustaining the community by
reproducing it and by reconciling its centrifugal and centripetal forces.
Thus does genre furnish ―ways of marshalling rhetorical resources‖ (p. 75) to
pragmatically structure communal action. It then follows that the SS bureaucrats‘
genres—the significantly recurring references to ―special‖ tasks, to secrecy, to national
consciousness, to protocols informed by the leadership principle and a military/
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bureaucratic ethos—bear their culture and incorporate the exigences of their shared social
knowledge. Genres structured group actions by providing:



speaker and addressee roles that could be reproduced according to SS rank
protocols (Obersturmbannführer, Hauptsturmführer, Untersturmführer) and
organizational hierarchies (II → IID → IID3 → IID3a → IID3a9) that
instantiated the leadership principle (and connected members to the broader
Nazi theme of ―community‖).



social typifications of a recurrent social exigence to ―partially hide reality
from themselves‖ by references to ―special‖ tasks of a ―secret‖ and ―military‖
nature, while also normalizing these tasks by folding them into bureaucratic
routines.



topical structures (or idioi topoi) that furnished a mental topology on which
members could ground their arguments and make ―moves‖ or ―steps‖ that
others within the community might find persuasive—such that patently absurd
arguments (―the procedure of the garrison doctor,‖ ―the gassing is without
exception not properly done,‖ ―ninety-seven thousand have been processed,‖
―Goetz and Meyer have completed their special mission‖) became the basis
for deliberation and decision.



ways of indexing genocide (by exchanging correct correspondence; by
adhering to speaker/addressee roles in reporting problems, proposing
solutions, and making and fulfilling requisitions) to the material conditions of
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everyday bureaucratic life at the Sipo Technical Matters Group and its Berlin
motor pool, and turning those conditions into a structure of resources for and
constraints upon pragmatic action.

Genres thus served as rhetorical resources to reconcile the centrifugal and centripetal
forces of the community. In other words, their presence permitted the everyday
documents of the Sipo Technical Matters Group to function as boundary objects, plastic
enough to meet the local needs of the organization‘s respective interests and robust
enough to forge, just barely long enough, a temporarily shared identity.

Visuality in the Rhetorical Community
The notion of rhetorical community would seemingly be broad enough to take
within its ambit the visual rhetorics that contribute to the community‘s (re)production.
Yet the rhetorical properties of visuality have resisted facile categorization. Visual
images have ―long been suspect as irrational, illogical, and somewhat slippery‖ to many
scholars, so that a ―traditional bias for modes of verbal expression and against visual
images‖ is found in much of the literature (Hope, 2006, p. 31). Kostelnick and Roberts
(1998), for example, proposed visual equivalents for the five classical canons of rhetoric,
a too-neat logocentric solution that seems reductionistic and unsatisfying. Instead,
DeLuca (2006) urges researchers to leave behind ―Gutenberg‘s Galaxy‖ and recognize
that attempts to ―approach images with the mindset and methods of print ensures we will
misread them; adopting an image orientation is a necessary first step‖ (pp. 86-87). For as
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Balter-Reitz and Stewart (2006) averred, ―The classical argumentation model of claim,
evidence, and inference does not seem to provide much insight into the working of visual
artifacts‖ (p. 116). Thus, I have elsewhere (Ward, 2010b) advanced the proposition that a
given arrangement of text and graphics has symbolic potency for a given audience
because the author/designer and the user, engaged in a communal conversation that is
grounded in the exigence of shared social knowledge, together co-construct its meaning.
In so doing, they ―satisfy a mutual need to establish a rule of action and ensure the
continuance of their common world‖ (pp. 68-69). In this light, let us consider the visual
rhetorics of the Sonderwagen documents.
To begin, the Rauff letter of 26 March 1942 is seemingly the most nondescript of
the gas van documents. If only the written text is considered then the letter is most
noteworthy not for what it says but, rather, what it does not say. The text does not
mention the purpose for which a gas van was requested by the Mauthausen camp, except
to reference ―the procedure of the garrison doctor‖ and thus give tacit assent to the public
health metaphor—or as Lifton (1986) proposed, the ―medicalization‖ of killing. The text
studiously assumes a passive tone, shifting the locus of action from the author to his
superiors Heydrich (the ―Chief of the Security Police and SD‖ or CSSD) and the General
Plenipotentiary for Vehicles (GEK), thereby denying the request but without taking
responsibility. Further, as Höhne (1969/1966, p. 267) explained, because the document
concerned business that had circulated outside Heydrich‘s Reich Security Main Office
(RSHA) then the letterhead omitted the word ―Reichssicherheitshauptamt‖ (which by
contrast was featured prominently on internal documents) and referred to Heydrich as
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Figure 6.1: German Original of 26 March 1942 Rauff Letter
Source: Holocaust History Project (http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420326-rauff-sonderwagen)
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CSSD rather than as RSHA chief. Finally, the letter is most interesting to historians
because the final paragraph mentions bottled gas as an alternative to the special vans,
thus clearly implying—but not actually stating—a connection. Why would bottled gas
solve a problem when ―special trucks‖ are unavailable? The letter does not say. And the
offhand mention of other ―remedies‖ (Hilfsmitteln) employs a word used as a reference to
poison gas in other SS documents.
Visually, however, the document‘s rhetoric would be experienced as normal,
standard, and business-as-usual. The letterhead mentions no ―Reich Security Main
Office‖ but features only a nondescript abbreviation (―II D Rf/Hb‖ or II D Referat
[Bureau] Hauptbüro [Headquarters]) that calls little attention to itself. Though the
―Secret‖ (Geheime) stamp is placed to draw eye traffic, it is less obtrusive than the
―Secret State Matter‖ (Geheime Reichssache) stamp that is found on other documents and
in which the type is larger and bolder. The formatting of the letter is impeccable with the
text precisely flush left. Interestingly, the final paragraph which is denoted as ―2‖ was
apparently added later with a different typewriter because the type is not as heavy, the
two lines of text angle slightly upward from left to right, and the last line intersects the
―I.A.‖ of the signature block. This may, then, be a copy of the letter that was routed to
Pradel for his information. In any event, Rauff signs his last name by hand with an
oversized executive flourish and Pradel countersigns his receipt of Note 2 with a hurried
scribble, but the filing codes in the upper left are handwritten with a clerk‘s precise and
legible script. Finally, the document does not avail itself of a feature found on typewriters
made for the SS—namely a key that types the ―lightning-bolt‖ SS runes (and which may
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be seen in the German originals of the Becker and Just documents). Indeed, unlike the
other documents that are filled with references to SS units and ranks, the 26 March 1942
Rauff letter contains no visible SS identifications at all. Since the letter might circulate
outside the RSHA and perhaps outside the SS, its language had to be carefully couched
and its visual appearance had to be entirely normal and businesslike.
The 16 June 1942 Becker field inspection report is interesting in that, unlike the
26 March 1942 Rauff letter, its visual rhetoric is a collective creation. The text may have
been composed by Becker but the visual elements show as many as six participants.
Thus, as the document proceeded through the Sipo Technical Matters Group bureaucracy,
visual components were added at each step of the process to create a cumulative and
collective rhetoric. Among the visual features of the Becker report are the following:

 The word ―Reichssicherheitshauptamt‖ is omitted from the letterhead, perhaps
because it had to be sent through the military field post (Feldpost).
 The three pages of the document appear to have been originally stapled
together, with the staple affixed at a 45-degree angle.
 The stamped words ―Secret State Matter‖ (Geheime Reichssache) are boxed
and in bold type, and thus more prominent than the word ―Secret‖ stamped on
the 26 March 1942 Rauff letter.
 An SS typewriter with a key for the trademark SS runes was employed, as seen
at the top of the first page in Rauff‘s SS rank title and on the final page in
Becker‘s title.
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 Rauff and Pradel have each countersigned the document toward the upper right
of the first page.
 A motor pool employee, whose difficult-to-read handwriting appears in other
gas van documents, has underlined ―(Saurer) stop completely in rainy weather‖
in the first paragraph and made a marginal notation beside that text.
 The scond paragraph in which Becker describes how the vans‘ camouflage has
failed is marked off in the left margin by a double-slash.
 An entrance stamp has been placed at right angles in the lower left of the first
page. Within it, the written notation ―II D 3 a‖ has been made in Pradel‘s hand,
while the filing code has been written (here as well as in the top left corner) by
the same hand that wrote the code in the 26 March 1942 Rauff letter. Space is
provided in the block to write in a ―Procedure‖ (Vorgang), though the line is
left blank. The date within the stamp appears to be 16 June 1942, indicating the
document has taken a month to travel through the mails and then down the
Sipo Technical Matters Group chain of authority.
 The text is flush left. As in the 26 March 1942 Rauff letter, the left margin is
generous but at the right margin the text is typed almost to the edge of the
sheet. As Lozowick (2000) has noted, RSHA guidelines on document style
called for a wide left margin to facilitate marginal notations.
 Someone has made handwritten bracket marks around most of the paragraphs.
 Beside the text in which Becker described how SS personnel unload corpses
themselves because they fear that prisoners compelled to do the work might
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take the opportunity to flee, and where Becker requested that orders be issued
to remedy the situation, there is in the left margin a handwritten question mark
and what appears to be a capital ―R.‖ This may be Rauff making a note of
Becker‘s request.
 Becker signs the report in his own name since his signature is not denoted as
either ―I.A.‖ or ―I.V.‖

In this document we see the rhetorical community, in a very physical and tangible way,
literally co-constructing its meaning. It is almost a kind of palimpsest in which an earlier
creation is subsequently modified by later creations on the same parchment. Here the
theory I articulated (Ward, 2010b) works nicely: confronted by the uncertainty of a new
datum—Heydrich‘s order to build gas vans—the bureaucrats of the Sipo Technical
Matters Group generated documents as boundary objects by which they could triangulate
a rule of action that reestablished their belief in ―the system‖ and continued their common
world. While Holocaust historians have focused solely on Becker‘s written text, that is
not the entirety of the document. To address the question ―Why?‖ a vital task is seeing
―the community as invoked, represented, presupposed, or developed in rhetorical
discourse‖ (Miller, 1994, p. 73) through the entire document—its codes, numbers, dates,
letterhead, logos, stamps, countersignatures, underlining, marginal notations, and more.
Through these elements we can see the rule of action that the community
triangulated and discern the belief they established and the meaning they co-constructed.
And what was that meaning? Genocide was absorbed into the common world of accepted
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Figure 6.2: German Original of 16 May 1942 Becker Field Report, Page 1 of 3
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 6.2: German Original of 16 May 1942 Becker Field Report, Page 2 of 3
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 6.2: German Original of 16 May 1942 Becker Field Report, Page 3 of 3
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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bureaucratic rules of action, reestablishing belief in professional bureaucracy and giving
genocide its meaning (for them) as procedure. Bogost (2007) has observed that procedure
itself constitutes a rhetoric ―of persuasion through rule-based representations and
interactions‖ (p. ix) for procedures can be expressive ―in a way that invokes political,
social, and cultural values‖ (p. 5) as rhetors engage in ―the practice of authoring
arguments through processes‖ (p. 28). While Bogost‘s theory of procedural rhetoric is
concerned with computational procedures, it does point up the notion that processes in
themselves can make arguments. Black (2001) documented how the Nazis from their
earliest days in power used the latest punch card technology and strove to employ
―massively organized information . . . [as] a means of social control‖ (p. 7). Historians
Aly and Roth (2004) in their review of Nazi census-taking noted that ―the simple
abstraction of humans into mere numbers‖ (p. 6) expresses a fundamental worldview in
which ―the person becomes a case, an example, an index card‖ (p. 23)—or, as in Becker
document, at first mere ―prisoners‖ for execution and then, ultimately, just a filing code.
The visual rhetoric of the preprinted RSHA telegrams can be interpreted the same
way, for their lines and boxes and serial numbers all scream ―Procedure!‖ The letterhead
states ―Reich Security Main Office News Transmission‖ (Reichssicherheitshauptamt
Nachrichten-Uebermittlung) and immediately below is a ―Space for Entrance Stamp‖
(Raum für Eingangsstempel), with boxes at the upper left and upper right to stamp the
transmission and receipt dates by ―Hour, Day, Month, Year.‖ Below the lefthand box,
each preprinted telegram form has a sequential ―News Transmission Number‖ (N.-U.
Nr.). And below the heading ―Telegram – Radio Wire – Writing – Saying‖ the sender can
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paste his message with the aid of preprinted baselines. Finally, along the lefthand side of
the form in type rotated 90 degrees is the word ―File Margin‖ (Heftrand) to allow space
for recipients to make notations. Thus, organization members would experience the
rhetoric of the telegram form as an argument for normal everyday bureaucratic
procedure. Yet of further interest to the analyst are the handwritten notations on the front
and back of the telegrams. These messages, which request vehicles and supplies or report
vehicle damage, once received were routed through the Sipo Technical Matters Group
chain of authority. Thus they provide—together with Rauf‘s 22 June 1942 reply to one of
the requests—clues to how, organizationally, the gas van program was administered on a
daily basis.
Such visual elements as those described above performed ―rhetorical boundary
work‖ (Wilson & Herndl, 2007) between the multiple levels and subcultures within the
Sipo Technical Matters Group. The need for such boundary work was considerable, for
competing interests within the Group included the executive level represented by Rauff
who, in his mid thirties, identified with young and ideologically-driven RHSA leadership
cadre cultivated by Heydrich and Himmler; the middle management level represented by
Pradel, who identified with the professional culture of career police officers and saw
himself as a transportation expert; the junior level represented by Wentritt, the upwardly
mobile technical school graduate who had recently been named chief mechanic of the
Sipo motor pool in Berlin; the employee level represented by Just, an older man in his
forties who had been a welder in German police service for more than twenty years; the
clerical level whose participation can be seen in the typing, stamping, coding, and filing
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of the documents; the expert level represented by Becker who, with his Ph.D. in
chemistry, was on loan from the T4 euthanasia program and dispatched by Rauff as a
field inspector; the field personnel represented by the gas van drivers Findeisen and
Gevatter who clung to their identity as specialists and refused to personally shoot any
Jews; the internal clients represented by Schäfer and Trühe who, like Rauff, were
dedicated ―SS men‖ and headed the regional offices that oversaw the Einsatzgruppen
shooting squads; and finally the suppliers, including the subcontractor Gaubschat that
built the truck compartments, the Armed Forces High Command with whom Rauff
negotiated allocations of truck chassis and motor fuel, and the General Plenipotentiary for
Vehicles that released the trucks.
How were such variations in perspective integrated to achieve, as Wilson and
Herndl (2007) put it, a ―trading zone, a temporary space of cooperation and exchange and
exchange between different disciplines or subdisciplines‖ so as to ―make discordant
language and knowledge understandable by demonstrating how these ways of thinking
and speaking fit within a common project‖ (p. 132)? In this regard, the visual aspects of
the Schäfer and Trühe telegrams are eerily reminiscent of the ―knowledge map‖ (p. 141)
by which project team members in the Wilson and Herndl study charted their respective
participation in the project. The preprinted RSHA telegram form provided lines and
boxes for nearly every level of the Sonderwagen administration to map its participation.
Spaces are graphically marked off for the client‘s messages, the entrance stamp of the
Sipo Technical Matters Group, the countersignatures of Rauff and Pradel, and the routing
stamp needed to properly file the document, while the back of the telegram provided a
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Figure 6.3: German Original of 9 June 1942 Schäfer Telegram, Page 1 of 2
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 6.3: German Original of 9 June 1942 Schäfer Telegram, Page 2 of 2
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 6.4: German Original of 15 June 1942 Trühe Telegram
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 6.5: German Original of 22 June 1942 Rauff Reply to Trühe
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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Figure 6.6: German Original of Retyped Telegrams from 15 and 9 June 1942
Source: Nuremberg Documents PS-501
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handy space where each level—Rauff, Pradel, Wentritt, Just—notated questions,
answers, instructions and procedures, while carefully denoting their individual numerical
codes. From this single sheet of paper, one can reconstruct precisely the chain of
command and how requests for vehicles, repairs, and supplies progressed through each
level. As Wilson and Herndl discovered with their missile team, I believe the document
forms of the Sipo Technical Matters Group helped to create trading zones as ―temporary
formations in which distinct groups with different orientations, professional
commitments, and characteristic forms of argument can cooperate in specific practices‖
(p. 145).
Even as the visual rhetoric of the one-page telegram forms is revealing, so is the
visual rhetoric of the lengthiest document in the gas-van corpus. For the 5 June 1942
technical proposal is, visually, the most unique of the documents under study. The visual
rhetoric that clearly stands out above all else is the formality of the document design. The
proposal was meant to impress in its appearance as well as its argument. Those who have
never created a document on a typewriter, but who have always enjoyed the convenience
of editing their copy on a word processor, cannot understand the painstaking difficulty
and repeated attempts required to produce such a document on a typewriter—and, further,
on a manual typewriter (with, of course, no self-correcting capability). And to have
sustained the precision of the margins and tab sets over five typewritten pages would
have required supreme effort. Notice also two very telling difference between the Just
proposal and both the Becker field inspection report and even Rauff‘s 26 March 1942
routine business letter. In the latter two cases the lines of type extend almost to the right
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edge of the sheet and words are hyphenated haphazardly so as to create a somewhat
ragged right margin. The line endings are within acceptable bounds but, clearly, the right
margin received only the ―usual‖ attention and no great effort was made to diminish its
raggedness. But the Just proposal is notable because its has a generous right margin, as
well as the left, so as to present a visually pleasing symmetry on the page; for that matter,
the top and bottom margins also allow a visually pleasing amount of white space; and the
manual line endings are regulated to keep the text from being too ragged at the right
margin. Clearly, this is a serious document, not routine at all, and intended to impress.
Considerable effort would have been required not only to compose and phrase the text,
but also to produce the document. The seriousness is also suggested by the fact that, at
the top of the document, it is marked not only ―Reich Secret Matter‖ in bold type but is
also denoted ―Only Copy.‖ The Just proposal is also notable in that no one else has made
any marginal notations and stamped any routing instructions upon it. The document
apparently received ―kid glove‖ treatment.
How, then, to interpret the meaning that the rhetorical community co-constructed
from this object? Any answer is speculation, of course. But perhaps a better approach to
an answer is to rephrase the question: Why were the other documents treated as merely
routine and this document was not? The stakes, apparently, were higher. Becker‘s
stinging report of van operations in the field had forced the hand of the Berlin-based
automotive technicians of the Sipo Technical Matters Group. After they had built the
Sonderwagen and sent them to the field, the vans were just another set of vehicles among
the four thousand they administered. But now the technicians came face-to-face with the
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Figure 6.7: German Original of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 1 of 5
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420605-rauff-spezialwagen
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Figure 6.7: German Original of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 2 of 5
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420605-rauff-spezialwagen
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Figure 6.7: German Original of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 3 of 5
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420605-rauff-spezialwagen
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Figure 6.7: German Original of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 4 of 5
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420605-rauff-spezialwagen

178

Figure 6.7: German Original of 5 June 1942 Just Technical Proposal, Page 5 of 5
Source: http://www.holocaust-history.org/19420605-rauff-spezialwagen
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vans‘ purpose and were given direct responsibility for using their know-how to devise
solutions to keep them going. Confronted with this new datum and its threat to
continuance of their common world, they created a document whose highly formal and
serious rhetoric (textually and visually) enabled them to absorb the datum into a habitual
rule of action—they retreated, that is, behind a genre they knew quite well: technical
communication.
In this chapter we have seen how the members of the Sipo Technical Matters
Group deployed metaphor, narrative, and genre in their texts to construct a rhetorical
community. Beside their texts, where do their visuals fit in? Did the visual rhetorics in
their documents supply metaphors to bridge the gaps between their similarities and their
differences? Or did their visual rhetorics furnish narratives that created a field in which
their differences could be converged into a shared project? Or did their visual rhetorics
constitute genres the desk-murderers employed to pragmatically structure social action?
In my view, we must heed here Williams‘s (2006) warning that any interpretive
framework must take into account visual intelligence or the ―intuitive and unconscious
cognitive nature of visual communication,‖ a mode of meaning that ―eludes traditional
semiotic, rhetorical, and other logocentric measurement techniques‖ (p. 32). As Barry
(1997, 2006) pointed out, images are cognized much differently than words. The latter
are cognized by the conscious/thoughtful half of the human brain, while images are
cognized not only by the conscious/thoughtful half but also by the unconscious/intuitive
half. And this whole-mind cognition occurs instantaneously, so that to ―read‖ images as if
they were ―texts‖ may be untrue to the way that images are cognized. The analyst must
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take care not ―to reduce the rhetorical force of images to meaning, domesticating them
for our studies‖ (DeLuca, 2006, p. 82). Or as Messaris (2003) cautioned, ―Images can
inveigle us into seeing them as real, even though most of us know full well that they are
artificial constructions,‖ a fact that ―serves as a clearer demarcation of how images differ
from words‖ (p. 553).
The visual rhetorics of the Sonderwagen corpus imparted to the documents a
patina of bureaucratic normalcy that, according to the properties of visual intelligence,
could be processed cognitively and intuitively at a mere glance. What the visual elements
of the documents say to the looker is, to paraphrase Bauman‘s (1989) description, ―Here
is an objective discharge of business according to calculable rules and without regard for
persons‖ (p. 14). This visual rhetorical argument may alternately be seen as metaphor,
bridging the gap between the killers‘ similarities and differences by explaining the new
(mass murder) in terms of the familiar (bureaucratic routine); as narrative, telling a story
of business-as-usual in order to create a field on which members‘ differences might
converge; or as genre, marshaling rhetorical resources to pragmatically structure social
action, sometimes as simply as filling in the blanks. Images may, as suggested above, be
―somewhat slippery.‖ But any analysis of a text that excludes the visual element may
miss a vital aspect of the meanings being conveyed—and, in our case, of the rhetorical
boundary work being done.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCOURSE OF DEATH

What Discourse Analysis Can Add
In the previous chapter we followed the implications of Miller‘s (1994) thesis that
rhetorical community is the cultural basis for genre. In so doing we saw the murderers of
the Sipo Technical Matters Group as a community that—through organizational texts that
served as boundary objects to negotiate their differences—marshaled the rhetorical
resources of metaphor, narrative, and genre to (re)produce itself. Along the way we
employed two of three approaches, rhetorical and genre analysis, that Berkenkotter
(2002) cited as methods for research into everyday organizational texts. What, then,
could the third approach—discourse analysis—add to what we have already learned?
Within the context of organization studies, Alvesson (2004) asked a similar question: Is
the ―organizational discourse‖ approach merely a re-labeling of the ―organizational
culture‖ approach since the two frequently study the same things? Or to rephrase this
question for the present study: If we have seen—through rhetorical and genre analyses—
that rhetorical community (re)produces the organizational culture which furnishes the
basis for genres by which organizations pragmatically structure social action, can
discourse analysis bring anything new to the table?
Alvesson (2004, pp. 328ff) answered this question by proposing four distinctions:
(1) Where researchers who accord primacy to organizational culture assume that much
organizational meaning is tacit and therefore precedes discourse or is not expressed via
discourse, those who privilege organizational discourse see meaning as driven by
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language use and social reality as locally constructed through such discursive acts as
categorizing, identifying, and relating. (2) Where those who see organizational culture as
decisive assume language use reveals meaning, those who give primacy to organizational
discourse assume language use creates temporary meaning, order, and power distribution.
(3) Where those who look first to organizational culture seek connections and syntheses
that produce a patterned organizational reality, those who look to organizational
discourse would identify local impacts of discourse that produce organizational fragility
and fragmentation as it generates local variations and multiple social realities. (4) Where
those who point to organizational culture see members caught in their own webs of
meaning, those who interrogate organizational discourse tend to see members caught in
webs of classifications their language use brings about; and where organizational culture
researchers view subjects as bearers of meaning who create and interpret reality, some
discursivists assign those functions to organizational discourse rather than to people.
Thus, we can add to the previous analyses of the Sonderwagen documents by
shifting our perspective and seeing where discursivist assumptions may lead us. This
move, however, need not vitiate the earlier analyses. Stillar (1998) has forcefully argued
that the choice is not either/or but both/and, since a discursive approach can work
alongside rhetorical and social-theoretical approaches in analyses of everyday texts.
―Discourse involves rhetorical action because it constitutes a major means through which
we link ourselves to one another,‖ while ―the act of participating in a discourse is also, of
course, a social act‖ (pp. 5-6). Thus discoursal, rhetorical, and social approaches are
―different, but complementary, perspective on text as practice, as action‖ (p. 5). Craig
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likewise observed that because discourse is conceptualized as ―language in use, or more
broadly, the interactive production of meaning,‖ then discourse analysis

represents a point of convergence between rhetoric and other traditions of
communication theory. It brings a rhetorical perspective to our understanding of
forms of communication (such as personal interaction) that were not traditionally
thought of as rhetoric. And it enriches the rhetorical perspective with insights and
techniques from pragmatics, conversation analysis, cultural studies, and other
fields. (Craig, 2000)

This chapter adds to the previous analyses by demonstrating from a discursive
perspective how documents can do boundary work by drawing on linguistic resources to
create zones of consensus. Such a discursive approach—as distinct from a cultural
approach—allows us, as Alvesson (2004) suggested, to better see the ways in which how
meaning was driven by language use, social reality was constructed through discursive
acts, language use created temporary order and power distribution, this order was fragile
and fragmented because discourse creates multiple local variations and realities, and that
discourse creates webs of classifications in which organization members become caught.

The Killers‘ Use of Linguistic Resources
As we saw in Chapter 5, Stillar (1998) has argued that language constructs
meaning through ideational resources since a text is ―about something,‖ interpersonal
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resources since a text is ―to and from someone,‖ and textual resources since a text has
structure and organization that permit cohesion and coherence). Stillar‘s breakdown of
these resources and their constituent parts are summarized below in Table 7.1.
From a discursivist standpoint, then, what meaning did the gas van program
administrators construct through their language use? Discourse analysis of the 5 June
1942 Just technical proposal is instructive because not only has this document been
widely commented upon in the technical communication literature (e.g., Dombrowski,
2000a; Katz, 1992a). Further, according to Sauer‘s (2003) scheme the Just proposal
represents a culminating moment in the Cycle of Documentation when embodied local
sensory experience, which the 16 May 1942 Becker field report had captured in writing
and turned into engineering knowledge, was finally re-represented for policy deliberation
so that it might be transformed into generalizable organizational standards. Then, too,
Lozowick‘s (2000) observations about accepted bureaucratic protocols in Nazi Germany
affirm that the Just document almost certainly was collaboratively authored by mid-level
and junior functionaries attuned to the preferences of the top man. A linguistically-based
discourse analysis of the document and its use of ideational resources, shown below in
Table 7.2, demonstrates quite strongly that the desk-murderers constructed for themselves
a social reality in which mental processes—that is, in which thinking—are entirely
absent, except in the faulty reasoning of those (the manufacturer and the subcontractor)
outside the organization. To use Stillar‘s (1998) scheme, ideational resources derive from
―the type of social activity involved‖ (p. 53), so that the Just document is clearly
embedded in a situation where the ―field of discourse‖ (p. 54) privileges the social
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Table 7.1: Resources for Discourse Analysis
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activities of ―doing‖ and ―being‖ and devalues ―sensing‖ (p. 25). In the social reality of
the document there are chiefly actional processes that feature ―agent‖ and ―acted upon,‖
and to a somewhat lesser degree the activity of making duo-relational identifications and
attributions. But of mental processes—which ―have two central participants: a processor
(the sentient beging that does the ‗mentalizing‘) and a phenomenon (that which is
‗mentalized‘)‖ (p. 23)—there are virtually none, or at least no field for such social
activity by members of the Sipo Technical Matters Group.
Also noteworthy is the way in which the Just document deploys interpersonal
resources, especially the heavy use of modal verbs. Modalities ―construct a speaker‘s/
writer‘s attitude toward the ideational content . . . of the text‖ (Stillar, 1998, p. 35).
The Just document is remarkable for the clear connection between modality and ideation
in that actional processes are almost entirely modified by modal verbs that modify the
main verbs, while relational processes are largely unmodified. Thus, the writers‘ position
and relation toward action is constantly modified by shifting action from the present to
the past (has been, have been, etc.) or the future (will be, could be, etc.), while by contrast
the writers‘ social activity of identifying and classifying is unmodified and takes place in
the present. The analysis here is aided by the fact that modal verbs are characteristic of
Germanic language and, in fact, the six English modal verbs derive in their etymologies
directly from the six German modal verbs: können/kann = can; sollen/soll = shall;
wollen/will = will; müssen/muss = must; mögen/mag = may; dürfen/darf = dare. That the
writers socially construct distance from their subjects of their actional processes is
reinforced by the fact that, of the document‘s 36 sentences that depict actional processes,
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Table 7.2: Linguistic-Based Discourse Analysis of 5 June 1942 Gas Van Proposal
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Table 7.2 continued
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Table 7.2 continued
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the writers are the subject in only two sentences (51 and 52) that appear at the end and
describe relationships with suppliers rather than actual vehicle operations.
Even without exploring the textual resources of the Just document (which would
then involve issues of German-to-English translation), and instead examining only those
linguistic resources necessarily found in all languages (that is, resources that construct
what a text is about and its speaker and addressee), a discourse analysis suggests the
bureaucrats of the Sipo Technical Matters Group used language to create a meaning that
devalued sensing, although doing was heavily modified to deflect the writers‘ and
addressee‘s position and relation toward actional processes by shifting them out of the
present. Returning to Alvesson‘s (2004) four distinctives for analyses that privilege
organizational discourse before organizational culture, we would see the Just document
doing boundary work by locally and temporally constructing organizational meaning,
order, and power distribution via such discursive acts as categorizing, identifying, and
relating; that the attempt to locally construct meaning, order, and power distribution is
born of the need to counteract organizational fragility and reconcile fragmented local
variations and multiple social realities; and that organization members become caught in
the webs of classifications their discourses bring about.

Reconstructing an Organizational Discourse
Finally, in following Grant and Iedema‘s (2005) dimensional approach to
organizational discourse studies, we can also turn to the interplay between communally
validated language patterns and the meanings those patterns marginalized. And this can
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be addressed by attempting to reconstruct/deconstruct the discourse carried on within the
Sipo Technical Matters Group by the various participants in the gas van program.
The discourse of the 26 March 1942 letter issued by Rauff seems straightforward
to interpret: A rival SS bureau had requested a gas van and Rauff was indisposed to grant
them such aid, whether because of their rivalry, or because design modifications for new
gas vans were still being worked out, or because RSHA operations were officially secret,
or because Rauff was preoccupied with supplying the Einsatzgruppen and did not want to
be otherwise bothered—or all of the above. Similarly, the telegram traffic between the
Sipo Technical Matters Group in Berlin and the Sipo-and-SD regional headquarters in
occupied territories—which occurred in the early and mid summer of 1942, when more
gas vans of improved design were available—can be straightforwardly interpreted as a
simple administrative discourse regarding vehicle requisition and disposition. By
reducing these discourses to ―banal‖ administrative routine, organization members
suppressed and marginalized non-Nazi construals of their deeds.
The organizational discourse that culminated in the exchange between the 16 May
1942 Becker field inspection report and the 5 June 1942 Just technical proposal, however,
is highly instructive about organization members‘ marginalization of traditional moral
meanings. According to my reconstruction, this discourse began in the late winter of
1941-42, involved all levels of the organizations in deliberations of policy, and extended
through the early summer, at which time the discourse is remarkable for the swiftness
with which organizational consensus broke down.
The early stage of the discourse is suggested by the Sipo-and-SD situation report
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for Einsatzgruppe B. Dated 1 March 1942 and covering the period 16-28 February 1942,
the report noted that gas vans had arrived February 23 ―at Smolensk with defects and,
after the defects were remedied, were assigned to the Einsatzkommandos.‖ Even at this
early stage, then, defects were already apparent. Then, too, Becker had embarked the
previous month on his field inspection tour and, since he regularly reported to Rauff,
news of vehicle defects was presumably reaching the Berlin office. And sometime after
the December 1941 opening of the Chelmno death camp, an embarrassing explosion
occurred when gas pressure inside one of the vans caused the back doors to blow and
ejected its still-living cargo of victims. Thus in his 26 March 1942 letter to the Criminal
Technical Institute, Rauff turned down a vehicle request from the Mauthausen camp on
the grounds that all the Sonderwagen ordered by Heydrich were already deployed and
any additional gas vans were still under construction.
In fact, new vehicles were not only under construction; their very design was still
under discussion as complaints from the field mounted. In April, Becker witnessed an
Aktion that was launched on Easter Sunday. That day, a militia of local collaborators
rounded up Jewish men, women, and children from the town of Stalino until some 200
victims were assembled in the interior courtyard of the local hotel. An SS sergeant had
been dispatched from Berlin by the RSHA, driven a gas van to Stalino, and put at the
disposal of Einsatzkommando 6 and its commander (Kogon et al., 1993, p. 63). The next
day, Easter Monday, operations resumed at 7 a.m. when the local militia forced the
captive Jews to remove their usable outer clothing and loaded about fifty or sixty victims
into the van. Once the doors were bolted and the gassing began, the SS driver took off for
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an abandoned mine shaft outside of town. But as a member of the SS commando recalled
after the war,

The gas-van could not be driven right up to the shaft and we had to pull the bodies
out of the vans and drag them to the shaft which was about eight meters away,
and then throw them in. … When the doors were opened a cloud of smoke wafted
out. After the smoke had cleared we could start our foul work. It was frightful.
You could see they had fought terribly for their lives. Some of them were holding
their noses. The dead had to be dragged apart. It was while doing this that I first
found out how heavy a human being can be. (Klee et al., 1991, pp. 72-73)

Over the course of three and a half hours the procedure was performed four times until all
200 Jews had been gassed. ―I know for sure it was Easter Monday,‖ the SS man later
testified, ―because I clearly remember discovering colored eggs back at the quarters after
the execution‖ (p. 72). Given the complaints continually reported by Becker, the Berlin
office began discussing improvements for its Sonderwagen. In a proposal dated April 24,
Pradel suggested overlaying the van compartment‘s metal floor with a sliding wooden
grille set on rollers and activated by a winch for easy unloading of victims. Though Rauff
approved, the subcontractor Gaubschat replied that winches were unavailable due to
wartime equipment shortages and its own workers had been drafted for military duty
(Browning, 1991, p. 64). A memo dated 27 April 1942 discussed how ―cargo‖ might be
unloaded more quickly by installing ―tip-up equipment for the box-superstructure,‖ or
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alternately a ―facility to tip-up the bottom-grate‖ or ―a facility to move in and out the
bottom-grate.‖ As the historian Beer (1987) noted, ―The proceeding was analogous to the
development of the prototype. The matter was debated first internally and then Rauff
gave an order for a van with the planned alterations to the Gaubschat factory. This one
should be tested practically and only after that a decision should be taken on the vans to
be altered further.‖ With such discussions still ongoing, Becker‘s detailed and highly
critical report of the vans‘ design and operational shortcomings arrived in May.
How this organizational discourse proceeded next is a matter of some conjecture.
That the 5 June 1942 Just technical proposal was a response to the 16 May 1942 Becker
field report seems clear enough. But as discussed in Chapter 3, it also seems clear that
Just was not the author or instigator of the proposal. The men of the Sipo Technical
Matters Group adhered to protocols that reflected a strict chain of command—even the
extensive handwritten notes on the telegram traffic, for example, demonstrate how the
most routine correspondences were efficiently routed down through a numerically
designated hierarchy. According to protocol, then, the 5 June 1942 proposal emerged
from a thicket of savvy mid-level and junior functionaries who then ordered Just to sign
the document. Among these, Pradel emerges—again, according to protocol—as a figure
of particular importance since his mid-level status made him the nexus between Rauff on
the executive level and the junior managers of the motor pool.
A clue to Pradel‘s role in the Just proposal may be found in the Becker field
report. Rauff signed the latter document to acknowledge receipt and placed a question
mark in the margin beside Becker‘s request that orders be issued requiring gas vans be
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unloaded by prisoners. That the document was then routed to Pradel is indicated by his
own countersignature. The fact that Pradel saw Becker‘s report hints strongly that Pradel
must also have had a hand in producing the document intended as a response to Becker‘s
report. This is reinforced by the careful language use and precise graphical appearance of
the Just proposal and which speak of its importance to its authors. Willi Just is alternately
described in the historical literature as a welder (Noakes & Pridham, 1988, p. 1202) and
dispatcher (Browning, 1991, p. 64), and his employee designation of IID3a(9) affirms
that he was subordinate to chief mechanic Wentritt and, at number nine, not high in rank.
Yet his extensive handwritten notations on the backs of the Schäfer and Trühe telegrams
suggest that Just—who had more than twenty years of experience as a welder—had a
significant role in coordinating repairs for the gas vans. Perhaps among the four thousand
vehicles in the Sipo motor pool, which Pradel and Wentritt oversaw, Just was the
dispatcher and mechanic they assigned to keep track of the gas vans. So while Just may
have had a hand in initially formulating the recommendations of the 5 June 1942
technical proposal and was the logical person to be its signatory, he signed the document
―I.A.‖ (im Auftrag) or ―by direction.‖ What seems most likely is that Pradel, Wentritt,
and Just collaborated on the proposal, secured a technical writer to draft the language and
a skilled typist to produce the draft, and ordered Just to sign.
But what was the impetus for producing such a detailed, lengthy, and graphically
impressive document? Did Rauff, upon receiving Becker‘s report, commission Pradel to
draft a response? Did Pradel, perhaps to absolve himself of the vans‘ problems and thus
protect his organizational turf, take the initiative and instigate a reply to Becker‘s report?

196

Did Wentritt and Just, either responding to field complaints or sensing an opportunity to
resolve design discussions in their favor, suggest to Pradel that the occasion was ripe for
a formal technical proposal? Or did perhaps Becker himself implore Rauff to have his
automotive experts suggest possible solutions?
My interpretation takes into account a 23 June 1942 memo, written by Pradel, in
which he objected for security reasons to using a Czech subcontractor, as was suggested
in the Just proposal. Why would Pradel take pains to point out a fault in the proposal, if
he himself had a hand in it? For that reason I surmise that the organizational discourse
proceeded in this manner: An ongoing internal discussion about design modifications for
new gas vans was brought to a head by Becker‘s report, prompting Rauff to request from
Pradel a response. Pradel delegated this task to Wentritt, who together with Just worked
up the major points for proposed solutions. Then Pradel approved the points in principle,
used his managerial clout to have the proposal professionally written up and typed, and
directed Just to sign. (The writer or typist finished the document June 4 since that date
and the initials ―wa‖ are found in marginalia at the end of the memo.) After the proposal
was submitted to Rauff for consideration and decision, however, Pradel pointed out the
difficulty of employing a Czech subcontractor.

[T]he proposed firm, Sodomka at Hohenmauth . . . [is] unsuitable for work of a
secret nature. (A Czech firm in an entirely Czech area, with a Czech labor force.)
We suggest that Gaubschat should be asked to make the required changes on one
cargo compartment only and then test it. Those alterations that Gaubschat cannot
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make because of their secret character will be done in our own shop. (Kogon et
al., 1993/1983, p. 56)

Why did Pradel object to a proposal drafted by his own bureau? Perhaps if the proposal
had been commissioned by Rauff, rather than originally instigated by Pradel, the latter
felt safe to clarify the proposals of subordinates who, after all, were competent in
technical matters only. Perhaps Pradel engaged in the common negotiating tactic of
starting with a comprehensive proposal and then suggesting the alternative (i.e., building
a single prototype rather than embarking on a full-scale project of dubious prospect) that
he felt Rauff would accept or that Pradel wanted all along. Or perhaps something came
up after the proposal was submitted and Pradel sensed a need to respond—and indeed,
the very day that the ink was drying on Just‘s signature, RSHA chief Reinhard Heydrich
died in a car-bombing by Czech assassins. Little wonder, then, that Czech contractors
would be deemed security risks.
This in turn provides an opening to probe the rhetorical concept of kairos or the
idea of the opportune moment. By raising the issue of contingency, a look at the kairos of
the document writers can reinforce the argument that the gas van texts were boundary
objects, stitching together a fluid constellation of competing interests as the documents
created temporary spaces for intraorganizational cooperation.
The Just proposal may have been, from a purely technical standpoint, plausible in
its lethal recommendations. The gas vans at Chelmno had, except for one explosion
caused by human error, performed flawlessly; in only six months the operation had
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essentially satisfied the quota of 100,000 victims set by the regional Nazi governor to
reduce the overcrowded Jewish ghetto in Lodz (Hilberg, 2003, p. 927). And because the
Chelmno vans were smaller Opel models than the Saurers used by the Einsatzgruppen,
they demonstrated how problems in the field could be resolved by reducing the size of
the Saurers. Together with other minor improvements—protecting the compartment
lights with a steel grill, putting a drain in the floor—the vans could be made more
maneuverable, less prone to leakage, and could ―process‖ just as many victims.
Moreover, the visual rhetoric of the Just proposal may have been impressive in its wellordered typescript and formal appearance.
But kairotically the document was a marked failure because its arguments were
advanced at anything but an opportune moment. Between Becker‘s letter and Just‘s
proposal, momentous events intervened. Heydrich was attacked by a car bomb in Prague
on May 27 and died eight days later—on June 4, the day that the Just proposal was typed
up and ready for signature. In turn, Rauff lost his powerful sponsor and was transferred a
month later to field command. Meanwhile, the gas van program Rauff had left behind
was winding down. Pradel testified after the war that about twenty gas vans had been
built by 23 June 1942, but the subcontractor Gaubschat had not yet delivered the
remaining ten special compartments which were on order (Kogon et al., 1993/1983, p.
54). The Just proposal was put forward when, kairotically, the timing could not have been
worse. The Sonderwagen program was at a technical impasse. The vehicles in the field
were experiencing problems and, given wartime exigenicies, no realistic prospects for
new and improved models were in sight. By fall, Rauff had officially relinquished his
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position as head of department II D (Nizkor, 2002). In September, Becker returned to
Berlin from his inspection tour only to discover that Rauff was not in the capital. Instead
he spent an hour debriefing Pradel on the intractable technical problems with the gas
vans. Pradel merely listened silently until Becker was finished, and then told the
inspector to submit a report and settle up his travel expenses at the cashier‘s office (Klee
et al. 1991, p. 71). The organizational discourse that culminated in the 5 June 1942 Just
proposal had swiftly unraveled. By that fall as Becker was being reimbursed for his
travel, the Wehrmacht‘s second and final offensive against the Soviets was bogging down
at Stalingrad, limiting the scope for new Einsatzgruppen operations. Besides, the mobile
SS death squads were nearing the end of their grisly work.
Yet Browning (1991) has pointed out how the failure of the Sonderwagen was
apparent earlier as suggested by 15 June 1942 telegram in which Trühe requested more
gas vans because the three on hand were not sufficient to handle weekly transports of
deported Jews that were arriving in Minsk. The clearing of the Minsk ghetto, when some
55,000 Jews were ―processed,‖ was the height of the gas van program. But these large
numbers were only achieved because the Sonderwagen were utilized in a single location
rather than in mobile operations. The ultimate ―reason for the rapid eclipse of the gas
van,‖ Browning noted, is that ―if it worked adequately only in the setting of a stationary
camp, it was rendered obsolete almost immediately by the far more efficient gas
chambers that were being put into operation in the first half of 1942‖ (p. 65). Thus the
Just document, despite the obvious pains of its authors to impress their audience,
illustrates the importance of timing and situation—or how the boundary objects, birthed
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amid flux and then dropped into a swirling sea of shifting organizational currents, are
inherently evanescent so that the cooperative spaces they create are temporary. For ―as
organizations become larger, more complex and more geographically extended, so will
multiple discursive communities emerge, each with a particular construction of the world,
each with a potential distrust or animus towards the others,‖ leading to the irony that
―successful organizing establishes the grounds for disorganization‖ (Gergen, Gergen &
Barrett, 2004, pp. 51-52)
And how does this reconstruction of the gas van program‘s organizational
discourse suggest ways that participants marginalized traditional moral meanings for their
actions? The blindness engendered by bureaucratic and technical routinization, career
ambition, job security, professional identity, euphemistic code language—all are part of
the answer. But if their discourse privileged nazified themes—advancing the ―people‘s
community,‖ observing the ―leadership principle,‖ being ―soldierly‖ and ―hard‖ and a
―fighting‖ pragmatist in the approved SS manner—and therefore marginalized traditional
morality, we return once again to three aspects of the Final Solution that were introduced
at the outset of this study. First, the gas van program was conceived and executed within
a polycracy; though the SS was held together by the centripetal forces of racism and antiSemitism, it was at the same time constantly riven by the centrifugal force of a social
Darwinist culture that prized fighting and struggle for their own sake. Second, the
Sonderwagen program was, like the Final Solution itself, entropic; the more that the
program extended its operations, the more its contradictions tended to undermine the
program. And third, perhaps most all, the gas van program was short; just six months
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after Heydrich‘s initial order to construct the Sonderwagen, the consensus of the
participants had irretrievably broken down. Heydrich was dead; Rauff was transferred;
Pradel turned to black marketeering and after the war resumed his police career; Becker
had his fill of mass murder and went into agriculture; the mechanics and drivers drew a
clear distinction between Sonderwagen operations and ―normal‖ duties.
The organizational consensus to marginalize their society‘s traditional morality
and pursue deeds that ―they clearly understood . . . were not positive except in the value
system of the Third Reich‖ (Lozowiock, 2000, p. 8) was possible because that consensus
was, in the end, only required to be short-lived, a transitional stage between Babi Yar and
Auschwitz. The trading zones created by the boundary objects of organizational texts
produce only ―temporary formations in which distinct groups with different orientations,
professional commitments, and characteristic forms of argument can cooperate in specific
practices‖ (Wilson & Herndl, 2007, p. 145). Through texts that activated and
disseminated shared metaphors, narratives, genres and discourses, the rhetorical
community of the Sipo Technical Matters Group held together a consensus about its
―special vans‖ just long enough to structure lethally pragmatic action. Just long enough,
but no longer.
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CHAPTER 8
REVISITING ―EXPEDIENCY‖

Boundary Work in Action
Having explored the historical and cultural contexts of the Nazi gas van
documents, and then analyzing these texts as a discourse, our cultural research
methodology (Longo, 1998) calls for an interrogation of the orderings imposed on the
texts by their analysts and what this may suggest about the relationships of these analysts
to the texts. Here it is productive to focus on the lengthiest text among the corpus, the
Just proposal of 5 June 1942. For Document II D 3a (9) NI. 214/42 G. RS. has led a
curious afterlife that illustrates the necessity for the final two delimiters in Longo‘s
method—and ironically, allows us to see this heinous document functioning as a
boundary object within the discipline of technical communication.
Tracing this ―rhetorical boundary work‖ (Wilson & Herndl, 2007) in action and
assessing its implications calls for three moves to be set out in this and succeeding
chapters. The infamous Just document was introduced into the technical communication
literature nearly twenty years ago by Katz (1992a), and yet his own encounter with the
text was not in isolation but was transmitted to him through another‘s frame of reference.
Thus, the antecedents to his influential ―ethic of expediency‖ thesis are worth exploring,
that his argument might be revisited in light of previous orderings imposed upon the text
he analyzed. The following chapter explores how subsequent technical communication
scholars have appropriated Katz‘s thesis and imposed their own orderings on the Just
text, turning it into a boundary object that, according to Star and Griesemer‘s (1989)
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thesis, has proven plastic enough for adaptation to the local needs of differing
disciplinary perspectives and yet robust enough to maintain a consensus between them
regarding a key point of technical communication ethics. Yet because rhetorical boundary
work is necessarily driven by the local needs of the participants—rather than, say, by
historical scholarship about the Holocaust—that opens a space in the final chapter to
explore an alternative view of what I believe we might learn about organizational and
technical communication ethics from the shameful example of Sipo Technical Matters
Group and its textual artifacts.

Lanzmann and the ―Why‖ Question
Since it was issued 5 June 1942 under the signature of Willi Just, the technical
proposal for boosting the killing efficiency of the SS gas van fleet has surfaced in a 1983
book (Kogon et al.) on the Nazi use of poison gas; a controversial 1985 film and
subsequent book (Lanzmann) by a poststructuralist French filmmaker; a 1988
compendium (Noakes & Pridham) of original Nazi documents; several general histories
of the Holocaust; Steven Katz‘s landmark 1992 essay; and numerous journal articles and
books (e.g., Brassuer, 1993; Dombrowski, 2000; Sullivan & Martin, 2005; Moore, 2004)
on technical communication ethics. Each of these iterations has, as Longo (2006)
predicted, ―imposed an ordering on the object and its contexts, thereby excluding some
ways of understanding the object and excluding others‖ (p. 126). The implication is that
technical communicators have necessarily imposed an ordering on the Nazi text to
legitimate certain ways of understanding ethics and exclude others. Interrogating ―those
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silences, absences, and exclusions still held within the dominant knowledge and
discourse of [our] field‘s practices‖ requires an ―antidisciplinary, situated, and personal‖
exploration that ―add[s] discussions of power, politics, ethics, and cultural tensions to our
understandings of what we do when we communicate‖ (pp. 126-127).
Long before the infamous Just document was introduced into the technical
communication literature, others had already imposed their own orderings on the text,
starting with the document‘s appearance in the 1983 original German edition of the book
Nazi Mass Murder: A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas (Kogon et al.). The
authors‘ stated purpose was ―to set down, in a precise and indisputable manner, the
historical truth about the massacres perpetrated by means of poison gas during this [Nazi]
period‖ (p. 2) and refute the then-new phenomena of Holocaust denial. As such the
authors‘ commentary on the Just proposal places the document in relation to the overall
situation in the spring of 1942 when ―the killing machinery had to be made more reliable.
And its capacity had to be increased, as the German zone of occupation within the Soviet
Union was constantly being increased‖ (p. 55). In their view, this explains the
document‘s stress on solving problems with the gas vans‘ maneuverability, reducing the
running time needed to dispatch victims, and shortening the time required to construct
new vans. The document is also described as ―couched in an extreme form of Nazi
double-talk, a monstrously inhuman language‖ (p. 55). In the appendices to the book, the
Just proposal is easily the longest of three original documents reproduced.
Yet the authors‘ sober record of the gas van program did not stop deniers from
construing the relevant documents according to their own lights. David Irving, perhaps

205

today‘s best known denier, claimed in 1992 that ―I accept that this kind of [gas van]
experiment was made on a very limited scale, but that it was rapidly abandoned as being
a totally inefficient way of killing people‖ (Evans, 2001, pp. 122). This line of
―reasoning‖ was advanced, with the Just and Becker documents explicitly cited in
support, during an online discussion that occurred 25-27 February 2003 on the Axis
History Forum. In the exchange, a denier allowed that the Just and Becker documents are
among ―the few cases where the homicidal function is clear from the context,‖ but
contended that since both documents ―refer to the deficiencies of those vehicles as a
method of killing en masse‖ then the texts can be interpreted as referring to limited field
trials that were soon abandoned. The Just proposal, he argued, only ―anticipates the
production of further gas-vans.‖ When other Forum members challenged the denier, he
scoffed that the Just and Becker documents are ―Just two letters, hardly overwhelming
documentary evidence.‖ Instead, he continued, the Just and Becker documents tended to
prove his case since they were written ―a few months after the commencement of field
trials of the vehicles modified as homicidal gas-vans, deal largely with defects, and make
suggestions for improvements. In other words, exactly what one would expect to find in
reports on field trials.‖ He cited the Trühe telegram of 15 June 1942 as more evidence
that only three gas vans were built on a trial basis and ―their killing capacity proved to be
inadequate, even for one transport arriving per week.‖ Finally, to explain away testimony
that gas vans were widely sighted across occupied Soviet territory, the denier argued that
the Becker document ―proves‖ the gas vans were largely a legend. The document ―refers
to attempts to camouflage the gas-vans, to make them look indistinguishable from
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ordinary vehicles. But all that would have achieved would have been to cause the local
population to misidentify ordinary vehicles . . .‖ This kind of ordering, imposed on the
Just and Becker texts, is what prompted Kogon et al. (1993/1983) to publish Nazi Mass
Murder: A Documentary History of the Use of Poison Gas.
Two years after Kogon, Langbein and Rückel ordered the text of the Just proposal
by precisely setting forth the exact document and embedding it within a professionally
researched historiography, an altogether different ordering was imposed by the French
filmmaker Lanzmann for his 1985 film Shoah. (That the film was being made when the
Kogon book was published, and that Lanzmann knows the German language, suggests
the possibility he may have seen the once-obscure document so prominently featured in
Nazi Mass Murder.) In the film and a 1985 English-language book based on the script,
Lanzmann presents an abridged and altered translation of the Just document in which text
is freely omitted, elided, rearranged and, in the subject line of the document, even
added—all without elipses or other indications of any changes. The result is a text that
appears entire but is less than half the length of the original document. Why would
Lanzmann do this? The question has salience for the present study because it is the 1985
Lanzmann version—rather than the original 1942 Nazi document—that was picked up by
Katz (1992a) and has subsequently become a standard point of reference for discussions
of technical communication ethics. To cite one example of why the choice of a reference
point matters, consider: While the Lanzmann translation and two mainstream scholarly
translations (Kogon, et al., 1993, pp. 228-235; Noakes & Pridham, 1988, pp. 1202-1203)
all primarily employ the word ―load‖ to translate the document‘s euphemism for the
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Jewish victims, in two places Lanzmann instead chose ―pieces‖ and ―merchandise.‖ And
it is these two words, rather than the more common ―load,‖ which have often drawn
notice in the technical communication literature.
Five years after the release of the film and book, Lanzmann contributed to an
edited volume (Deguy, 1990) of essays about Shoah and reflected at length about his
work: ―What interests me is the film. One has been able to discuss Nazism for forty
years. One doesn‘t need the film for that‖ (p. 282; cited in LaCapra, 1999, p. 96). Thus
the film is ―a fiction of the real‖ (Lanzmann, 1990, p. 301) and ―poetical construction‖
(Lanzmann, 1985, p. v) that takes place not in the past but the present. Slavishly reliving
and recounting the past only hinders the project of working through it in the present. Thus
the film, at nine-and-a-half hours in length, steadfastly refuses to incorporate archival
footage and material. As Lyotard (1990) explained in discussing Lanzmann‘s film,
memory through inscription, or through ―word representations (books, interviews) and
thing representations (films, photographs) of the extermination,‖ is no defense against
forgetting, which is itself effaced in Western culture (p. 26, passim). Thus Lyotard (see
26-29) praises Lanzmann‘s Shoah precisely because it ―rejects representation in images
and music.‖ The film, as Lyotard noted, seeks instead to indicate ―the unpresentable of
the Holocaust . . . by the alteration in the tone of voice, a knotted throat, sobbing, tears, a
witness fleeing off-camera, a disturbance in the tone of the narrative, an uncontrolled
gesture‖ because

what is not inscribed, through lack of inscribable surface, of duration and place
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for the inscription to be situated, what has no place in the space nor in the time of
domination, in the geography and the diachrony of the self-assured spirit, because
it is not synthesizable—let us say, what is not material for experience because the
forms and formations of experience . . . are inapt or inept for it—cannot be
forgotten, does not offer a hold to forgetting . . . (Lyotard, 1990, p. 26)

As Lanzmann himself discussed, the impetus of Shoah is not to historically reconstruct
the past but, rather, to act it out in the present and thus deal with the ongoing radical
disjunction of the Holocaust. In the film Lanzmann interviewed Jewish survivors, Polish
bystanders, and German perpetrators. He staged scenes that encourage speakers to act out
their memories and work through them—for example: interviewing a Jewish man, who
was forced by the Germans to cut off women‘s hair before they were gassed at Treblinka,
in a rented barber shop as the man cuts the hair of a hired extra; or bringing a group of
elderly Polish peasants together with a survivor of the Chelmno death camp and then
interviewing them in front of the village church where the Jews were imprisoned before
being gassed. As Lanzmann cajoled, pestered, and even badgered the speakers to work
through the past, the results captured on film are often stunning—not least when offhand
statements by low-level Nazi functionaries and acquiescent Polish bystanders reveal the
degree to which their anti-Semitism still lies just beneath the surface.
For Lanzmann the project of working-through excludes the question of why. As
he propounded, ―‗Why were the Jews killed?‘ The question immediately reveals its
obscenity. There is indeed an absolute obscenity in the project of understanding‖
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(Lanzmann, 1990, p. 279). Understanding leads to historicizing, which leads to
normalizing. Instead, he wrote,

Blindness should be understood as the purest mode of looking, the only way not
to turn away from a reality that is literally blinding: clairvoyance itself. To direct
a frontal look at horror requires that one renounce distractions and escape-hatches,
first the primary among them, the most falsely central, the question why, with the
indefinite retinue of academic frivolities and dirty tricks [canailleries] that it
ceaselessly induces. (p. 279)

In a 1998 interview with journalist Ron Rosenbaum (1998), Lanzmann reiterated his
stance with a more vernacular explanation:

When I was making Shoah I was like a horse with [blinders]. I did not look to the
side, neither my right side nor my left side. I was trying to look straight into this
black sun which is the Holocaust. And this blindness, this voluntary blindness
was—is—a necessary requisite, the necessary conditions for the creation. And
this blindness was the contrary of blindness, it was like clairvoyance, it was to
see, to see absolutely clearly, you know. And the only way to cope with this
blinding reality is to blind one‘s self to all kinds of explanation. To refuse the
explanation. It is the only way. It was a moral attitude, an ethical touchstone.
(Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 261)
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And why is the Holocaust a black sun? The abyssal nature of the genocide was conveyed
to the journalist by Lanzmann in another revealing statement:

You can take all the reasons, all the fields of explanation . . . And every field can
be true, and all the fields together can be true. But these are conditions. Even if
they are necessary, they are not sufficient. A beautiful morning you have to start
to kill, to start to kill massively. And I said that there is a gap between all the
fields of explanation and the actual killing. You cannot give birth—in French we
say engendre—you cannot generate such an evil. And if you start to explain and
to answer the question of Why you are led, whether you want it or not, to
justification. The question as such shows its own obscenity: Why are the Jews
being killed? Because there is no answer to the question of why. (Rosenbaum, p.
260, emphasis in original)

Other commentators who are sympathetic (e.g., LaCapra, 1999) to engaging with
Lanzmann‘s views, and those who are not (e.g., Rosenbaum, 1998), have noted how the
filmmaker‘s personal biography may have necessarily influenced his outlook. Once
private secretary to Jean-Paul Sartre, he stands in ―a long tradition in French thought that
emphasizes tragic, self-rending ecstatic experience—a complex tradition often drawing
from Nietzsche and Heidegger and passing through Georges Bataille and Maurice
Blanchot to reach among such recent thinkers as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze,
Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida,‖ noted LaCapra (1999, p. 98). But then, after
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pointing to Lanzmann‘s admission that ―the circularity of the film is linked to the
obsessional character of my questions, of my own obsessions‖ (p. 188, citing Lanzmann,
1990, p. 300), LaCapra added, ―It is perhaps not irrelevant that these obsessions were
those of a secular intellectual who was not raised as a practicing Jew but now assumed a
certain Jewish identity in significant measure through the making of his trilogy of films
(Why Israel, 1983; Shoah, 1985; Tsahal, 1994)‖ (p. 118). A critic of Lanzmann, the
psychoanalyst Sean Wilder, ascribed the filmmaker‘s zeal to the ―late conversion
phenomenon‖ (Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 2354). Thus, contended LaCapra (1999), an
important perspective from which to understand Shoah and its ―significant, historically
dubious omissions‖ is that the film‘s content is ―prompted by Lanzmann‘s desire to have
only characters who relive or act out the past, and who do so in ways that provide him
with relatively unproblematic objects of transferential identification‖ (pp. 127-128). In
the 1990 volume of essays about Shoah, Lanzmann himself was straightforward about his
personal project of identification:

The idea that has always been the most painful for me is that all these people died
alone. . . . A meaning for me that is simultaneously the most profound and the
most incomprehensible in the film is in a certain way . . . to resuscitate these
people, to kill them a second time, with me; by accompanying them. (p. 291)

What then of the gas van document in Shoah? First, it must be noted that Lanzmann saw
the book version, which reproduced ―the complete text of the film,‖ as being different in
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nature than the film. While the subtitles in the film naturally come and go with the onscreen action,

Bringing them together, on the other hand, in this book, engraving on page after
page the succession of sheer instances that in the film maintain the rhythm
imposed by their sequence, having them pass from the inessential to the essential,
suddenly gives them another status, another dignity, as it were a seal of eternity.
They have to exist by themselves, to justify themselves without any indication of
what is happening, without any image . . . (Lanzmann, 1985, p. viii)

The challenge for Lanzmann, observed Lyotard (1990), is that, on the one hand, ―One
must, certainly, inscribe in words, in images. One cannot escape the necessity of
representing. It would be sin itself to believe one-self safe and sound.‖ But on the other
hand, it is ―one thing to do [representation] in view of saving the memory, and quite
another to try to preserve the remainder, the unforgettable forgotten, in writing‖ (p. 26).
Thus, the gas van document occupies a curious place in the book version of Shoah. As
the only archival material in the book it is burdened with the task, as Lyotard would have
it, of representation not to save memory but to preserve in writing ―the unforgettable
forgotten.‖ Further, the gas van document follows the only instance where Lanzmann the
interviewer asks the ―Why?‖ question of his subjects: ―Why do they think all this
happened to the Jews?‖ (Lanzmann, 1985, p. 99) This question comes near the end of a
lengthy scene in which Polish villagers of Chelmno have been gathered in front of the
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village church—where Jews had been locked up before gassing—to talk about the past.
Lanzmann‘s questioning throughout the sequence elicits telling answers about the
underlying attitudes of these bystanders toward their former Jewish neighbors. Then the
Why question prompts a Polish man to relate a story that, implicitly rather than explicitly,
reaffirms the supposed blood-guilt of the Jews for the death of Christ. In his telling, the
Jews‘ own rabbi admitted their blood-guilt and instructed the people to comply with the
Germans. Immediately after this story, another man describes the working of the gas vans
and then a Jewish survivor of Chelmno relates his observations of the killings. The SS
technical proposal for boosting the vans‘ killing efficiency—or rather, Lanzmann‘s
version of the original document—is then reproduced as a coda to the lengthy Chelmno
sequence.
Though Lanzmann does not cite his sources, he knew the German language so
that it is reasonable to speculate he may have seen the document in the 1983 volume Nazi
Mass Murder (Kogon et al.). Not only did Lanzmann‘s film and book alter the 1942 Nazi
document, but the version printed in the English edition of the book—the version read by
Katz (1992a)—is an English translation of a French translation of the original German.
But for Lanzmann, the purpose of the gas van text is not documentation:

The worst moral and artistic crime that can be committed in producing a work
dedicated to the Holocaust is to consider the Holocaust as past. Either the
Holocaust is legend or it is present: in no case is it a memory. A film devoted to
the Holocaust . . . can only be an investigation into the present of the Holocaust or
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at least into a past whose scars are still so freshly and vividly inscribed . . . that it
reveals itself in a hallucinated timelessness. (Lanzmann, 1990, p. 316, emphasis
in original)

Felman, whose important commentary (1992) on Shoah was translated into French with
the help of Lanzmann himself, has contrasted the film‘s artistic purpose with the juridical
and documentary purpose of the 1961 Eichmann trial, arguing that ―law’s story focuses
on ascertaining the totality of facts and events. Art’s story focuses on what is different
from, and more than, that totality‖ (Felman, 2002, p. 153, emphasis in original). For
Lanzmann, ―The truth kills the possibility of fiction‖ (cited in Felman, 2002, p. 153) so
that the Just gas van proposal is appropriated into a ―poetical construction‖ (Lanzmann,
1985, p. v) and ―a fiction of the real‖ intended as a ―work of art‖ and ―not at all
representational‖ (LaCapra, 1999, p. 96). Among all the serious works on the Holocaust
that ―by their exactitude, their severity, are, or should be, best qualified not to let us
forget,‖ Lanzmann‘s Shoah thus stands out as ―the exception, maybe the only one,‖ that
refuses to ―represent what, in order not to be forgotten as that which is the forgotten
itself, must remain unrepresentable‖ (Lyotard, 1990, p. 26).
As we will learn below, the ordering imposed by Lanzmann on the Just gas van
document is important for understanding the text‘s subsequent function as a boundary
object for the technical communication discipline. For I contend that, by deleting those
portions of the text which show the document as a discourse between organizational
actors and instead including only those passages that go straight to the killing, the
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Lanzmann translation—now so familiar to technical communicators—may have
encouraged a simplistic characterization of the text as incomprehensibly foreign to any
dynamics of our own organizational lives.

Implications of the Lanzmann Alterations
Technical communicators first encountered II D 3a (9) NI. 214/42 G. RS. when
Katz (1992a) analyzed its rhetoric and discovered what he called an ―ethic of
expediency.‖ Yet he was working from a text upon which Lanzmann had already
imposed a distinctive ordering. That Katz (1992a) accepted the Lanzmann version of the
document as genuine is clear: ―This is a real memo‖ (p. 256) are the first four words of
his essay. Like Katz, I too assumed the text was genuine when I first read it in the book
version of Shoah and subsequently wrote about the document (Ward, 2009, 2010a). Even
the journalist Rosenbaum (1998), who spent a dozen years researching the various
controversies among Holocaust scholars and became a Lanzmann critic, ―thought Shoah
an impressive achievement when I saw it‖ and ―was not aware until I began researching
the literature . . . how the film had raised him [Lanzmann] to the vatic, prophetic heights‖
(p. 252). LaCapra (1999), an admirer of the film, likewise allows that ―discussion of
Shoah has been marked by an understandable inclination to ritualize the film and to
regard its viewing as a ceremonial event with respect to which criticism pales or even
seems irreverent‖ (p. 95). Seemingly, the ―sin . . . to believe one-self safe and sound‖
(Lyotard 1990, p. 26) by accepting a representation as memory, is a widespread
temptation. For as Foucault (1977) observed, Western culture ascribes to an author the
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function ―to characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of discourses within a
society‖ (p. 124).But does the fact that Katz‘s (1992a) ―ethic of expediency‖ thesis is
based on a ―false‖ document invalidate his argument? In my view, he raises an important
point about expediency with which technical and organizational communicators must
engage. By his analysis, the Just proposal happens to be—if its morality is set aside—a
well-constructed example of persuasive rhetoric whose wording is well-crafted for its
organizational ethos. ―Indeed,‖ Katz points out, ―in this memo one can find many of the
topoi first defined by Aristotle in the Rhetoric that are used to investigate any situation or
problem and provide the material for enthymemic arguments‖ (p. 257). Within the
memo's first section the SS writer ―uses the common topic of relationship: cause/effect
arguments, in conjunction with the topic of comparison (difference) and the topic of
circumstance (the impossible), are used to investigate the problem . . .‖ Then in the
closing section the writer employs cause/effect and contraries to refute counterarguments.
―Thus, in a series of enthymemes that make use of the topoi, [the author] investigates and
proves his case for a reduction in load space‖ that would boost the killing efficiency of
the gassing vans (p. 257). Moreover, as I discussed in relation to the visual design of the
document, Katz noted that the proposal employs good document design by dividing the
text into ―numbered sections that are clearly demarcated by white space for easy reading‖
(p. 257), while the ―stuffy‖ grammatical style—featuring polysyllabic words, modified
nouns, a passive voice, and subordinate clauses that separate subject and verb—
effectively shifts responsibility from ―from the writer (and reader) to the organization
they represent‖ (p. 258). Altogether, then, Katz concluded that
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Just's memo to his superior, while an extreme case, is not an anomaly nor a
problem in technical writing only, but a [general] problem of [Western]
deliberative rhetoric . . . I will suggest that it is the ethic of expediency that
enables deliberative rhetoric and gives impulse to most of our actions in
technological capitalism as well . . . (Katz, 1992a, p. 258)

But because his thesis is based on the Lanzmann version, is Katz‘s argument necessarily
colored by Lanzmann‘s prior ordering of the text? Did his reliance on Lanzmann
predispose his analysis toward the expedient elements of the SS text at the expense of
those elements in the 1942 original—which I have alternatively chosen to highlight in my
own analysis (and thereby imposed my own ordering)—that would show the document as
a dialogue?
Without implying that Lanzmann‘s interpretations of the Just document were
thereby mirrored by Katz, let us interrogate the implications of the former‘s alterations.
The stripped-down 1985 Lanzmann version arguably emphasizes those elements of the
original 1942 document that are expedient, giving the impression of a text that is
straightforwardly about killing efficiency—to the point of adding words in the subject
line that make the document appear as if it were about stationary death camp operations
at Chelmno rather than (as was really the case) about mobile operations across the
occupied Soviet Union. (And indeed, Katz [1992a, p. 256] astutely associated the vans‘
deployment with the Einsatzgruppen killings ―in the early Nazi program of exterminating
the Jews and other ‗undesirables,‘ just months before the Final Solution of gas chambers
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and death camps was fully operationalized.‖) The Lanzmann version of the Just text is, in
fact, presented as the coda to an entire film sequence about Chelmno, so that in Shoah the
document is clearly framed as being associated with the death camp. What are stripped
out of the document are those elements of the text which show it as a discourse between
competing organizational actors. The Lanzmann version emphasizes the aspect of ―Here
is how we can kill more Jews‖ and omits the aspect of ―My plan resolves your
complaints.‖
In the document heading that states the subject of the memo, to the phrase
―Changes for special vehicles now in service‖ Lanzmann adds ―at Kulmhof (Chelmno),‖
a qualifier which is not in the original document. By this alteration the text appears to be
specifically focused on death-camp operations at Chelmno when, in fact, the text is not
concerned with Chelmno at all. This tends in the Lanzmann version to emphasize a
putative desire to expediently kill more Jews at Chelmno (even though the 97,000 Jews
murdered had already fulfilled the camp‘s ―quota‖ for reducing the population of the
nearby Lodz ghetto) and tends to suppress the discursive nature of the Just text—namely
its authors‘ intention to respond to Becker‘s highly critical report about the fleet of 20 gas
vans deployed for mobile operations across Soviet territory. As we have seen, these vans
were modified by a private subcontractor from trucks manufactured by Saurer and
Diamond (or Opel), whereas the three vans at Chelmno were Renaults (or Dodges) and
smaller than the Saurer models operating behind the Eastern Front (Greif, 2001, p. 230;
Browning, 2004, pp. 418-419; Beer, 1987, pp. 402-417). Thus the memo writer is not
arguing for intensified killing at Chelmno, as the Lanzmann alteration makes it seem.
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Rather the SS technician is arguing, in his first paragraph after the subject heading, that
size is not the primary criterion and is citing Chelmno as an example of how smaller vans
can achieve ―safety‖ and ―efficiency.‖
In the first paragraph Lanzmann makes a key alteration by deleting four sentences
that describe a truck explosion at the Chelmno camp. This deletion downplays the aspect,
which I discussed in Chapter 6, of the document writers constructing an ―occupational
safety‖ narrative. The killers could create a field on which to converge their competing
interests and undertake a shared project by constructing a narrative in which they attempt
to carry out improved ―safety‖ standards and avoid accidents from pressure buildup,
unbalanced ―loads,‖ diminished maneuverability, and corroded pipes.
The Lanzmann translation omits (without use of ellipses to indicate the omission)
Point 1 of the original memo, in which the writer establishes the need to enhance ―safety‖
by regulating pressure buildup within the vans and offers a solution. Instead Lanzmann
skips straight to the sensational Point 2, thus giving the appearance of a direct connection
between his abridged introductory paragraph and the details of killing. The Lanzmann
translation of Point 2 is defensible but, when compared with two other mainstream
translations (Kogon et al., 1993/1983, pp. 228-235; Noakes & Pridham, 1988, pp. 12021203), some of his word choices might be perceived as more vivid and less neutral than
those in the other versions. Where Lanzmann used the word ―pieces,‖ the other
translations employed ―numbers‖ and ―number of subjects treated.‖ Where Lanzmann
used the word ―merchandise,‖ the other translations rendered the German as ―cargo‖ and
―load.‖ What Lanzmann rendered as ―packed solid‖ is phrased by the other translators as
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―completely full‖ and ―fully occupied.‖ And for the penultimate sentence that described
how the victims press toward the rear door, the mainstream translations say the human
cargo ―is always primarily concentrated there‖ or ―places itself for the most part at the
rear.‖ But in the Lanzmann version the victims are ―mainly found lying there at the end
of the operation.‖ Individually these word choices are defensible, especially given the
unavoidable issues of translation (e.g., see Steiner, 1983; Johnson, 1985). But, in the
aggregate, the word choices made by Lanzmann appear, in my view, discordant because
they seem to ―mix metaphors.‖ For example, the word ―merchandise‖ seems out of place
because, not only did the Nazis place no exchange value on Jews, but the word invokes a
different metaphor—that of a commercial enterprise—than the transportation metaphor
that, as I noted in Chapter 6, otherwise suffuses the Just document. The word ―pieces‖
also seems to connote an economic calculation, versus the transportation terminology of
―load‖ and ―cargo‖ found in the other translations. Of the five remaining points in the
original text Lanzmann deletes three, transposes the order of the remaining two, and then
renumbers those points. His translation of Point 2 (Point 6 in the original) is conventional
until near the end, when the following sentence is rendered: ―Also, because of the
alarming nature of the darkness, screaming always occurs when the doors are closed.‖
The word ―screaming‖ is a considerable liberty when compared to the two mainstream
versions: ―Furthermore, it has been observed that the noise always begins when the doors
are shut presumably because of fear brought on by the darkness‖ and ―It has also been
noticed that the noise provoked by the locking of the door is linked to the fear aroused by
the darkness.‖ Lanzmann also deletes the final sentence of this section—which refers to
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using the van compartment‘s interior lighting for night operations and general cleaning,
thus again removing an aspect of the document‘s ―safety narrative.‖ Two of the three
points omitted by Lanzmann (Points 3 and 7 of the original) also reinforce this ―safety‖
orientation: one point recommends steps to prevent corrosion of the pipes, and the other
proposes a winch-operated movable floor that would allow the killers to ―unload‖ the van
without having to enter the compartment and risk exposure to noxious residues in a
confined space.
In Point 3 of the Lanzmann version (Point 4 in the original) the writer describes
modifications to facilitate cleaning of the vehicles. The filmmaker‘s translation shortens
the section by about half and proceeds to its conclusion: ―During cleaning, the drain can
be used to evacuate large pieces of dirt.‖ The implication—especially when the loaded
term ―evacuate‖ is employed—is that ―large pieces of dirt‖ is a euphemism for human
feces. This is clearly an important aspect of a correct interpretation. But again, a part of
the perpetrators‘ putative ―safety narrative,‖ an element of their discourse that both hid its
true purpose and simultaneously legitimated intraorganizational cooperation, is
downplayed in the Lanzmann translation.
The final paragraph of the Lanzmann translation again shortens the original text
by about half. Two sentences from the beginning and end of the section are elided into
one. What Lanzmann deletes is an account of a discussion with the SS contractor about
the proposed modifications, a recommendation to engage another contractor, an
affirmation of unavoidable delay, and a compromise proposal to outfit at least one of the
ten new vans as a model for testing, after which the other nine can be modified over time.
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One last time, then, the discursive aspect of the document is diminished. (Historians
would note that the final paragraph, with its reference to ten new Saurer vans on order, is
further affirmation that the document is concerned with vehicles for mobile use with the
Einsatzgruppen rather than stationary use in Chelmno—since the latter used only three
vehicles, none of them Saurers.)
Altogether, among the seven points contained in the original document,
Lanzmann included only the three points that deal most directly with killing, while
omitting the other four points—as well as most of the introductory and concluding
sections—that carry on the authors‘ procedural and ―safety‖ narratives. So, do such
alterations in the Lanzmann translation call into question Katz‘s (1992a) ―ethic of
expediency‖ thesis? Katz initially used the document as a classroom illustration until
Carolyn Miller suggested he ―consider the memo in relation to Aristotle‘s discussion of
deliberative rhetoric‖ (Katz, 2004, p. 195) and prompted a ninety-page conference paper
that was condensed and published in 1992 as ―The Ethic of Expediency,‖ which has since
become a landmark essay in the discipline, plus a sequel article (Katz, 1993). First, let me
emphasize that my critique is not intended to suggest his concerns are unfounded or the
subsequent attention given to ethics by technical communicators has not been useful.
Katz has rendered the discipline a signal service in bringing ethics to the forefront. As
Katz (2004) recently, and rightfully, noted, ―When I wrote it [in 1990], discussions of
ethics in technical communication were little more than the requisite paragraph or two on
accuracy and precision of language, or whistle blowing, stuck in the corners of chapters
buried inside textbooks.‖ At the time, he pointed out, despite the ―rhetorical advances

223

[that] were being made in other areas of technical communication, ethics seemed
immune‖ to such critiques. But now ―the field has come . . . [to see] ethics as central to
and of the same substance as the epistemic nature of technical writing‖ (pp. 195-196).
Nor do I venture here a refutation of Katz‘s cogent arguments regarding Western
rhetoric. While Katz pursued a much larger point for which the Nazi memo was only a
steppingstone, I have set myself the task of illuminating the actual document.
Furthermore, I acknowledge it is not entirely fair to expect that Katz would have
questioned the Lanzmann version of the Nazi memo—even as I did not initially question
its authenticity. The only other English translation (itself only a partial translation)
available at the time was released in 1988 in a massive multi-volume series (Noakes &
Pridham) known mostly to Holocaust scholars. On the other hand, the 1985 Lanzmann
film Shoah was popularly and critically acclaimed; most criticisms of his method were
confined to Holocaust scholars. And as Slack, Miller and Doak (1993) notably observed
from Foucault (1977), in our culture we ascribe authorship to books and not technical
documents. In a contest between a celebrated filmmaker and a faceless bureaucrat, our
presumption inclines (as did mine) toward the former.
Nevertheless, if ―The Ethic of Expediency‖ is a standard ―point of reference‖ on
communicators‘ ethical compass, and if for nearly twenty years that reference point has
been grounded differently than what we believed, then a reconsideration is appropriate—
a project with which Katz, as chair of this dissertation, agrees. Katz (1992a) began his
analysis of what he believed to be the Nazi memo by stating ―it is an almost perfect
document‖ (p. 256). But this ―perfection‖ rightly belongs to the 1985 Lanzmann version
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which was altered by a cinematic master for dramatic effect, that it might be more ―true‖
than the 1942 original. So it may be fairly asked: What of the actual Nazi document?
In this light, several references Katz (1992a) made to the document must at least
be qualified. He noted that the text begins with a purpose statement designed to ―invoke
an assumption or goal shared by the audience‖ (p. 256). But as we have seen, the purpose
statement in the 1985 Lanzmann text substantially alters the meaning and orientation of
the introductory paragraph in the actual 1942 document. Next, as Katz pointed out, ―In
keeping with some of what today are recognized as the rules of good document design,
the memo is also divided into three numbered sections that are clearly demarcated by
white space for easy reading‖ (p. 257). In fact, the actual Nazi document has seven
numbered sections. Katz attributed a ―stuffy‖ grammatical style to the memo due in part
to its heavy use of modified nouns. But the examples he provided—natural tendency, full
capacity, sealed drain, fluid liquid, technical changes—appear only (except for
―technical changes‖) in the Lanzmann version and not the mainstream translations.
Nevertheless, my analysis does not invalidate—but rather tends to confirm—Katz on
these points. The document‘s purpose statement does invoke shared assumptions and
goals, except that my analysis of the actual 1942 text suggests the authors shared an
―occupational safety‖ narrative. The design of the original document is good and—now
that we see its true length—was composed with unusual care, a fact which my analysis of
its visual rhetoric expands upon to describe how the design itself constitutes an argument.
And the style of the authors is stuffy, although, aside from issues of translation that Katz
acknowledged at that point in his article, my analysis of the entire 1942 original text
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points to use of modified verbs, rather than modified nouns, in shifting responsibility
away from the authors.
Yet my study would seem to disconfirm Katz‘s (1992a) argument that ―All the
stylistic features I have pointed out communicate and reveal a ‗group think,‘ an officially
sanctioned ethos grounded in expediency‖ (p. 258). And this is where the choice of a
reference point—that is, the Lanzmann version or the German original—may make a
difference. In his translation, with its omissions and alterations, Lanzmann went straight
to the heart of the murders and dispensed with the document‘s bureaucratic and
organizational elements. From Lanzmann‘s perspective this was a defensible resort to
representation, not for the sake of inscription but as an evocation of what cannot be
represented. Katz then encountered what Lanzmann evoked, took the representation to be
inscriptive, and extrapolated from the text an ethic of groupthink and group expediency.
This is not to suggest that Katz‘s analysis was ―determined‖ by the Lanzmann text, that
an underlying ethic of expediency is not a concern in the Western tradition of deliberative
rhetoric which animates our technological capitalism, or that the SS gas van killers did
not engage in expedient conduct and did not share a certain ethos. Rather, I repeat the
truism that different reference points can lead to different destinations. And my study,
which begins with the original document and all its organizational complexities, perhaps
not surprisingly leads to a different destination. For my analysis points away from
groupthink and instead argues that the gas van documents served as boundary objects
(Star & Griesemer, 1989; Wilson & Herndl, 2007) by which competing organizational
actors negotiated their differing interests in order to achieve a temporary and ultimately
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short-lived consensus. The SS authors and their audience shared coded terminology, but
―groupthink‖ connotes mindlessness—akin to Arendt‘s (1963) ―banality of evil‖ thesis.
Yet the ―solutions‖ offered by the SS writers—when read in full, rather than in the
abridged Lanzmann text—seem instead to impress by their hideous ingenuity and
problem-solving ability. As Lozowick (2000) observed, SS mid-level managers were
―people of initiative and dexterity who contributed far beyond what was necessary‖ (p.
9). Such people present a much different—and more challenging—picture than the
―banal‖ bureaucrats of popular imagination.
Nevertheless, the power of popular imagination is enduring and important to
reckon with. As we will see in the next chapter, the popular image of the banal Nazi
technocrat has played a decisive role over the past generation as technical communicators
have grappled with the implications of Katz‘s thesis—and especially the realization that
skilled technical writing could be practiced in the service of genocide. Thus, the infamous
Nazi gas van document emerged once again as a boundary object—this time as an object
over which scholars and practitioners could negotiate a trading zone for consensus on a
key point of technical communication ethics. And in that consensus, the figure of the
banal Nazi technocrat became a prominent feature.
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CHAPTER 9
BRIDGING THE BOUNDARIES

An Ahistorical Consensus?
Historiography is not ―objective.‖ Since no historian can survey all the primary
data—both witnesses and documents are inevitably lost to time—the writing of history
requires selectivity and interpretation. Nevertheless, professional historians give
allegiance to ―the continuing authority of a somewhat outdated, but still in many ways
influential, philosophy of science‖ (Megill, 1989, p. 627) which impels them to practice a
certain way of knowing. Their ―historical method‖ examines the empirical evidence of
original documents and artifacts, which are then sifted and hypotheses advanced and
progressively falsified, until a consensus may emerge about the likeliest interpretations.
This is important to understand as, in this chapter, we trace the boundary work performed
among technical communicators by the object of the infamous Just document.
Why important? Historians would say technical communicators‘ consensus about
the meaning of the Holocaust—or at least the meaning it holds for their discipline—is
ahistorical. This does not suggest historians are right and others wrong. Rather, the
question here is why technical communicators, despite their differences, followed a
certain way of knowing as they negotiated a consensus on the lessons of the SS gas van
document. After all, scholars could have taken up Katz‘s (1992a) hypothesis, which he
expanded upon in 1993, examined multiple Nazi technical documents for themselves, and
followed the historical method to develop their consensus. But they did not. Why not?
Elsewhere (Ward, 2009, 2010a) I have described how the emphases in Holocaust
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scholarship have shifted over the years: from the ―intentionalist‖ perspective that sees the
long-planned intentions of Hitler as the driving force behind the Final Solution (e.g.,
Fleming, 1984), to the ―functionalist‖ position which contends that increasingly
murderous anti-Jewish local initiatives finally reached a critical mass and accelerated into
genocide (e.g., Aly & Heim, 1991), to the current emphasis on the role of ideology. In
recent years scholars have focused on both the negative and ―positive‖ aspects of the
Nazi program, as the regime strove to foster what Koonz (2003) has termed a ―Nazi
conscience.‖ The exclusionary ethos of racism and anti-Semitism was balanced by the
―socialist‖ side of National Socialism which sought to form ―Aryan‖ Germans into an
inclusive and classless people‘s community. Much scholarship has emerged since the late
1990s on the broad social consensus which undergirded the Nazi regime (e.g., Fritzsche,
1998; Gellately, 2001; Johnson & Reuband, 2005; Aly, 2006). This racial-ethnic public
culture offered not just ―its savage hatreds but its lofty ideals‖ as it ―defined good and
evil, condemning self-interest as immoral and enshrining altruism as virtuous‖ (Koonz,
2003, p. 2). The system ―relied not only on repression but also an appeal to communal
ideals of civic improvement‖ and built ―a vibrant public culture founded on self-denial
and collective revival‖ (p. 3). Burleigh (2007) has described how ―the fundamental
structure of the Nazi creed was soteriological, a redemptive story of suffering and
deliverance, a sentimental journey from misery to glory, from division to mystic unity
based on the blood bond that linked souls‖ (p. 105).
Though historians‘ views of the genocide and its causes have shifted—and will no
doubt shift again in the future—their changing views are based on a way of knowing that
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strives to expand the evidentiary base so that interpretations may be continually refined.
But the tides of Holocaust scholarship have not come near the shores of technical
communication research. In other respects, technical communication scholars are
exemplary in their continuous investigation of new cases to contribute new knowledge
about their practice. Yet the case of Nazi technical writing and the Holocaust is an
exception—even though the 1992 Katz article touched off a broad and perhaps even
unprecedented disciplinary discussion of ethics. Katz himself moved on in a 1993 sequel
article and extended his thesis by reviewing the social-epistemic rhetoric of Hitler‘s Mein
Kampf. But again and again in the literature, subsequent citations of Katz‘s thesis
reference only the Nazi gas van document—until scholars as diverse as Markel (1997)
who rejects postmodern ethics, and Longo (2000) who embraces postmodern thought,
have all cited Katz‘s thesis in concluding that the case of Nazi technical writing
demonstrates the danger of amoral technocracy.
One of the key ethical tenets of the discipline is therefore rooted in a historical
example, but the example has been interpreted in an ahistorical manner. Thus historians,
based on their empirical research into the available sources, reject amoral technocracy as
the mainspring of the Final Solution; yet technical communicators, based on their
consideration of a single artifact, have adopted the explanation as a conventional wisdom.
One of way of knowing is not necessarily superior to the other. But why, in the case of
technical writing and the Holocaust, did technical communicators follow one way of
knowing and not the other? And perhaps more curiously, why is this conventional
wisdom arguably the opposite of Katz‘s thesis—even though subsequent scholars have
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all cited Katz in support of their views? Indeed, why is Katz‘s (1992a) ―Ethic of
Expediency‖ so widely cited, but his 1993 sequel, in which he followed up the initial
article by detailing the connection between epistemic rhetoric and the construction of
morality, so little noticed in comparison?
Confronted with the Just gas van document and the realization that a skilled
technical writer could draft such a text, I contend that the artifact became more useful to
the discipline as a boundary object than a starting point for interrogating how our own
epistemic rhetorics socially construct notions of what is prudent and moral. The Nazi
document is plastic enough so that scholars of diverse viewpoints can—like looking at a
Rohrschach blot—project their own local needs upon it, yet robust enough so that shared
condemnation of the text can create a trading zone where scholars may negotiate a
common identity as moral beings who may be defined in opposition to the putatively
amoral Nazis. ―We‖ have morals (whatever those might be for each of us) while ―they‖
are without morals. Such a binary opposition comfortably distances scholars and
practitioners from the disquieting notion that SS technical writers were free moral agents
like us, and also permits technical communicators to distance their profession from the
taint of the Nazi case.

Expediency without Ethics
Katz‘s (1992a) original article, composed by him in 1990, was very much in
keeping with the universalizing trend that was evident in much of Holocaust scholarship
two decades ago. In fact, his implicit call for a post-Holocaust rhetoric that takes into
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account the ―dark side‖ of classical Western rhetoric is reminiscent of Bauman‘s (1989)
call, published at about the same time, for a post-Holocaust sociology. There Bauman
urged his profession to no longer regard the Holocaust as an aberrant detour in the
upward progress of Western modernity, but rather as a product of potentialities inherent
in the West‘s culture of technological and bureaucratic organization. Though Holocaust
scholars today place more emphasis on the particularities of the genocide, most would
also agree with Bauer (2001) who pointed out that ―absolute uniqueness leads to its
opposite, total trivialization: if the Holocaust is a one-time, inexplicable occurrence, then
it is a waste of time to deal with it‖ (p. 14). But because Auschwitz does in fact ―change
everything,‖ the call to develop a post-Holocaust rhetoric is a summons worth heeding.
Moreover, in his initial article and its sequel (1993) Katz astutely illustrated how, because
notions of ―prudence‖ and phronesis are socially constructed, rhetoric may be employed
for evil ends. One need not agree that Aristotelian rhetoric is inherently ―expedient‖ to
concur that it can be so employed. Thus, even though many Holocaust scholars today
would question Katz‘s thesis on several important points—his endorsement of Arendt‘s
(1963) ―banality of evil‖ thesis, his focus on the primacy of Hitler‘s will in driving the
genocide, his argument that the ―moral basis‖ the Holocaust was spun from an ethos of
scientific and technological expediency rather than a millenarian ideology—his nuanced
analysis spotlights the truly important point that the Nazis‘ rationale for mass murder was
an ideologized social construction. By contrast, as we will see, technical communicators
have since then largely contented themselves with tilting at stick-figure Nazi villains who
had no morals or even no ideology.
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Although Katz (2004, pp. 195-196) expected his thesis to be greeted with outrage,
the work was widely acclaimed and soon became a standard point of reference for
discussions of ethics in technical communication (Smith, 2000, p. 450). Yet these
approving citations have, I contend, imposed new and different orderings on the Just gas
van document. The Nazis, argued Katz, reconceived expediency as an ethical value that,
in their eyes, gave a ―moral basis‖ to the genocide. But immediately after the initial
article was published, commentators began focusing almost entirely on the ―expediency‖
half of the thesis and ignored the ―ethic‖ half. Where Katz portrayed the Nazi document
as an extreme perversion of rhetoric, scholars now routinely cited the document as an
extreme perversion of ―hyperpragmatism‖ (Scott, Longo & Wills, 2006, p. 9).
Descriptions of the desk-murderers as amoral, indifferent, detached, and neutral—words
actually used in the literature—thus misread the lessons of the Nazi gas van document by
ignoring ―ethic‖ to focus only on ―expediency.‖ That the Nazis did have an ethical
philosophy makes us uncomfortable. It is far easier to dismiss the perpetrators as
automatons and thereby comfort ourselves that ―we‖ humanistic scholars are different
than ―those‖ amoral technocrats. One can argue, as I have done (Ward, 2009, 2010a), that
current scholarship on the Holocaust views the ―Nazi conscience‖ as a redemptive secular
religion. But whether one believes that the Nazi ethic was soteriological or technological,
the point is that the Third Reich had an ethic.
And what is an ―ethic‖? Markel (2001) wrote that ethics ―concern the individual‘s
thinking and conduct about matters of right and wrong‖ and ―people‘s ethics are derived
to a greater or lesser extent from their society‘s morality‖ (p. 29). Thus, if we join Katz in
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positing that the Nazis had an ethic—whether the technological ethic asserted by Katz or
the soteriological ethic that I maintain—then we concede that, for example, the writer of
the Nazi memo engaged in ―thinking and conduct about matters of right and wrong‖ and
was influenced ―to a greater or lesser extent [by his] society‘s morality‖ (Markel, 2001, p.
29). In turn, then, we now have phronesis: the document writers practiced ―thinking,‖
prudently (for their rhetorical community) pondered ―right and wrong,‖ were sensitive to
socially constructed mores around them, and through their conduct enacted their heinous
convictions. And so again, we end up with a far different picture than stick-figure
automatons.
While Katz (1992a) characterized the Nazi text as exhibiting an ―ethos of
objectivity, logic, and narrow focus‖ that was ―taken to extremes‖ (p. 257), he did not
stop there—as most subsequent scholars have done. Instead he added, ―Here, expediency
is an ethical end as well‖ (p. 257). And though Katz claimed his argument corroborates
Arendt‘s (1963) ―banality of evil‖ thesis, he also claimed to ―go beyond‖ Arendt by
finding that the Nazi writer was not ―simply doing his duty‖ but had ―adopted the ethos
of the Nazi bureaucracy he works for as well‖ (Katz, 1992a, p. 258). In other words, the
SS technical writer was not a man with no ethical concerns but, rather, was enacting
convictions about right and wrong that he had adopted as a free moral agent after a
volitional process of socialization.
Further, noted Katz (1992a), the Nazi document belongs to the ―problem of
deliberative rhetoric‖ because it examples ―that genre of rhetoric concerned with
deliberating future courses of action‖ (p. 258, emphasis added). There is deliberation
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occurring in the document and not simply mere amorality, indifference, detachment, and
neutrality. Instead, a ―morality‖ is implicated here because expediency ―was rhetorically
embraced by the Nazi regime and combined with science and technology to form the
‗moral basis‘ of the holocaust‖ (p. 258). Thus, an ethic of expediency is not the absence
of morality but, rather, constitutes a certain type of morality. Katz correctly warned, ―We
have tended to understand the holocaust from a nonrhetorical, Platonic standpoint, which
amounts to a refusal to understand it at all‖ (p. 258). The seemingly caricatured Nazi
villains that technical communicators have drawn for themselves amount idealized antiforms that, I believe, can be seen as amounting to a refusal to understand. Because the
gas van document is the product not just of ―expediency‖ but an ―ethic of expediency,‖
the Nazi technical writer manifested a phenomenon described in rhetorical theory:
namely, ―the role of ethos‖ as that ―moral element in character‖ which provides ―an
essential link between deliberation and action‖ (p. 259). Put another way, a purely
expedient technocrat might seek technical perfection for its own sake; but to say that a
desk-murderer was impelled by an ethic of expediency is to recognize that a moral
calculus took place that linked deliberation and action. While logos ponders the means,
Katz noted, ethos and pathos furnish the impetus.
Many technical communication scholars have cited Katz‘s (1992a) observation
that ―All deliberative rhetoric is concerned with decision and action. Technical writing,
perhaps even more than other kinds of rhetorical discourse, always leads to action, and
thus always impacts on human life,‖ (p. 259). But we should neither forget his next
sentence which states, ―In technical writing, epistemology necessarily leads to ethics‖
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(Katz, 1992a, p. 259). If we take this at face value, then we must concede that the Nazi
writers‘ epistemology led to ―ethical‖ behavior according to their lights. Only if we
suggest the writers had no epistemology, which cannot be true, can we say they had no
ethics. The problem in technical communication is not any disconnect between
epistemology and ethics, Katz averred, but ―how that relationship affects and reveals
itself in human behavior‖ (p. 259). The challenge of the Nazi gas van document is not to
explain how the writers separated epistemology and ethics, but how the writers‘
epistemology shaped their ethics and how those ethics influenced their actions. Nazi
technical writers enacted a set of ethical principles they believed were moral and
provided justification for their actions. ―Although the characterization seems hard to
swallow, Hitler‘s was an ‗ethical‘ program in the broadest sense of that term,‖ for the
dictator believed ―power must be based on a ‗spiritual idea,‘ a philosophy‖ and
―understood—all too well—that his political program for world war and mass
extermination would not be accepted without a moral foundation‖ (Katz, 1992a, p. 263).
Though Katz may have analyzed the ―wrong‖ document, he arrived at a ―right‖
conclusion by illuminating how the Nazis enacted a heinous ethic, but an ethic
nonetheless. This is why scholars who have cited ―The Ethic of Expediency‖ as a
warning against amoral technocracy and mindless hyperpragmatism can perhaps, I would
suggest, be said to have drawn an opposite conclusion to what Katz argued.
Why have technical communicators negotiated a new ordering of the Nazi gas van
document—and along the way, found the Nazi text more useful as a boundary object than
a historical artifact? Longo (1998) contended that how analysts order a text says as much
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about the analysts as about the text. Thus, to begin my interrogation into what the
disciplinary deliberation about the Just text may reveal about the discipline itself, I turn
first to two published cases—representing two very different poles of response—in which
scholars‘ responses to the Katz thesis precluded their participation in rhetorical boundary
work and, as a result, excluded themselves from the emerging disciplinary consensus.
The cases are instructive for two reasons: First, they suggest the limitations of boundary
work, a work that apparently is precluded when at least one side advances exclusive
claims that erect rigid boundaries no object can bridge. And second, the cases established
two outliers of reaction—between which much boundary work could and did occur.

Protecting Rhetoric and Rhetoricians
Only two adversarial exchanges have occurred in print over ―The Ethic of
Expediency.‖ But these exchanges illustrate three distinct agendas for technical
communication that argue, respectively, for the primacy of rhetoric‘s social-epistemic
function as the key to understanding technical writing (Katz, 1992a; 1993), the primacy
of reasoned deliberation based on rationally derived ideals (Rivers, 1992), and the
primacy of clear, precise, and accurate use of instrumental language (Moore, 2004).
In the same journal and year Katz (1992a) published ―Ethic,‖ Rivers (1992)
offered a Response which contended that the ―rhetoric‖ of Hitler and the Third Reich
should not be considered rhetoric at all. Though he did not specifically address the SS gas
van proposal, the import of Rivers‘ refutation is that the document is best understood as a
nonrhetorical communication. The Rivers refutation is based on Quintilian‘s notion of vir
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bonus, or that a good orator must by definition be a good man. For example, at the time
Katz and Rivers were writing in the early 1990s, one-time Klansmen and white
supremacist David Duke was making headlines as a populist vote-getter in Louisiana
politics. Yet because Duke operated within an American polis comprised of competing
voices, Rivers pointed out, he was compelled to ―give allegiance to virtues he may not
possess and to a culturally determined vir bonus that he alone cannot create‖ (p. 858).
Similarly, in the polis of Weimar Germany, Hitler‘s rhetoric never won him a free
election. (However, by 1932 the National Socialists were the largest of Germany‘s seven
major parties and tallied 37 percent of the electorate in a multi-party system where an
absolute majority was not practically attainable.) But once Hitler achieved dictatorship
and became ―the ultimate vir bonus,‖ all deliberation ceased, according to Rivers. Thus,
he concluded that, because ―Rhetoric within the Sophistic tradition does not exist without
competing voices,‖ then ―after 1933, rhetoric as understood within the Sophistic tradition
ceased to exist.‖ Nazi public discourse was not thoughtful persuasion but propaganda.
And because ―apathy, fear, and hatred are the weapons of propaganda and the fuel for
mass hysteria, not the topoi of Aristotle or the public and competing voice of the vir
bonus‖ (p. 858) then, according to Rivers (and despite Aristotle‘s classification of pathos
as a mode of appeal), propaganda is nonrhetorical. On that basis Rivers ―question[s] the
assumption that the key to Hitler‘s success can be credited to his rhetorical skill‖ and
denied that such an assumption is ―in line with classical rhetorical practice and
theorizing‖ (p. 857). In the end, Rivers contended, ―The complicity of millions cannot be
attributed to the rhetorical virtue of Hitler or a virtue that is socially constructed. A
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silenced society constructs nothing.‖ Free discussion and deliberation were absent in the
Third Reich, so that ―In Hitler‘s Germany, any competing voice that would have tried to
talk the Nazis out of their final solution would have simply been shot‖ (p. 858).
In his counter response, Katz (1992b) rejoined that ―I did not wish to examine
Hitler‘s rhetorical success against notions of ethos found in all of classical rhetoric, but
only that of Aristotle,‖ and that Rivers ―shift[ed] the grounds of my argument by
collapsing what I see as two more or less distinct traditions—that of Quintilian and that
of Aristotle—into one.‖ Compared to Aristotle, Cicero and the Sophists, Quintilian
reposed more trust in Isocrates‘ dictum that rhetorical practice cultivates moral
development. ―Thus,‖ Katz argued, ―Quintilian‘s notion of ethos is perhaps more
‗Platonic‘ than any of his predecessors‘‖ and ―can be seen as an idealistic response to the
political corruption and absence of any real deliberative rhetoric in late imperial Rome‖
(pp. 859-860). The rub here may be that Hitler‘s rhetoric (or propaganda) brought him
successes but not of the kind which are more familiar to our own democratic polis. Katz
(1992b) himself pointed out that Hitler‘s achievements cannot be measured by electoral
votes alone, for his career

was marked by other kinds of rhetorical successes that do not conform to
democratic ideals: the construction of Nazi ethos and ideology, the building of a
movement that toppled the Weimar Republic, the rise to political power, the
seduction of the German people, the silencing of the opposition, and the carrying
out of war and genocide. Hitler used rhetoric, as Foucault might say, to surround
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sanctioned discourse with silence and so to legitimize and institutionalize both the
discourse and the silence. A silenced society does construct something; it
constructs silence, which in this case was necessary to carry out the holocaust.
And silence is rhetorical too. (p. 859)

Within the social construction that was Nazi Germany, apathy and fear and hatred ―can
become valid rhetorical strategies‖ (Katz, 1992b, p. 859). While they may not be
formally named among the topoi, these strategies are still amenable to Aristotelian
analysis as ―logical extensions and perversions of the more legitimate rhetorical uses of
emotions and character we find in Aristotle‘s Rhetoric‖ (p. 859; cf. Aristotle‘s discussion
of emotions in Book II of the Rhetoric). However, just as this study has compared Katz‘s
(1992a) thesis about expediency to what current scholarship on National Socialism and
the Holocaust, so too can Rivers‘ fair question about the rhetoricity of Nazi discourse be
examined from that angle: First, given current scholarly understandings of the Third
Reich, is it historically true that the Nazi regime had no competing voices and
constructed only silence? And second, though Rivers did not address himself to the SS
memo reviewed by Katz in ―The Ethic of Expediency,‖ what is the implication of his
thesis for analyzing Nazi technical communication? Can the SS technical memo be
viewed as nonrhetorical?
The assertion made by Rivers, that ―any competing voice that would have tried to
talk the Nazis out of their final solution would have simply been shot,‖ is not necessarily
sustained by the historical record. Current research confirms that the SS had no need
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threaten anyone into carrying out the genocide. In 1992, the same year that Rivers was
writing (and so he would not have been aware of it), the historian Browning documented
in a landmark study that the historical record contains not a single instance of anyone
being punished for declining to kill Jews. The postwar claims of perpetrators, that they
were forced under duress to pull triggers and drive gassing vans, are attempts at
exculpation. The real question is why 80 to 90 percent of rank-and-file conscripts
voluntarily accepted assignments to killing squads (the remainder affirmed the justice of
the murders and only pleaded ―weakness‖ rather than moral opposition). In their view of
the German home front, scholars have overturned the notion that Nazi Germany
constructed only silence. Johnson and Reuband (2005) described how ―a new conception
of the Nazi dictatorship has been developing in the international scholarly community,‖
in contrast to the former view that ―was heavily influenced by the theorists of the
‗totalitarian school‘ that emerged during the early years of the 1950s‖ and that saw
―dictatorial regimes and not the people who lived under them as the problem and
construed terror and coercion to be the essential features of Nazi, Soviet, and other
dictatorial societies‖ (p. xv). Emphasis on ―the supposed omnipotence of secret police
agencies‖ has receded as

a fundamentally new view of the Nazi dictatorship is emerging that stresses
complicity and consent rather than coercion and compulsion. We are now
beginning to understand, for example, that the Gestapo was far more limited in its
resources and powers than was once thought, and that to be effective it had to
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concentrate on policing targeted enemies like Jews and communists, on the whole
leaving most of the German population considerable latitude to go about their
private lives. They were able to do this because Hitler and his ideology had
widespread support from the German population. (p. xv)

Indeed, only two percent of German citizens were ever interrogated by the police on
suspicion of illegal acts (Johnson & Reuband, 2005, p. 298). For the Nazi regime realized
that attempts at complete totalitarian control of private life would foment discontent and
thus become self-defeating. The dictatorship, founded on popularity as much as power,
was sensitive to ―public mood‖ and received regular reports—which were remarkably
frank—from the SS Security Service. On a number of key issues Hitler and state
authorities backed down in the face of popular unrest: Christian crosses were restored to
public school classrooms after protests in Bavaria. The euthanasia program was ended
after Catholic clerics preached against the killings. The effort to merge Protestants into a
single Reich Church was abandoned, as Hitler decided to put off a reckoning with the
churches until after the war. Jewish husbands in ―mixed‖ marriages were released from
custody after their Gentile wives demonstrated in the streets. A recent study by Aly
(2006) documented how the Nazi government crafted progressive social-welfare policies
(often funded through plunder) in response to popular aspirations for social leveling.
Historians also confirm that, far from having few competing policy voices, Nazi
Germany was, as we learned in Chapter 3, an intensely competitive polycracy. Seen in
this light, the SS gas van document must be viewed as rhetorical, if rhetoricity is defined
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as a product of competing voices. The 1942 document must be placed in its rhetorical
context of the attempt by the SS to consolidate its still-contested hold over Jewish policy,
as well as internal competition within the SS to develop a killing procedure that reduced
the psychological stress on the killers. The Just proposal was composed at a heady time
when gas vans were ―competing‖ for a place in the Final Solution, all in the midst of
history‘s largest military invasion.
At the time (when the SS had even experimented with dynamiting Jews in situ as
an alternative to mass shootings) the ―success‖ of the gassing vans was viewed by their
SS advocates as critical to demonstrating that a ―final solution of the Jewish question in
Europe‖ was feasible. Otherwise, competing voices might prevail which demanded
Jewish labor be utilized for the war effort, or coveted the scare resources devoted to the
extermination project, or counseled postponement of a Final Solution until after the war
was won and a ―territorial solution‖ (deporting the Jews to perish in Siberia) could be
implemented.
Perhaps no other SS document illustrates this point—how technical
communication can be embedded in organizational politics—more than the infamous
Wannsee Protocol, called ―perhaps the most shameful document of modern history‖
when discovered by the Nuremberg prosecutors. The Protocol is the minutes of a January
20, 1942, conference of ministerial secretaries convened by Heydrich to assert his control
over the implementation of the Final Solution and secure the cooperation of key state
agencies represented. The minutes, composed by Eichmann under the direction of
Heydrich, are an exemplary document in their concise language, clear organization, and
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physical appearance. But the rhetoric of the document goes far beyond its mere words.
Detailed analyses of the historic circumstances and hidden SS agenda behind the
Wannsee Conference and Protocol have recently been published by Roseman (2003) and
Cesarini (2004, pp. 110-116). Their analyses are, for technical communicators, perhaps
reminiscent of Mirel‘s (1988) study of how one organization‘s computer users manual
functioned rhetorically as a sop to infighting factions, a preemption of further conflicts,
and a depiction of administrative commitment to progress. Though the manual‘s authors
are in no way equated here to the Nazi SS, the dynamic portrayed by Mirel was writ
large—and hideously lethal—by the authors of the Wannsee Protocol and the Sipo
Technical Matters Group gas van document.
Rivers‘ implication, that the memo is nonrhetorical, is ostensibly based on the
assumption that rhetoricity emanates from competing voices, and yet current scholarly
understandings do not support the contention that Nazi Germany was a ―silent‖ society
and had no ―competing‖ voices—even if those voices competed in a repugnant Social
Darwinian milieu. Why then did Rivers appeal to the popular, but historically inaccurate,
generalization that the Nazis shot all dissenters out of hand? (Even the most brutal
dictatorships, much less those founded on popular support, will attempt to ―reeducate‖
dissenters.) To read Rivers‘ critique is to get the clear impression that he is ―protecting‖
rhetoric, or a certain idealized view of rational polity, against what he perceives to be
Katz‘s implication that rhetoric is value-neutral rather than innately good. In our culture,
―Hitler‖ and ―Nazi‖ are the god terms for ultimate evil; for Rivers, to use these two words
in connection with rhetoric is to slander the latter—and by extension, to diminish the
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scholars who study it. ―We‖ teach rhetoric, while ―they‖ practiced propaganda.
Rhetorical study is a lofty calling, essential to democratic society, but for Rivers, Katz‘s
argument unacceptably relativized rhetoric into mere expedience.
Thus even in this early exchange, the only part of Katz‘s thesis that mattered was
the ―expedience‖ and not the ―ethic.‖ But to illustrate the point here about rhetorical
boundary work, less than a year later Brasseur (1993) made the same move—casting off
―ethic‖ and making ―expediency‖ the focus—but as we will see later, successfully
appropriated Katz‘s thesis in support of her own. What, then, was the difference between
Rivers and Brasseur? We will explore Brasseur‘s case later on. Yet as for Rivers, he
opposed rather than allied his argument to Katz‘s. In other words, he precluded any
possibility of boundary work. And Rivers did not mention the SS gas van document,
thereby removing from the equation what would with Brasseur and later disciplinary
deliberations become an object for performing boundary work. Instead Rivers conducted
his argument on an entirely abstract plane, leaving no tangible object available to bridge
his differences with Katz and create a trading zone between them. As a result, Rivers‘
argument quickly dropped from the scene—a result that also reveals something about the
self-identity of the technical communication discipline. If scholars lauded Katz and
ignored Rivers‘ attempt to exclude propaganda and silence from rhetoric, then by the
early 1990s the leading edge of the discipline agreed on the proposition that everything is
rhetorical. Generally this might help explain the outcome to the second adversarial
exchange with Katz, one that hinged on a putative separation between rhetoric and
instrumentality.
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Safeguarding Science and Civilization
While Rivers (1992) argued that Katz incorrectly discovered rhetoric in the Nazi
technical memo, Moore (2004) argued that Katz incorrectly discovered Aristotle in the
SS document. But once again, as with Rivers, the case entirely omits any reference to or
engagement with the document itself. Thus, no object is available to work across the
boundary between the two competing perspectives and create a trading zone. Instead,
Moore patently opposed himself to Katz with personal attacks and a critique grounded in
translation issues, culminating with the accusation that an elitist animus against
capitalism motivated Katz to selectively—and negatively—construe the Greek
sympheron as ―expediency‖ rather than more neutrally as ―advantage‖ or ―utility.‖ Then,
after striving to refute ―The Ethic of Expediency‖ based on translation and quotation
issues, Moore concluded with a second line of refutation by asserting that humankind is
more driven (through religious and humanitarian impulses, evolutionary advantage, or
self-interest) to long-term cooperation than momentary expedience. (Another way to cast
and interpret this exchange in terms of boundary work is to note that the Aristotelian text
was rendered brittle, rather than made plastic, by Moore‘s insistence on staking out an
―either/or‖ opposition to Katz).
Moore (2004), and Katz in response (2006), have both written at length on the
translation and quotation issues. Yet there is one question that Moore did not directly
address: How might his thesis explain the SS gas van document? Katz (2006) saw this as
one of the fundamental flaws in Moore‘s argument and suggested, ―Professor Moore does
not address the issue of the Nazi memo, which is the focal point of my College English
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article, and only touches on the use of expediency in Nazi Germany as a way of accusing
me of trying to make deliberative ‗rhetoric and technical communication look bad‘‖ (p.
5). For a possible explanation of the gas van document from Moore‘s theoretical
perspective, it is necessary to survey his other writings on what he calls ―instrumental
discourse.‖ The debate over Moore‘s theory is summarized in a recent article by Warnick
(2006) who noted that Moore ―did not coin the term instrumental discourse, but over the
past ten years he has made it his own by being its chief proponent in the field of technical
communication.‖ At the time of this writing, the latest iteration of Moore‘s theory of
technical communication as instrumental discourse is found in his 2006 article, ―From
Monologue to Dialogue to Chorus: The Place of Instrumental Discourse in English
Studies and Technical Communication.‖ Though its final section concluded with an
indictment of ―The Problems of Totalizing Rhetoric,‖ the first section on ―Defining
Instrumental Discourse‖ may suggest a theoretical framework for interpreting the SS text.
According to Moore‘s (2006) basic definition, ―Instrumental discourse is
individually verified discourse that registers social agreements so people can cooperate in
order to coordinate and control their activities‖ (p. 387). Rhetorical and instrumental
discourses are different species of communication, as ―Rhetoric tries to persuade, but
instrumental discourse tries to govern, guide, and control‖ (p. 388). The former is needful
because social agreement requires ―a process (sometimes long, sometimes short) of
discussion and argumentation‖ (p. 387). But the latter is equally needful for ―If people
want to live together peacefully and ethically, and if people want to work together for a
common and greater good, then they need such instrumental genres of discourse as laws‖
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and commercial documents that allow ―people around the world to engage rapidly, safely,
and economically in huge numbers of transactions for their mutual benefit‖ (pp. 387388). Humans have evolved these two species of communication as a matter of survival.

Sometimes we need communications that help us change our minds (and the
minds of others) to adapt our behaviors to new situations, or to newly perceived
situations. Since the time of Aristotle, we have called those communications
rhetorical or persuasive communications. But once people agree about how to
behave in certain situations, then they need other kinds of communications to
record their cooperation and to coordinate their activities. (p. 392)

As different species of communication, Moore contended, rhetorical and instrumental
discourses manifest different qualities. ―Rhetorical discourse typically has direct or
indirect appeals to logos (i.e., logic), ethos (i.e., the author‘s character), and pathos (i.e.,
the audience‘s emotions),‖ while ―instrumental discourse is ‗those utterances that are
supposed to achieve their purpose directly, as they stand, without the need to produce any
additional ‗reasons‘ or ‗supporting arguments‘‖ (p. 388). Because rhetorical documents
are authored for persuasion rather than application, he continued, these utterances ―tend
to be more personal‖ as the speaker or writer must establish argumentative credibility; by
contrast, instrumental discourse bears the authority of collective agreement and thus ―is
typically impersonal, and frequently uses imperative mood or passive voice‖ (p. 391).
And because instrumental documents must be applied to real situations, Moore concluded
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that they may be revised as conditions change, whereas ―rhetorical documents do not
usually get updated‖ (p. 391). In other words, instrumental discourse depends on contexts
and rhetoric does not.
Nevertheless (and to parody Aristotle), for Moore rhetoric is the dialectic
counterpart of instrumentality. Moore views rhetorical and instrumental discourses as a
continuum where (1) persuasion leads to social agreement, (2) this agreement is codified
in an instrumental document, (3) persuasion then ceases and cooperation begins, and (4)
the parties ―apply the agreement to intervene successfully in the world in a specific
situation‖ (p. 387). Yet instrumental documents ―do not map perfectly onto existing or
changing situations‖ (p. 391) so that reevaluation and adjustment is required from time to
time, ―at which point persuasion again becomes the dominant purpose of the
communication‖ (p. 387). Thus rhetoric leads to agreement, which leads to instrumental
codification, which leads to intervention in reality, which leads to change, which leads
once again to rhetoric.
To ―achieve its purpose directly,‖ instrumental discourse manifests the three
properties of changeability, mappability, and sovereignty. Thus, ―Because contexts
change frequently, instrumental communications also change frequently,‖ unlike
literature which ―is not context-dependent‖ (p. 389). Further, instrumental discourse is
mappable because ―it has a close correlation with some physical object, task, or situation,
so that users readily identify what the object, task, or situation is and what they are
supposed to do,‖ although ―the map may or may not resemble what is being mapped‖
(pp. 389-390). For the purposes of analyzing the SS gas van document, Moore‘s
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conception bears a closer look.

Mappability does not involve pure representation, positivism, or correspondence
theories of the truth. Social construction, individual experience, and functional
use partially create the perception of correspondence in instrumental discourse,
but none of these ways of creating meaning involves positivism or pure
representation. . . . For people who create instrumental discourse, language is a
jumping off point, not pure representation. The crucial question is this: can the
user perform the task presented in the document or communication? Instrumental
discourse is based on a usability theory of language: language is a contingent
social agreement whose validity depends on individuals applying the language to
intervene successfully in reality. If the intervention is successful, then the
language is useful or mappable. (p. 390)

Finally, for Moore, the sovereignty of instrumental discourse ―is established in two ways:
by social groups and by individual experience‖ (p. 391). In the end, therefore,
instrumental documents are deficient if they: cannot accommodate changing needs and
circumstances, do not readily correlate with the intended intervention into reality, and
lack socially legitimated authority or individually legitimated efficacy. Changeability,
mappability, and sovereignty are the ideal conditions of instrumental discourse but may
not always be achieved in reality. ―Like anything else, certain conditions are more
conducive to cooperation,‖ Moore writes. Ideally, ―Cooperation should be democratic‖
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and ―freely chosen but with the awareness that people are not always free to do anything
they want‖ due to personal, social, ideological, physical, and economic constraints. For
one thing, ―To attempt the total involvement of all people in all decisions of any sizable
group would be economically impossible‖ (p. 393).
Moore‘s theory of instrumental discourse, then, leads to two possible
interpretations of the Nazi SS technical memo: either (1) the document is part of the
argumentative process leading to an eventual agreement on the design of the gassing
vans, in which case it is rhetorical; or (2) the document instrumentalizes a collective
agreement on the killing operation, in which case it is not rhetorical. Clearly, the former
would seem the appropriate interpretation according to Moore‘s criteria, so that the SS
memo is rhetorical. Yet that conclusion, based on the 2006 iteration of his theory, may
leave some loose ends when compared to his 2004 critique of Katz and ―The Ethic of
Expediency.‖ For Moore‘s 2004 article seems only to leave open two possibilities, that
either: (1) because the memo does not produce ―utility‖ then it is nonrhetorical; or (2)
because the memo is rhetorical then it must be grounded in an ethic of ―utility‖ (as
opposed to an ethic of ―expediency‖)—despite the fact that such utility was in the
apparent service of Nazi evil. By comparing Moore‘s own theory of instrumental
discourse and his later critique of Katz—which we will review below—a fundamental
contradiction seems to arise: If the authors of the Nazi gas van memo were arguing for
adoption of their design recommendations (rather than codifying an agreement about the
vehicle design), then they were engaging in rhetoric. But according to Moore, as we will
see below, rhetors argue for utility (rather than expediency) with the object of urging
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what is good as their main consideration. Yet the SS document was not good unless one
allows that concepts of goodness are socially constructed—which Moore does not allow
since, by his theory, rhetoric is representational and does not depend on context, and only
instrumental discourse engages in social construction. How then, if we follow Moore‘s
line, can the use of ―utility‖ for terrible ends be accounted for?
Moore‘s (2004) attack on Katz and his ―ethic of expediency‖ thesis began with a
lengthy discussion of translation issues, after which Moore launched into his own views
―utility‖ and ―goodness‖ by citing the Roberts (1954) translation of The Rhetoric:

If Aristotle believes that orators ―must not make people believe what is wrong,‖
then his Rhetoric would reflect an ―ethic‖ that encouraged orators to support what
was just and right. That is precisely what Aristotle does: he advocates what is just
and right, though he is aware that some orators do not practice what he preaches.
(Moore, 2004, p. 12)

Thus for Moore (2004), orators do not operate on expediency. (And neither, in his view,
do governments: ―I find it hard to believe that ‗expediency outweighs compassion in
government‘‖ [p. 23]). Moore believed the best reading of The Rhetoric 1.3.4 is (referring
again to the Roberts translation) that the political orator who ―aims at establishing
expediency‖ will, as ―the main consideration,‖ urge acceptance of a proposal ―on the
ground that it will do good‖ (p. 15). To Katz‘s contention that Aristotle ―collapses all
ethical questions in deliberative rhetoric into a question of expediency,‖ Moore
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steadfastly maintained that ―Aristotle does not ‗elide‘ goodness and utility‖ but rather
―keep[s] both ideas separate and distinct‖ (p. 13). In summary, then, for Moore,
―Aristotle does not believe that deliberative discourse is based on expediency; he believes
that deliberative discourse is based on goodness and utility, and that goodness and utility
embrace many other virtues, including happiness, justice, honor, health, moderation,
courage, beauty, and so on‖ (p. 27). Finally, Moore‘s concluding section seemed to
suggest that the rhetoric of an evolved humanity should instantiate its ―instincts for
building social cooperation‖ (p. 21)—a conclusion that seems to accord rhetoric a role in
the social construction of good ends, except that his 2006 article claimed that role only
for instrumental discourse.
Thus we return to the seemingly fundamental contradiction in Moore‘s logic: If
the SS gas van memo was rhetorical (according to his theory of instrumental discourse)
because it argued for policy change, and if rhetors necessarily plead (according to his
critique of Katz) for utility and goodness, how can one account for rhetoric that urges evil
ends unless without moving past Moore‘s representational theory of rhetoric and instead
conceding Katz‘s point about rhetoric‘s social-epistemic dimension?
In addition to the conundrum that ―utility‖ was used to bring about evil in Nazi
Germany, which raises a basic question about Moore‘s views on rhetoric, a second
logical inconsistency may be seen—in light of the Nazi document—which has
implications for his instrumental discourse. For on the one hand, the Moore of 2004
argued that Aristotelian rhetoric should produce not social constructions but such ideal
forms as goodness, utility, happiness, justice, honor, health, moderation, courage, and

253

beauty. Therefore, by this reading, the SS memo is nonrhetorical. (Or anti-rhetorical?)
Yetthe Moore of 2006 contended that rhetorical discourse is defined in a continuum
against instrumental discourse—the former being persuasion that leads to agreement, the
latter codification of that agreement. Therefore, by this reading, the memo is rhetorical
(although the instrumental agreement to which it leads is extermination). Then again, in
contrast to ―ways of meaning‖ that instantiate ―pure representation, positivism, or
correspondence theories of the truth,‖ Moore only allowed that instrumental discourse
involves social constructions whereby ―language is a contingent social agreement whose
validity depends on individuals applying the language to intervene successfully in
reality‖ (p. 390). Therefore, by this reading of the Nazi document (which Moore himself
does not conduct), the gas van memo—would also be instrumental since the validity of
its coded and euphemistic language is contingent on the social agreement of the SS deskmurderers.
Katz has willingly tested his thesis in the awful crucible of the Holocaust, which
is arguably the central and most vexing question of Western modernity. Technical
communicators could benefit if Moore and other scholars of the genre were willing to do
the same. Katz (2006) responded to Moore by noting their respective interpretations are
―based on different epistemologies‖ and concluded,

I do not believe human objectivity is possible, which an instrumental view seems
to require, and so cannot believe in a non-ideological instrumentalism—whether it
be called utility or expediency. Nor do I share Professor Moore‘s unbridled

254

enthusiasm for technology and/or capitalism, or his ‗optimism‘ concerning the
behavior of corporations and government.‖ (p. 7)

That sentiment was echoed by Browning (1998), a leading Holocaust researcher who has
commented on the potential for further genocides that,

I fear we live in a world in which war and racism are ubiquitous, in which the
powers of government mobilization are powerful and increasing, in which a sense
of personal responsibility is increasingly attenuated by specialization and
bureaucratization, and in which the peer group exerts tremendous pressures on
behavior and sets moral norms. (p. 223)

Disciplines from theology (e.g., Rubinstein, 1966) to sociology (Bauman, 1989) have
wrestled with the implications of a post-Holocaust world. Moore has propounded a
thought-provoking theory of rhetorical versus instrumental communication. But this
theory of communication—as must all theories of communication and rhetoric—must
account for Auschwitz. Thus, I concur with Katz‘s thesis on many of its crucial points:
that the SS gas van document is rhetorical, that it is amenable to Aristotelian rhetorical
analysis, that phronesis is a social construction, and that the Holocaust is not an aberrant
Platonic anti-form that is beyond analysis. Whether or not the SS gas van proposal is an
exemplar of technological expediency or social utility, there is surely sufficient evidence
to conclude that either can be taken to extremes. The many articles written by scholars of
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technical communication about, say, the Challenger disaster are a testament to this fact
(e.g. Dombrowski, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; Herndl, Fennell & Miller, 1991; Miller, 1993;
Moore, 1992; Pace, 1988; Winsor, 1988, 1990). Further, the argument that an ethic of
expediency does broadly underlie Western deliberative rhetoric—but with the caveat that
different expediencies are possible, whether technological or ideological—could be a
possible reading of the implications suggested by my own analysis. Elsewhere (Ward,
2009, 2010a) I have argued for the basic desirability and need to study more cases,
engage in more in-depth discussion, learn more of how technical communication can be
abused, and encourage more scholars to take up the investigation.
Interest in such an investigation was not, however, the impetus for Moore‘s
(2004) critique of Katz. Where Rivers desired to protect rhetoric—and by extension,
rhetoricians and, even further, the exceptionalism of democratic polity—from being
tarred by association with Nazism and the Holocaust, Moore desired to protect technical
writing—and thus technical writers, Western capitalism and, by extension, notions of
Western progress and the innate goodness of human nature—from that same association.
In a subsequent book chapter Moore (2005) explicitly decried ―authors of contemporary
academic studies of technical communication [who] frequently attack capitalism as the
source of many of the social problems of our time‖ (p. 53). He put Katz and Carolyn
Miller at the head of a list of ―critical theorists‖ within technical communication who fill
students ―with bias and misinformation‖ and ―ignore the fact that the cultures that have
the most freedom, the most social opportunities, the most democracy, the longer life
spans, and the highest standards of living are precisely the cultures in which high-tech
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state capitalism plays a central role in the economy‖ (p. 54). In the past five hundred
years ―science, engineering, technology, and capitalism helped bring more and more
benefits to humanity,‖ while capitalism in particular ―played a significant role in the rise
of political freedom‖ (p. 73). The influential Frankfurt School of critical theorists were
creatures of their time, Moore asserted, who reacted ―to the Nazi control of German
businesses and sciences, and so they attacked instrumental reason, capitalism, science,
and technology‖ in their ―hostility toward the abuses of the Third Reich‖ (p. 74). Thus,
the first generation of critical theorists engaged in the ―fallacy of guilt by association‖
and ―invented a philosophy that made Hitler and Nazism appear to be the inevitable
outcome of science, technology, and capitalism, and not an aberration‖ (p. 74).
According to Moore, however, technical communicators must move past the critical
theories—from the likes of Heidegger and Habermas—that have ―biased Western
thinking for two generations‖ and instead recognize that ―after a half century of
increasing freedoms and standards of living [throughout] the world, it is time to see that
Hitler, Nazism, and Fascism were not the inevitable outcomes of science, technology, and
capitalism‖ (p. 74).
In the most direct manner possible, the problem of Nazism and the Holocaust are
identified by Moore as the primary challenges to Western science, technology, and
capitalism. If critical theorists can succeed in using the Holocaust as a wedge, the entire
Western edifice is threatened and therefore must be vigorously defended. To make his
argument, Moore, like Rivers, picked up only on the ―expediency‖ portion of the Katz
thesis and not the ―ethic‖ portion. And just as Rivers saw Nazism and the Holocaust as
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the crucial wedge issue that jeopardized his own worldview, so too did Moore. Their
critiques represent two poles of response to the disquieting notion that skilled technical
writers furthered genocide: Rivers sought to protect rhetoric, rhetoricians, and an
idealized view of beneficently rational democratic polity; Moore strove to protect
technical writing, technical writers, and an idealized view of beneficent progress through
Western technology, science, and capitalism. In both cases, the binary and oppositional
nature of their claims precluded the possibility of rhetorical boundary work and
ultimately excluded both scholars from an emerging disciplinary consensus.

Converging on a Comfortable Distance
The consensus which has emerged is, as we will see below, one that accepts the
―ethic of expediency‖ thesis in name but has spun it into a warning against amoral
technocracy, thereby suppressing Katz‘s (1992a, 1993; cf. Katz & Rhodes, 2010)
assertion that a culture can vest expediency with moral, ethical, and spiritual value. Since
our cultural methodology (Longo, 1998) calls on us to finally interrogate how orderings
have been imposed on a text and what this reveals about analysts‘ relationships to it, we
come now to those orderings of the Nazi gas van document imposed by analysts who
claim agreement with Katz. In line with the analysis presented in Chapter 6, it may be
said that the technical communication discipline is a rhetorical community whose many
and varied interests have constructed a metaphor (the banal Nazi technocrat against
whom all parties can identify themselves), generated a shared narrative (about amoral
technocracy) to serve as a field onto which their interests may converge, and produced an
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institutional genre (―ethic of expediency‖ as a heuristic designation) to pragmatically
structure social action.
That the many interests within the discipline have created a trading zone—a zone
where diverse interests cooperate to heuristically affirm the dangers of amoral
technocracy—demonstrates that boundary work has occurred. In the heinous Nazi gas
van document the discipline has found an object plastic enough to permit its varied
interests to map their own local needs onto the text, but robust enough to maintain a
common identity across these sites. The analysis below does not claim to provide an
exhaustive survey of every reference to ―the ethic of expediency‖ in the technical
communication literature. But I believe the analysis is nevertheless broadly representative
of the disciplinary discourse over the Katz thesis. And here the mechanics of rhetorical
boundary work can, I believe, be helpfully likened to Latour‘s (1987) description of
academic arguments in science and engineering—or ―technoscience,‖ as he put it. Latour
posited six principles (p. 259) for technoscientific argument, of which the first three are
key for our study: (1) ―Facts‖ are determined by later users and thus are ―a consequence,
not a cause, of a collective action.‖ (2) Claimants ―speak in the name of new allies that
they have shaped and enrolled‖ in order to marshal support and ―tip the balance of force
in their favor.‖ (3) Arguments hinge on ―a gamut of weaker and stronger associations‖ so
that understanding ―facts‖ amounts to understanding their advocates.
As such, arguments proceed as scholars buttress their claims by marshalling
impressive arrays of citations but, in so doing, construe the original citations in ways that
lend support to their own arguments. A modality is thereby imparted to the citation by
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which the original claim of a scientist or engineer is modified or qualified to suit and
build a new claim. In time, a ―fact‖ can become ―blackboxed‖ or allowed to operate
without being questioned; it is simply easier to accept the ―fact‖ than to reopen the box
and revisit the complexities of its construction. Only input and output matter; you put
something into the box and it then produces the expected result. So too can such
dynamics be seen in how ―The Ethic of Expediency‖ has been shaped and enrolled as an
ally in the claims of later users—until it has become a useful blackbox into which
technical communication scholars, who wish to make a point about amoral technocracy
or hyperpragmatism or technological determinism, need only cite the Nazi gas van
document and the desired output of ―factual‖ backing for their claims is the result. In a
sense, then, a boundary object can become a Latourian blackbox. And for such cases,
Latour‘s first two rules of method for following technoscientific argument are to confront
blackboxed facts and ―follow the controversies that reopen them,‖ and to investigate
claims ―not [by looking] for their intrinsic qualities but at all the transformations they
undergo later in the hands of others‖ (p. 258). That is what we will attempt now to do.
Brasseur (1993) first appropriated Katz to make an argument against ―the
objectivist paradigm.‖ Where Katz had analyzed the SS gas van document to make a
claim about Western deliberative rhetoric, Brasseur lent a new modality to ―Expediency‖
by citing it in support of her own claim that objectivist ―language practices can obscure
or hide the complexity of the social environment‖ (2004, p. 476). She initially illustrated
this point by citing a study (Paradis, 1991) of a power-tool users‘ manual that contributed
to injury and death because written instructions reflected the manufacturer‘s
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preoccupation with objective language and ignored the workplace situations in which the
tool was employed. Then, Brasseur asserted that Katz‘s analysis of a Nazi document
offered ―a similar critique‖ (p. 477), even though Katz had raised the issue of the writer‘s
rhetorical use of the Aristotelian topoi and demonstrated how the writer skillfully took
into account the ethos of his readers—a critique not at all ―similar‖ to that of a users
manual written without any regard for how it would be read. Brasseur held up the SS gas
van document as an exemplar of an ―objectivist paradigm‖ manifested in ―ideals of
clarity and conciseness‖ of language—and cited Katz in support of his thesis, even
though Katz (1992a) had remarked on ―the style of Just's memo, particularly the
euphemisms and metaphors used to denote, objectify, and conceal process and people . . .
as well as use of figures of speech . . .‖ (p. 257). And my own analysis, detailed in
Chapters 6 and 7, suggests how the language of the Just proposal served to (re)produce
the rhetorical community of the SS gas van bureau by deploying metaphor, narrative,
genre, and linguistic resources as means of negotiating their differences.
Thus, by imparting a new modality to Katz in support of her own claim, Brasseur
(1993) imposed a new ordering on the Nazi document by citing it as an example of
objectivity in language use. And by modifying Katz‘s critique to become ―similar‖ to her
own, Brasseur appropriated the gas van text to suit and build a new claim about ―the
problems inherent in an epistemology which positions technical communication as a
solely expedient venture without any explicitly stated ethical concerns‖ (p. 115)—even
though Katz (1992a) argued that in the Nazi document ―Here, expediency is an ethical
end as well‖ (p. 257).
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Brasseur‘s modal alteration of the ―expediency‖ thesis was then perpetuated by
Johnson-Eilola (1996) who continued to pair the Katz study with the same Paradis (1991)
study of a power-tool user‘s manual. In Johnson-Eilola‘s reading, the Paradis study
illustrated ―instructing users in functional but not conceptual aspects of technologies,‖ of
which the Nazi gas van document thus becomes ―a more extreme case‖ (p. 179) even
though the latter was an engineering proposal and not a set of instructions. Then JohnsonEilola shaped the Katz thesis yet again and enrolled it as an ally for a new argument by
claiming Nazi technical writing as an example of ―expediency and decontextualization‖
(p. 179, emphasis added). Thus, where Katz contended that the Just proposal shows the
―inherent dangers of the prevailing ethic of expediency as ideology‖ (p. 269, emphasis
added), Johnson-Eilola (1996) appropriated Katz to impose a different ordering by which
the SS writers emptied their rhetoric of context such that the gas van text became a
―technical communication [which] allowed Nazi administrators and engineers to sidestep
ethical issues‖ (p. 249). For Katz, the SS bureaucrats enacted ethical convictions
grounded in ideology; but the new claims of Brasseur and Johnson-Eilola seem to imply
the gas van administrators had no ethics or ideology. The Nazi document thereby
becomes an ―extreme case‖ of an attitude that emphasizes ―relatively mechanical writing
skills‖ (Johnson-Eilola, 1996, p. 178)—with Katz cited in support, despite the fact that
Katz began with a brief illustration of how the writer‘s skillful use of rhetoric was used to
argue for what he regarded as an ethical end.
Five years after its publication ―The Ethic of Expediency‖ appeared to have
achieved blackbox status. A survey of the literature on technical communication found
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the Katz article to be among the most-cited and a ―standard reference point‖ for the
discipline (Smith, 2000, p. 450). Yet the disciplinary consensus hewed to the claims of
Brasseur and Johnson-Eilola and the settled ―fact‖ that the Nazi gas van document was an
extreme example of expediency without any ethic. In a textbook published that year on
Foundations for Teaching Technical Communication, Ornatowski (1997) concluded his
chapter on rhetoric by mentioning in passing the by-then conventional wisdom that the
Nazi bureaucrats were the leading example of being ―indifferent‖ to the role of rhetoric in
technical, scientific, and commercial discourse—although, once again, Katz had argued
that the SS killers were surprisingly attuned to rhetorical nuances. But this is the way,
even in scientific and technical argumentation, that scholarship works and the rhetorical
community of academics evolves ―knowledge.‖ In the present case, consensus on the
ethical import of the Nazi gas van document was not grounded in any empirical analysis
of the text itself but, rather, through a communal phronesis in which the text functioned
as a boundary object to bridge the interstices of the technical communication discipline.
A strikingly creative shaping and enrolling of the Katz thesis occurred that same
year when Markel (1997) appropriated it for his argument against ―postmodernism and
postmodern ethics in particular‖ (p. 291). In support of his contention that postmodernism
―is particularly vulnerable to charges of relativism,‖ he averred that ―Perhaps the most
devastating critique of relativism in rhetoric and ethics is Stephen [sic] Katz‘s description
of what might be called the worst case scenario: the ethic of expediency demonstrated by
Nazi technical communicators‖ (p. 291; also repeated verbatim in Markel, 2001, p. 108).
This modality is strengthened in the following sentence, which urged readers to consult a
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recent book on literary theory ―for a detailed discussion of the problem of relativism in
postmodern thought‖ (p. 291). The implication here is that relativism, which Markel
defined as a state of having ―no coherent normative theory against which our ideas and
actions can be measured‖ (p. 290), is bad because it can lead in a worst-case scenario to
Nazi mass murder. In this way, a new ordering is imposed on the Just gas van proposal
by which the writer had ―no coherent normative theory against which [his] ideas and
actions can be measured.‖ Was Markel claiming that the SS killers were postmodernists?
As noted in Chapter 3, Herf (1986) has instead described the Nazis as ―reactionary
modernists‖ who saw high technology as an aesthetic expression of the people‘s spirit
and will to power. Further, and as this study has demonstrated, the Nazi perpetrators of
the Final Solution did operate from a coherent normative theory—namely the Nazi
Weltanschauung of racial and national renewal, the ―Nazi conscience‖ that Koonz (2003)
has described—against which they measured their ideas and actions. Katz (1992a, 1993),
too, argued that the Nazi technical writer acted ―prudently‖ according to his own and his
society‘s conception of virtue. Nevertheless, the modality imparted to the Katz thesis by
Markel reinforced the emerging disciplinary consensus that Nazi technical writers had no
ethical values.
In a striking demonstration of how boundary objects can potentially bridge even
highly divergent perspectives, Longo (2000) came to the same conclusion as Markel—
but from a markedly different direction. While Markel appropriated the Katz ―ethic of
expediency‖ thesis to argue against postmodernism, Longo appropriated it to argue for a
postmodern critical approach to technical communication research and pedagogy.
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One of the backgrounds for her claim is an earlier article in which Longo (1998)
dismissed the social constructionist approach to research—an approach that seeks to
understand how participants construct their organizations through communication—by
claiming this approach takes the organization as stable and normative and does not
interrogate its position within the wider societal discourse on knowledge and power. (In
this article Longo advocated the cultural research methodology that has guided the
present study. Her critique of the social constructionist approach is valid and one I have
taken into account by, as explained in Chapter 1, utilizing both interpretive and
postmodern perspectives on organizations rather than rejecting one for the other.
Ultimately, my debt to Longo is in adopting the meta-structure of her methodology—
researching a text‘s historical and cultural contexts, seeing the text as a discourse,
interrogating its analysts and their orderings of the text. But I differ from her by believing
that social constructionism has its uses and is not necessarily captive to the limitations
she cited.) In her book on the history of technical writing in the United States, Longo
(2000) again mounted a critique of social constructionist research. Against this approach
she held up Katz‘s article on the ethic of expediency as a paradigm of cultural research.
Where social constructionists ―do not adequately . . . deal with issues of difference and
change within organizations,‖ the Katz article ―illustrated the importance of difference
and change by exploring discourse practices within the community of Nazi Germany‖
through a ―study that analyzed culture in an inclusive sense‖ (p. 8). Thus, instead of being
a rhetorical analysis with a larger claim about Western deliberative rhetoric, the ―ethic of
expediency‖ thesis in Longo‘s modality is transformed: ―Katz clearly placed current

265

technical writing practices in contests for power and knowledge legitimation, a research
outcome that relies on a critical approach to the object of inquiry‖ (p. 9).
In contrast to Markel (1997) who appropriated Katz for his claim that Nazi
technical writers had ―no coherent normative theory against which [their] ideas and
actions [could] be measured‖ (p. 290), Longo (2000) interpreted the Katz study as
showing how ―Hitler‘s rhetoric . . . formed a coherent foundation for his programs and
propaganda‖ (p. 8). Then, to further appropriate ―The Ethic of Expediency‖ for her
argument in favor of cultural research and against social constructionism, Longo argued
at length on what Katz would have done if had he been a social constructionist. Thus, not
only the argument, but its author as well, was given a new modality. (And yet a reshaping
of Katz that still permitted Longo to participate in the discipline‘s boundary work over
the Nazi gas van document. By contrast, the explicit and personal nature of Moore‘s
[2004] attacks on Katz, to the point of ―questioning‖ his motives, placed Moore outside
the discussion.) In the end, however, the disciplinary consensus remained intact: the
Nazis, Longo asserted, erected a ―runaway technocracy‖ that was ―built single-mindedly
on scientific knowledge‖ (p. 9).
Also that year when Dombrowski (2000a) devoted an entire chapter in his
textbook on Ethics in Technical Communication to the problem of Nazi technical
communication, he returned to Brasseur‘s objectivist paradigm in stating that the ―Just
memorandum presents a real example of technical objectivity taken to an extreme‖ (p.
103). Although the chapter reproduces the majority of the Kogon (1993/1983, pp. 228230) translation of the gas van document, rather than the Lanzmann version,
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Donmbrowki himself reorders the text in several notable respects (at least from the
perspective of the present study, which argues the socio-cultural significance of such
details): the original notation ―Only Copy‖ and the document‘s filing code are omitted;
the salutation to Rauff is moved from the end of the document to the beginning; the
reference to the Kulmhof truck explosion is stricken; the paragraphs are renumbered
differently than the original; the proposals to reorient the vehicles‘ gas nozzles, eliminate
the observation windows, and add a winch-operated removable floor grid are deleted; and
the final two paragraphs that discuss the difficulties in implementing changes and suggest
a single prototype be built are likewise deleted. The net effect of this reordering is to omit
portions of the document that place it within a larger organizational conversation and, as
this study argued in Chapter 6, show how it drew on rhetorical resources (the ―safety‖
narrative, the ―transportation‖ metaphor) and linguistic resources (devaluation of thinking
and sensing, modified verbs) to function as a boundary object for negotiating competing
organizational interests in the Nazi regime. Indeed, although Dombrowski referenced the
Becker field inspection report he did not connect it with the Just document. In line with
the disciplinary consensus on putatively amoral Nazi technocrats, only those portions of
the document mattered which most directly described the killing.
Dombrowski thus imposed an ordering on the text that lent itself to considering
the gas van document only in isolation and not as a discourse within an actual rhetorical
community. Such a rendering also changed the modality of the Katz thesis such that
Dombrowski grafted it into his own claims about the technological imperative. In Katz‘s
(1992a) original article this line of reasoning is mentioned in passing only once, in a
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single sentence that referenced Ellul‘s theory—and that Katz qualified as a factor ―that
may partly explain what occurred‖ (p. 266, emphasis added). But in Dombrowski‘s
(2000a) reordering, the level of certainty regarding the operation of a technological
imperative, ―that what we can do, we should do‖ (p. 103, emphasis in original), is
increased and becomes the main point. The rhetorical quality of the document, which was
the focus of Katz‘s analysis, is lost. Thus, in an article Dombrowski (2000b) published
the same year, he surveyed the literature on technical communication ethics and
characterized the Katz article as a riff on technological determinism. The word ―rhetoric‖
does not appear in Dombrowski‘s two-paragraph review. Instead, the ―ethic of
expediency‖ thesis is modified so that its main thrust becomes ―the danger of having
technical excellence serve as the sole rationale for action‖ (p. 16). The disciplinary
consensus to ignore any Nazi ―ethic‖ and emphasize only the killers‘ ―expediency‖ is
reaffirmed, for the Nazi technical writers ―lack‖ any ethics, were ―profoundly amoral,‖
and acted with ―the technical perfection of a technology [as] the sole rationale‖ (p. 16).
Like Arendt‘s Eichmann, the gas van bureaucrats are not faulted for having wrong
ethics but for having no ethics. And just as Dombrowski echoed Brasseur‘s appropriation
of ―the ethic of expediency‖ to contest the objectivist paradigm, Monberg (2002)
imparted the same modality such that ―Steven Katz has forcefully revealed the
consequences of . . . a ‗pure‘ form of objectivity‖ (p. 216). Likewise, that same year a
book review by Ornatowski (2002) asserted, ―The foundation of this ethic [of
expediency] is the detachment of technological rationality.‖ Finally, to culminate a dozen
years of disciplinary discussion about the Katz thesis, the editors (Johnson-Eilola &
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Selber, 2004) of Central Works in Technical Communication declared that in ―Katz‘s
analysis of the rhetoric of Nazi memoranda during the Holocaust, he illustrates the
potential of an ideologically neutral model of technical communication‖ (p. 193). This
summation is breathtaking for, if the historical record of the Final Solution indicates
anything, the SS perpetrators were anything but ideologically neutral—and yet this
statement, the result from a dozen years of rhetorical boundary work, represents the
definitive disciplinary consensus on Nazi technical communication to date.

What the Orderings May Reveal
Our cultural research methodology (Longo, 1998) therefore calls the question:
What does this consensus, and the ordering of the Nazi text that is requires, reveal about
technical communicators‘ relationships to that text? One thing stands out: whatever a
scholar is against, the Nazis are powerfully cited as being for. In this way, the SS gas van
document is completely protean—or as Star and Griesemer‘s (1989) original conception
of boundary objects put it, is ―both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the
constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a
common identity across sites‖ (p. 393). Arguably, Katz‘s 1992 article may be said to
have attained the same qualities as a boundary object itself. Even the phrase ―ethic of
expediency‖ has become a theme in the profession‘s institutional narrative by which
members of the discipline can pragmatically structure social actions. Use of the phrase no
longer even requires explicit reference to the Nazi object or any summation of the Katz
thesis. For example, Dragga (2001) in his influential critique of technical illustration
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practices described a case that was ―insensitive and indifferent to the human condition‖
and succinctly concluded, ―It is a graphic that exhibits ‗the ethic of expediency‘‖ (p.
266). And in a recent volume honored with a National Council of Teachers of English
book award in technical and scientific communication, the editors‘ (Scott, Long & Wills,
2006) introduction states, ―In its more extreme forms, hyperpragmatism may be driven by
an ethic of expediency, to use Katz‘s term‖ (p. 9). No further explanation is needed. The
blackbox works smoothly as the authors input their thesis about hyperpragmatism
(―utilitarian efficiency . . . at the expense of . . . ethical action‖), the box does its work,
and the output is a ―fact‖ that supports their claim. The boundary objects of the Nazi
document, the Katz article, and the heuristic phrase have done their rhetorical boundary
work: scholars with diverse, even opposing perspectives, can simply use ―the ethic of
expediency‖ to support their claims.
In the case of Nazi technical writing, interpretations perhaps reveal as much
about the interpreter as about the interpreted. In my view, the disciplinary discourse may
reveal a need to distance ―us‖ from ―them‖ and the thought that ―they‖ might in some
respects be people like ―us.‖ This study has endeavored to demonstrate that even Nazi
desk-murderers inhabited rhetorical communities with dynamics found in many
organizations; that they shaped local versions of larger historical and cultural discourses
to satisfy the exigences and epistemes of their times; that through their local discourses
they engaged in sense-making by socially constructing coherent realities constitutive of
organizational culture and identity; and that they produced boundary objects to
temporarily negotiate their competing interests and fragmented interpretations in the face

270

of organizational change and ambiguity. From this perspective—from the ―ontological
shift‖ proposed at the outset of this study—comes the suggestion that, rather than be
satisfied in ascribing wrongdoing to an absence of ethical action, it may be profitable to
consider, as we will do in the concluding chapter, how communal boundary work can
make wrong ethical action seem right.
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CHAPTER 10
SOME ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

A Bias for Explanation
This study began by suggesting than an ontological shift—from a perspective
which views ―The Final Solution‖ in monolithic terms as a symbolically composite
crime, to a perspective that sees the genocidal program as a contingent event of a
polycratic, entropic, and punctuated nature—might open a door to new insights. Since
then we have explored how the gas van administrators of the Nazi SS manifested the
three dimensions of integration, by what they shared; differentiation, by the various
subcultures they inhabited; and fragmentation, by their need to forge temporary and
issue-specific consensus amidst organizational change, confusion, and ambiguity.
Through Longo‘s cultural research methodology we then charted the integrative elements
of the killers‘ shared historical context and national and institutional cultures, the
differentiating elements of their organizational culture, and fragmenting elements of their
individual biographies and motivations. The methodology led us next to interrogate how
the texts of the Sipo Technical Matters Group constituted a discourse that constructed a
rhetorical community, their documents functioning as boundary objects that drew upon
metaphor, narrative, genre, and language to bridge their competing interests and create a
temporary space for exchange. We then took the final steps called for by the
methodology in looking at the ways subsequent analysts have imposed orderings on the
Nazi gas van texts for the purposes of their respective studies—and discovered that the
Just document, the lengthiest of the corpus, has functioned as a boundary object among
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technical communication scholars, thereby revealing much about the discipline‘s
relationship to the text.
All of this, in laying bare the rhetorical boundary work performed by the Nazi
documents, is well and good. We have learned, from a supreme worst case, about
dynamics of organizational discourse. But beyond that, what difference can our
understanding of these dynamics make? How might we apply this understanding of
organizational discourses to our own organizational lives?
To explore the ethical implications of this study for organizational and technical
communicators, let me begin with two observations. First of all, as the second and third
generations after the Holocaust we did not experience the genocide directly but have
encountered it only through mediation. What, then, is the effect of that mediation on the
lessons we draw? Is our impulse for monolithic and universalized lessons driven, at least
in part, by what mediates how we view the Holocaust? For most of us, our mediation is
the histories we read, histories prepared by historians who, as a discipline, aspire to
―scientific‖ inquiry and the discovery of generalizable laws. As Megill (1989) noted,
historians evince a strong ―bias for explanation,‖ or penchant for reasoning from effect to
cause, which ―is to be found in the theoretical and methodological handbooks‖ of
historiography (p. 629). He described a ―relative unanimity in [this] preoccupation‖ since
historians ―remain deeply influenced‖ by a philosophy of science ―overwhelmingly
concerned with ‗explanation,‘ which [is] viewed as answering the ‗why‘ question‖ (p.
628 n4). White (1999) similarly observed among historians the assumption that true
historiography must be capable of ―extract[ion] from its linguistic form, served up in a
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condensed paraphrase purged of all figurative and tropological elements, and subjected to
tests of logical consistency as an argument and of predictive adequacy as a body of fact‖
(p. 5). This explanatory bias is manifested in a yearning for universality and ―the idea that
a field is scientific only if it produces general laws‖ (Megill, 1989, p. 633).
Are we, the generation that has only encountered the Holocaust through such
mediation, ourselves therefore biased toward generalizable answers? In my view, our
own bias for explanation carries over into discussions of technical communication ethics
through a tendency to view them, as Porter (1993) suggested, ―as an infrequent moral
problem that may arise . . . as [in] a matter of the occasional whistle-blowing decision‖
(p. 132) so that scholars ―treat ethics as a matter of individual decision making . . .
separate from and prior to composing‖ (p. 130). This leads to an emphasis is on
generalizable ethical systems that prescribe the actions of individuals—rather than seeing
composition as social action that is by nature processual, so that ethical intuition is
inextricably bound up in the action and ethical decision-making is shaped by the
structural contexts in which it is grounded. Thus, if technical communicators perceive in
the monolithic enormity of ―the Holocaust‖ a call for generalizable lessons, the ―ethic of
expediency‖ (Katz, 1992a) may be more tractable for the discipline as a universalized
warning against amoral technocracy rather than an invitation—which Katz extended
more explicitly in an infrequently cited sequel article (1993)—to interrogate the vagaries
of how notions of prudence and virtue, including our own, are socially constructed.
But are these two perspectives—ethics as a prescription of individual action and
ethics as a description of structural contexts—mutually exclusive? I believe not and will
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suggest below how they might be productively blended. Ethics and action are linked, not
separable; for even as ethical decisions are outcomes of social action, ethical intuitions
(Faber, 1999) simultaneously form an important ground for social action. The personnel
of the Sipo Technical Matters Group acted not without any ethic but, rather, engaged in
ethical action of the profoundest moment. When assigned to create and administer a
program for gassing human beings, they each decided to accept their tasks in accordance
with their ethical lights. But as we have seen, it was not simply a matter for each member
of the rhetorical community to articulate a clear-cut ethical philosophy and on that basis
decide, at a given moment in time, that henceforth he would accept the ethical primacy of
the ―occupational safety‖ narrative—and of the ―war‖ and ―transportation‖ metaphors
and the organizational genre of ―special‖ missions and tasks—over the ethical claims of
their society‘s conventional morality. Perhaps Lanzmann is helpful here when, as we
noted earlier, he declared, ―[T]here is a gap between all the fields of explanation and the
actual killing. You cannot give birth—in French we say engendre—you cannot generate
such an evil‖ (quoted in Rosenbaum, 1998, p. 260, emphasis in original). The deskmurderers did not ―give birth‖ to their murderous campaign by one day explaining it to
themselves and deciding from that moment to proceed. Instead, their ethical intuitions
gave salience to the organizational texts they produced as boundary objects, whereby
they negotiated their differences and, for about six months, created and sustained a
consensus to act.
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Prescriptive and Descriptive Ethics
Disciplinary discussions of professional ethics in technical communication have
cited the example of Nazi technical writing as, on the one hand, a prime violation of
Kant‘s categorical imperative (Dombrowski, 2000a, pp. 53, 113), and on the other as a
―devastating‖ challenge to ―relativism in rhetoric and ethics‖ (Markel, 1997, p. 291;
2001, p. 108). But even though none would doubt that Nazi desk-murderers failed Kant‘s
(1785/2002) maxim to ―act so that you use humanity . . . always at the same time as end
and never merely as means‖ (pp. 46-47), can we say that the ethical lessons of their
atrocities can be framed only in Kantian terms? Are ethical judgments from a
―nonfoundational‖ perspective disqualified because, as Markel contended, Nazi technical
writing is relativism‘s own worst-case scenario?
Foucault‘s (1984) approach to ethics—or at least his observation that individuals
become defined by naturalized institutional authorities—is an important perspective for
grasping why the men of the Sipo Technical Matters Group did what they did. As Dragga
(1997) discovered, most communicators make ethical choices through intuition, feelings,
or conscience (pp. 166-168). And Faber (1999), who built on Dragga‘s work to propose a
theory of ―intuitive ethics,‖ noted that intuitions are ―a composite of cultural lessons‖
whose values and ideologies are routinized ―until their adoption simply becomes
common place‖ (p. 193). Likewise, as we have seen, the SS gas van murderers intuitively
shared common historical and cultural contexts—a history of religious, economic and
racial anti-Semitism, a culture steeped in völkisch values of national community and the
leadership principle—which permitted them to produce texts with metaphors, narratives,
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and genres that resonated across otherwise diverse organizational interests. By generating
boundary objects to bridge competing subcultures, their documents and discourses
created islands of temporary stability—zones to intuitively marshal routinized and
ethicized values and ideologies for issue-specific consensuses—amid the constant flux of
organizational change, confusion, and ambiguity. (A parallel to this concept is suggested
by Katz and Rhodes [2010] in their recent discussion of ―ethical frames.‖) Yet, in
contrast to this picture of individuals making decisions from a constellation of cultural
and institutional biases, much of the literature on technical communication ethics focuses
on single moments of decision—such as ―the‖ decision to launch the Challenger space
shuttle or ―the‖ decision to knowingly publish a misleading user manual.
Most of the current literature on technical communication ethics generally places
the two perspectives—ethics as a prescription of individual action and ethics as a
description of structural contexts—in binary opposition. Markel (1993, 1997) has argued
strenuously for modern ―foundational‖ approaches to ethics and against postmodern
―nonfoundational‖ approaches, offering technical communicators an either/or choice. On
the other hand, Dombrowski (1995) disdains the ―technologizing‖ of ethics. Faber‘s
(1999) theory of intuitive ethics draws from Bourdieu, Fairclough, and Foucault. And
Sullivan and Martin (2001) have suggested that communicators develop a narrative
approach to ethics by making a habit of telling the ―universal audience‖ (a concept
borrowed from Perelman [1969]) a story of how their actions in a given situation affirm
life. Yet I contend that reconciliation between modern and postmodern ethical approaches
may be found in the concept, described below, of ―prescriptive‖ and ―descriptive‖ ethics
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as being complementary approaches for guiding ethical action. And by recognizing that
ethics are both an outcome and a ground for the social action of rhetoric, we can move
beyond a perhaps somewhat simplistic and ahistorical explanation of Nazi technical
writing as amoral technocracy, and begin a discussion which can lead us toward a deeper
understanding of the social field on which our technical and organizational
communications play out.
This study has argued that organizations are comprised of multiple voices and
competing interests, that the boundaries between these interests must be bridged (at least
temporarily on an issue-specific basis) for consensual action to occur and that, when
prompted by an integrative exigence, organizations can generate discursive objects (such
as texts and documents) that are plastic enough for adaptation to each interest‘s needs and
yet robust enough to bridge their identities and thereby create a temporary trading zone
for consensus. Since these social actions generates zones across boundaries in order to
enable further social actions—and since ethical intuitions are an important ground for
giving boundary objects the salience needed to do rhetorical boundary work—then it is
useful to conceive of ethics, as well as actions, playing out across these zones. For this
reason I find it useful to draw from Sturges‘s (1992) concept of an Ethical Dilemma
Domain and his notion that ethical questions should be conceived not as single points of
decision but as positioned within a proverbial gray area. This view is markedly similar to
Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall‘s (1965) social judgment theory, which proposes that a
belief or opinion held by a person should be conceived not as a point along a line but as a
band or ―latitude of acceptance.‖ By seeing the Nazi technical writers as individuals who
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could tolerate ethical choices within certain thresholds, we change the basic question
about their documents. Those who see an opinion as a point on a line will ask, ―Why did
they make ‗the‘ decision to facilitate genocide?‖ But when we see opinion as a band, then
our focus shifts and we ask, ―What cultural and institutional factors shifted the writers‘
latitudes of acceptance so that genocide fell within their tolerable ethical thresholds?‖
With that new question, our analysis moves away from categorical Kantian ethics to the
realm of rhetorical communities that govern persuasion and influence.
We could ask, then, as Dragga (1996, 1997) and Faber (1999) might do, how
racial anti-Semitism may have been routinized to become the intuition that guided the
ethical decisions of the desk-murderers. In an organization as massive as the Nazi
bureaucracy, such routinization could have been driven by a plethora of reasons:
careerism, deference to authority, true belief, and more. But like the practitioners in
Dragga‘s study, at the level of individual ethical decision-making they acted on culturally
informed intuition. How, then, can we break through the naturalized intuitions of our own
organizational settings and strive toward ethical conduct?
On the one hand, Markel (1997) has taken ―nonfoundational‖ (and especially
postmodern) ethics to task for not providing technical communicators with actionable
guides to behavior (p. 290). On the other hand, because ―foundational‖ ethics are
categorical, then by their nature, systems such as Kant‘s (1785/2002) are prescriptive
rather than descriptive. In general terms, foundational ethics may tell us what to do but
they don‘t explain anything, whereas nonfoundational ethics may explain things but they
don‘t tell us what to do.
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Sturges‘ (1992) posited that ethical dilemmas are functions of significance and
magnitude. Whether or not you should take a pencil from work, for example, does not
present a dilemma because the significance and magnitude of the action are so obviously
trivial. And whether or not you should kill someone in a premeditated act does not (for
most people) present a dilemma because the significance and magnitude are obviously so
high. But whether or not you should kill someone in self-defense may pose a dilemma
because even though the magnitude of the act is high, the significance—at least legally
and morally—is less. Thus, in between the clearly trivial and the clearly unethical is a
gray band in which ethical questions present dilemmas. Similarly, Sherif‘s (1965) social
judgment theory holds,

An attitude is not adequately represented by a single point on a continuum . . .
[but rather] the ranges or latitudes of rejection, acceptance, and noncommitment
are also crucial . . . [so that] the latitude of rejection increases with the extremity
of the respondent‘s most accepted position and with his involvement in the issue
. . . Assimilation and acceptance occur when the communication falls within or
near the range of accepted positions, but when the communication falls far
beyond this range, contrast and rejection result. (Saltzstein, 1966, pp. 162-163)

How are individuals‘ ethical thresholds or latitudes constructed? Here Foucault‘s (1984)
project of describing the regularization of institutionalized authorities comes into play:
―Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with
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universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to
constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing,
thinking, saying‖ (pp. 45-46). I contend that in such an investigation the rhetorical
boundary work that occurs in institutions and organizations is a productive object for
inquiry, for it is by and through this work that we constitute ourselves as subjects for
collective action.
Foundational approaches to ethics are advantageous because they suggest possible
courses of action when organizational and technical communicators are confronted with
ethical dilemmas. But why do issues become ethical dilemmas in the first place? How do
individuals determine significance and magnitude so that particular questions fall
between what they deem clearly trivial and clearly unethical? And what is the influence
of cultures and institutions upon those individuals as they place ethical questions within
their personal latitudes of acceptance, rejection, or noncommittal? Nonfoundational
approaches can illuminate such ethical questions—even the question of Nazi technical
communication that, at first glance, seems so obviously amenable to a Kantian
framework. As Sullivan and Martin (2001) pointed out, ―There are times when we will
find ourselves in an ethical dilemma in which moral laws are in conflict,‖ and ―the
weakness with [the Kantian] position is that it provides no course of action when there
seems to be no morally right or correct choice‖ (p. 264). Although the practicing
professionals whom Dragga (1997) interviewed at length may refer to ―the narratives of
cases and scenarios‖ that they heard in their professional training, they ―come to the job
with a sense of ethics developed chiefly through the influence of their mothers and
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fathers.‖ Then at work, they ―look to colleagues and supervisors as sources of continuing
moral guidance‖ and ultimately ―make their moral choices according to feelings and
conscience‖ (p. 173). Or as we have seen in this study, they generate boundary objects
whose communally validated metaphors, narratives, genres, and linguistic forms resonate
across the organization‘s individual interests and thereby (re)produce the rhetorical
community.
How are feelings and conscience formed? The literature suggests a number of
answers to that question. Faber (1999) has extended Dragga‘s insight—and connected it
to Foucault‘s (1984) ethical approach—by citing key social theorists who have
―documented processes whereby agents unconsciously make ideological, political, and
value-based judgments . . . [and perpetuate] certain values, ideologies, and political
objectives [that] are unknowingly disseminated and reproduced through specific
functions of everyday life‖ (p. 191). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have shown how
figurative language reifies cultural beliefs. Bordieu (1980/1990) coined the term habitus
to describe the ―systems of durable, transposable dispositions‖ (p. 53) by which societies
structurally inculcate their ideologies. Giddens (1984) cited ―the habitual taken-forgranted character of the vast bulk of activities of day-to-day life‖ (p. 376), a process of
routinization by which societies ―structurate‖ common rules for morality, power, and
communication. Fairclough (1992) noted how a society‘s very discourse naturalizes
certain values as language itself becomes invested with favored ideological assumptions.
Now this study—which, as we reviewed in Chapter 3, understands organizations ―as
shaping local versions of broader societal [discourses so that] . . . organizational cultures
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are then best understood not as unitary wholes or as stable sets of subcultures but as
mixtures of cultural manifestations of different levels and kinds‖ (Alvession, 2002, pp.
190-191)—brings these societal processes to the organizational level and suggests how
organizational actors unconsciously engage in rhetorical boundary work to disseminate
and reproduce their own local manifestations of broader discourses.
Thus the gas van bureaucrats undoubtedly acted, on a personal level, for a variety
of everyday reasons. But on a deeper level, their decision to place genocide within their
ethically tolerable latitudes of acceptance must be analyzed in terms of their cultural
cognition, habitus, routinization, naturalization, vested language, and regularized
institutional authority. Such an analysis does not excuse the SS perpetrators as being
merely culturally determined products of their society or institution. But a full
understanding of their actions is impossible without such analyses. Even Foucault (1984),
a postmodernist who rejected a foundational approach to ethics, believed that individuals
could cultivate the power to denaturalize and subvert institutionalized influences by
asking these four types of questions:

1. Ethical substance: Which part of my self or my behavior is influenced or
concerned with moral conduct? What do I do because I want to be ethical?
2. Mode of subjection: How am I being told to act morally? Who is asking? To
whose values am I being subjected?
3. Ethical work: How must I change my self or my actions in order to become
ethical in this situation?
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4. Ethical goal: Do I agree with this definition of morality? Do I consent to
becoming this character in this situation? To what am I aspiring to when I behave
ethically? (Foucault, 1984, pp. 352-355, adapted in Faber, 1999, p. 195; Moore,
1987, pp. 82-83)

Is Nazi technical communication a ―devastating‖ challenge to postmodern ―relativism,‖
as Markel (1997) contended? I believe not. If we take up the Foucauldian project of
analyzing ―the kind of collective that is implied by the history of an institution‘s
beginnings and the regularization of its practices, for it is in the context of the collective‘s
identity that individual decisions are made‖ (Moore, 1987, p. 89), then we can find useful
insights into the Nazi killers‘ ethical decision making. And if we conceive that our
inquiry is concerned not simply with ―the‖ single moment of decision but with the
individual, organizational, and cultural dynamics—including the rhetorical boundary
work—by which human actors shift the latitudes of what they are willing to accept or
reject, then we open ourselves to a descriptive approach to ethics rather than taking only a
prescriptive approach.
Thus, I make a twofold proposal for a synthesis of foundational and
nonfoundational approaches to ethics. First, both foundational approaches (which focus
on prescription) and nonfoundational approaches (which focus on description) are needed
for full understanding. Second, although foundational approaches can help organizational
and technical communicators set stable and appropriate thresholds for what is clearly
trivial and what is clearly unethical, when questions arise in the latitude between those
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thresholds and thereby become true ethical dilemmas, then surely a nonfoundational
approach—such Foucault‘s (1984) four areas of questioning—can be a useful supplement
to foundational approaches.
Each of us is, in our own organizational life, engaged in a daily process of sensemaking and of negotiating that life in the face of constant organizational ambiguity and
change. In that ongoing progress, the boundary objects we encounter and which we
communally generate are many—from the kinds of documents described in this study, to
the diverse arrays of objects described by Star and Griesemer (1989) and by Wilson and
Herndl (2007). All three studies, though in highly different contexts, indicate that such
boundary objects are intrinsic to organizing—indeed, the organizations under study could
not cooperate effectively without these objects, for they bridged competing interests
while permitting a common identity. But because organizational conditions are in
constant flux, these spaces of consensus are inherently temporary and require constant
maintenance and renegotiation. Star and Griesemer and then Wilson and Herndl have
shown how boundary objects can be benign, while the present study demonstrates by the
example of Nazi genocide how these objects can produce effects of even unprecedented
evil. Somewhere between these poles of salutary cooperation and extreme malignity will
lay the boundary objects that we encounter each day. Foundational or prescriptive ethical
systems can provide beneficial and actionable guides for our responses. But without a
framework for describing and denaturalizing the rhetorical boundary work in technical
and organizational communication, we may be unable to take ethical action as our own
boundary objects continue to both legitimate and hide themselves from our view.
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